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THE EDUCATIONAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION:
THE NEED FOR A RATIONAL APPROACH
MARCUS SCHOENFELD t

I. INTRODUCTION

NO

PROVISION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE:..CODE
(Code) 1 deals specifically with the deductibility of. expenditures made by a taxpayer for education. 2 Various court decisions,
rulings, and a specific Treasury Regulation3 have,- however,* permitted a deduction for certain types of educational expenditures
which can qualify as "ordinary and necessary" "expenses" of "carry4
ing on" a "trade or business" under section 162(a) of the Code.
t Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. A.B., 1954, J.D.,
1957, Harvard University. LL.M., New York University, 1962.
1. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9042 (1976).
2. Section 117 of the Code provides an exclusion from gross income for
certain scholarships and fellowships. See I.R.C. § 117 (1980). Although § 117
grants an exclusion rather than a deduction, to the extent that an otherwise
deductible expenditure arises in connection with an excludable fellowship, it
is arguable whether the deduction should be disallowed under § 265(l) of the
Code. See id. § 265(1) (1981). In addition, § 127 was added to the Code in
1978 to permit an exclusion for certain employees who benefit from certain
educational assistance programs. See The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-600, § 164(a), 92 Stat. 2811 (codified at I.R.C. § 127). 'For a discussion of
§ 127, see notes 652-72 and accompanying text infra.
3. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 36-40.
4. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1981). Section 162(a) provides in relevant part:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business, including(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals
and lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant
under the circumstances) while away from home in pursuit of a
.trade or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to. the continued use or possession, for -purposes of the
trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken
or is not taking title or in which he has no equity
Id. Each of the phrases quoted in the text presents a separate test which must
be satisfied before an expenditure can be deducted under'§ 162(a). Id.
(237)

.
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Although a full discussion of section 162(a) is beyond the scope of
this article, each of the phrases quoted above will be discussed
briefly to illustrate how each type of educational expenditure fits
into the pattern of section 162(a).5
A. The Pattern of Section 162
The phrase "ordinary and necessary" in section 162(a) has been
construed liberally.0 In the context of section 162(a), one meaning
of "ordinary" is "common and accepted," 7 but an expense may be
"ordinary" even if it occurs "once in a lifetime." 8 The determina5. This article is limited to a discussion of those situations in which a tax
allowance arguably should be given because the expenditure bears a relationship to some business or profitmaking activity of the taxpayer. None of the
proposals which are designed primarily to give a subsidy to tuition-paying
students, their parents, or educational institutions will be discussed. For an
exhaustive discussion of the theoretical bases for any type of tax allowance
for educational expenditures, see McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Credit
Legislation: Federal Income Tax Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1973). This article deals only with those allowances which, in the theoretical scheme of Professor McNulty's article, "perfect
the definition of income." See id.at 16-36.
6. Legislative history on the meaning of the phrase "ordinary and necessary" is sparse. The phrase initially appeared in the Revenue Act of 1913,
the first piece of legislation enacted under the sixteenth amendment. See
The Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16 § II G(b), 38 Stat. 172. Section II G(b) of
that Act allowed a corporation a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses [in the] operation of its business." Id. Under § II B of the
1913 Act, non-corporate taxpayers were allowed only "the necessary expenses
. . in carrying on any business." Id. § II B. The committee reports expressed no interpretation of these phrases. See generally H.R. REP. No. 5,
63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913). The present statutory pattern, allowing the "ordinary and necessary" expenses of carrying on a business, appeared in 1919.
See The Revenue Act of 1919, Pub. L. No. 254, 40 Stat. 1066 Again the
committee reports are silent, although the rephrasing was not intended to
produce a substantive change. See generally H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1918).
7. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
8. Id. at 114. As Justice Cardozo stated:
We may assume that the payments to creditors of the Welch Company were necessary for the development of the petitioner's business,
at least in the sense that they were appropriate and helpful .... He
certainly thought they were, and we should be slow to override his
judgment. But the problem is not solved when the payments are
characterized as necessary. Many necessary payments are charges upon
capital. There is need to determine whether they are both necessary
and ordinary. Now, what is ordinary, though there must always be
a strain of constancy within it, is none the less a variable affected by
time and place and circumstance. Ordinary in this context does not
mean that the payments must be habitual or normal in the sense
that the same taxpayer will have to make them often. A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen, once in a lifetime. The
counsel fees -may be so heavy that repetition is unlikely. .None the
less, the expense is an ordinary one because we know from experience that payments for such a purpose, whether the amount is large
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tion of what constitutes "ordinary" is a question of fact; although
an 'expense may be unusual for a particular taxpayer,, it- -may be
"ordinary" if it is not unusual in the given business context.9 In
addition to this general equation of "ordinary" with the not unusual, the term "ordinary" has been interpreted as a tool to help
differentiate between expenses, which are "ordinary," and capital
expenditures, which are not "ordinary." 10 "Ordinary" shares :this
function with the "expenses" test of section 162(a) and with'section
263.11
In the context'of section 162(a), the term "necessary" has:been
construed to mean "appropriate and helpful," 12 rather than "required." Is In general, the "necessary" test can be -viewed as a
requirement of reasonableness and good faith.' 4 Consequently, to
the extent that an expenditure is unreasonable in amount 0r: made
.
or small, are the common and accepted means of defense. against at
tack .... The situation is unique in the life 6f the individual af-.
fected, but not in the life of the group, the community, of which
he is a part. At such times there are norms of conduct that help to
stabilize our judgment, and make it certain and objective. The instance is not erratic, but is brought within a known type.
Id. at 113-14 (citations omitted).
9. See'Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1939). The di Pont Court
noted:
Ordinary has the connotation of normal, usual, or customary. To be
sure, an expense may be ordinary though it happen but once-in. the
taxpayer's lifetime. . . .Yet the transaction which gives rise to it
must be of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business
involved. . . . Hence, the fact that a particular expense would be
an ordinary or common one in the course of one business and so
deductible under [§ 162(a)] does not. necessarily make. it. such in
connection with another business...., [W. hat is. ordinary, though
there must always be a strain of constancy within it, is none the less
a variable affected by time and place and. circumstance." One of the
extremely relevant circumstances is the nature. and scope of the particular business out of which the expense in question accrued. The
fact that an obligation to pay has arisen is not sufficient. It is the
kind of transaction out of which the obligation arose and its .normalcy
in the particular business which are crucial and controlling.
Review of the many decided cases is of little aid since each turns
.
on its special facts.
Id. at 495-96 (citations omitted).
10. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966), citing Welch
v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
11. See I.R.C. §263 (1981).
12. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).'13. Id. The word "necessary," however, was often construed to mean "required" if the expense claimed was' an educational expense... See notes 56-64
and accompanying text infra.
14. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943).
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in bad faith,. itis -not "necessary." 15 While the word "necessary"
wIould. thus seem to. disallow any payments made. in the absence of
a. -legal obligation,1 0 a deduction will be allowed if the payment is
based on a -moral obligation or is otherwise appropriate and
helpful.' 7
The "expense", test of section 162(a) serves to differentiate current expenditures from capital expenditures.' 8 In this task it is
aided by the "ordinary" test 19 and by section 263(a) of the Code,
which disallows any deduction for "permanent improvements" and
like expenditures. 0 While an analysis of the problems involved in
15. See, Commissioner v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 176 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 (1950).

.16. See, e.g., Friedman v. Delaney, 171 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 986 (1949) (attorney's payment on behalf of bankrupt client);
Alsobrook v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Ark. 1977) (majority
shareholder's payment to bank to alleviate capital impairment and prevent
dosing).
17. Waring Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 921 (1957). See also
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). The payments involved in Welch
were voluntary in the sense that the taxpayer was under no obligation to
pay. See id. at 112-13. Although the United States Supreme Court disallowed
the deduction because the payments were not "ordinary," the Court assumed
the.payments to be "necessary." See id. at 113-14. See also note 8 supra.
18. See I S. SuRREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME- TAkATION 349 (1972).
19. See notes 6-11 and accompanying text supra.
20. I.R.C. §263(a) (1981). Section 268(a)'provides in part:
No deduction shall be allowed for(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements 'or betterments made to increase the value- of any
property. or estate. This paragraph shall not. apply to(A) expenditures for the development of mines or deposits
deductible under section 616,
(B) research and experimental expenditures deductible under
section 174,
(C) soil and water conservation expenditures deductible under section 175,
(D) expenditures by farmers for fertilizeri; etc., deductible un-. ,der section 180,
(E) expenditures by farmers for clearing land deductible under section 182,
(F) expenditures for removal of architectural and transportation 'barriers to' the handicapped and elderly which the: taxpayer elects to deduct under section 190,
(G) expenditures for tertiary injectants with respect to which a
deduction is allowed under section 193, or
(H) expenditures for which a deduction is allowed under section 179.
. (2) Any iam-unt expended in restoring -property 'or in making
good' the exhaustion 'thereof for which an allowance is or has

be en m ad e.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss2/1

. I . : . ... . .

4

Schoenfeld: The Educational Expense Deduction: The Need for a Rational Approa
1981-82]

THE EDUCATIONAL

EXPENSE DEDUCTION

distinguishing current expenditures from capital expenditures is
beyond the scope of this article, 21 certain aspects of this differentiation are vital to an understanding of the problem of educational
22
deductions and will be discussed at a later point in'this article.
The "carrying on" test imposes two requirements upon the
taxpayer. First, the taxpayer must actually be carrying on a trade or
business at the time that the expense is paid or incurred; expenses
which have been paid or incurred before the taxpayer has entered
the trade or business are disallowed.2 3 Thus, the so-called "business
investigation" expenses of one seeking to enter a trade or business
are disallowed because that person has not yet arrived at the stage
of "carrying on" that trade or business. 24 Similarly, expenses which
have been paid or incurred after the specific trade or business has
been decided on, but before it has actually begun, are not allowed
because no business was being carried on by the taxpayer at the
time that the expense was paid or incurred.25 When a taxpayer is
admittedly in a trade or business and takes a temporary leave of
absence, the "carrying on" of that trade or business does not cease; 26
however, according to the Internal Revenue Service (the IRS or
Service) more than a one year leave usually ends the "carrying on"
27
period until an actual resumption of activity occurs.
The second aspect of the "carrying on" test requires that the
particular expense be "directly connected with or pertaining to the
taxpayer's trade or business." 28 This requirement precludes personal or nonbusiness expenses from coming within the ambit of
section 162(a).2 9
21. For a discussion of the problems inherent in distinguishing between
current and capital expenditures, see Gunn, The Requirement that a Capital
Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv.
443 (1974). For a discussion of Professor Gunn's treatment of educational expenditures, see id. at 472-81.

22. See notes 65-77 and accompanying text infra.
23. Frank v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 511 (1953).
24. Id.
25. United States Asiatic Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1373 (1958).
26. Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968).
27. Rev. Rul. 68-591, 1968-2 C.B. 73.
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a), T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51.
29. See I.R.C. § 262. Section 262 disallows a deduction for personal expenses. Id. But cf. id. § 212 (deduction for certain "non-business" expenses
allowed). Section 212 provides:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction
all, the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year-
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Although the "trade or business" test appears in sections of the
Code other than section 162,80 neither the Code nor the regulations
define the phrase. Justice Frankfurter, however, attempted the
following definition:
To avail of the deductions allowed by [section 162(a)], it
is not enough to incur expenses in the active concern over
one's own financial interest.

".

.

. carrying on any trade

or business," within the contemplation of [section 162(a)]
involves holding one's self out to others as engaged in the
selling of goods or services. This the taxpayer did not do.
Expenses for transactionsnot connected with trade or business, such as an expense for handling personal investments,
are not deductible.81
The final phrase of this quote was amplified in Higgins v. Commissioner 32 in which the United States Supreme Court held that mere
investment activities, no matter how extensive, are too passive to
be treated as a "trade or business." " The seeking of a profit is
absolutely essential; 84 hobbies and other pursuits for pleasure are
not within the meaning of the phrase "trade or business." 5 A
profit need not be made, however, since a bona fide belief that the
activity will lead to a profit will suffice.8 6
(1) for. the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of

property held for the production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.
Id.
30. See, e.g., id. §§ 165(a) (1976), 166 (1976), 167(a) (1981), 346(b), 355(b)
(1980).
31. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., concuring) (emphasis added). This definition was accepted by the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit without discussion in Helvering v. Wilmington
Trust Co., 124 F.2d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 164 (1942).
32. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
33. Id. at 218.
34. See I.R.C. § 183(a) (1976). Section 183 relates to activities which have
usually generated losses for a taxpayer, disallowing deductions for amounts
in excess of the income generated by those activities. Id. § 183(b) (1976).
Moreover, § 280A disallows a deduction for the use of a taxpayer's personal
residence in his trade or business unless one or more of its narrow exceptions
apply. Id. § 280A (1978).
35. See Porter v. Commissioner, 437 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1970). In Porter, the
circuit court found that the taxpayer's lack of a bona fide expectation of making a profit as a professional artist precluded him, a retired lawyer, from being
considered as in the trade or business of an artist even though he had devoted
most of his time over many years to painting. Id. at 40.
36. See, e.g., Doggett v. Burnet, 65 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Hill v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 75-2 U.S. Tax. Cas.
9632 (10th Cir. 1973).
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B. Education as a Part of Business Activity.
Before one attempts to fit an educational expenditure within
each of the five tests of section 162(a), it is important to. note that
three different types of expenditures may be termed "educational
expenses." First, there are what may be called "direct" educational
expenditures--payments made in connection with a formal course
of study ranging from a four or more year degree program to a short
refresher or continuing professional education course at an educational institution. These direct costs include tuition as well as the
incidental costs of attending the program such as books, room, board,
and transportation. Second, there are what may be denominated
"indirect" educational expenditures, primarily involving "travel as
education" 37 or research activities which fit within the concept of
educational expenses. These expenditures, however, are usually
incurred only within the academic community. Third, there are
the expenses of activities which have only an "incidental" educational effect, such as attendance at meetings or conventions of professional societies or trade associations, in which education is
typically only a part of the general business activities."8
The tax treatment of education as a part of business activity in
all of these contexts has gone through four phases.

First, prior to

1950, virtually no "direct" educational expenses were deductible,
but "indirect" or "incidental" expenditures often were allowed.8 9
In the second phase, from 1950 to 1958, a few leading cases and
rulings allowed deductions for some "direct" educational expenditures.40 In 1958, the Treasury Department issued regulations defining which educational expenditures qualified as deductions under
section 162(a). 41 The 1958 regulations, which marked the beginning
42
of the third phase of the tax treatment of educational expenditures,
4
8
Finally,
broadened the scope of deductible educational expenses.
which:
are
currently
in 1967 the Treasury issued new regulations
37. For a discussion of travel as education, see notes 253-57 and accompanying text infra.
38. See Postlewaite, Deductibility of Expenses for Conventions and Educational Seminars, 61 MINN. L. REV. 253 (1977).
39. See notes 49-86 and accompanying text infra.
40. See notes 87-143 and accompanying text infra.
41. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6291, 1,958-1 C.B. 67.

42. See notes 144-68 and accompanying text infra.
43. For a thoroughstudy of the law in this area as it developed up through
the 1958 regulations and the first interpretations thereof, see Shaw, Education
as an Ordinary and Necessary Expense in Carrying On a Trade or Business,
19 TAx L. REV. 1 (1963).
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in force. 44 Although in many respects the new regulations broaden
the scope of deductibility of educational expenditures, in some
45
respects they are more restrictive than the prior regulations.
The pre-1967 rules will be discussed, primarily to demonstrate
how the present rules have developed.4 6 The present rules will
then be analyzed 47 and remedies will be proposed for the deficiencies
in the current tax treatment of educational expenditures illustrated
48
by this analysis.
II.

AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE TAX TREATrMENT
OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES

A. Pre-1950 Law
The first official statements concerning educational expenditures were issued administratively in 1921 and are brief enough to
be quoted in their entirety. Office Decision (O.D.) 892 simply
stated: "The expenses incurred by school teachers in attending
summer school are in the nature of personal expenses incurred in
advancing their education and are not deductible in computing net
income." 49 O.D. 984 similarly stated: "The expenses incurred by
doctors in taking post-graduate courses are deemed to be in the
nature of personal expenses and not deductible." 50 Then, in 1926,
the Board of Tax Appeals (Board) held that the costs incurred by
a cartoonist in studying sculpture for a possible future career "1and
the costs of vocal instruction for one preparing for a singing career 52
were each in the nature of nondeductible personal expenditures.5 3
Apparently, the Board assumed that education was per se "per44. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 36.

45. For a discussion of the new regulations, see notes 267-412 and accompanying text infra.
46. See notes 49-266 and accompanying text infra.
47. See notes 267-554 and accompanying text infra.
48. See notes 713-831 and accompanying text infra.
49. O.D. 892, 4 C.B. 209 (1921) (emphasis added). This position was modified by I.T. 4044, 1951-1 C.B. 16, to conform with the decision in Hill v.
Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950). For a discussion of Hill, see notes
78-86 and accompanying text infra. O.D. 892 was not declared obsolete until
1969.

See Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307, 310.

I.T. 4044 was similarly de-

clared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 69-43, 1969-1 C.B. 310, 312.
50. O.D. 984, 5 C.B. 171 (1921) (emphasis added). This ruling was finally
declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307, 309.
51. Darling v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 499, 503 (1926).
52. In re Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008, 1009 (1926).
53. See notes 51 & 52 supra and authorities cited therein.
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sonal." 54 The expenditures were called "expenses"; 55 the possibility that these expenditures might be capital expenditures apparently
was never considered by either the Treasury or the Board.
In the area of "indirect education" expenditures, an early
ruling, Income Tax Unit (I.T.) 1520, disallowed a deduction for
the research expenditures of a college teacher who was "urged"-but
not required-by his employer to do the research.5 6 Since the expenditures would not affect the teacher's salary, but would only
enhance his "professional recognition and standing," the expenditures were deemed to be "personal." 67 Nevertheless, the Board of
Tax Appeals allowed another professor to deduct the expenses of
attending a convention of his professional society in spite of the lack
of any direct connection between the activity and the amount of
his salary.5 8 The Board relied instead on its previous opinion in
In re Shutter,59 an "incidental education" case,60 wherein a minister
was allowed a deduction for attending a convention of his church
because such attendance was essential to his "standing and position"
in the church. 61
The Board made no reference to I.T. 1520 in Shutter, and it
is difficult to square the Shutter decision's allowance of a deduction
based on "standing and position" in one's profession with the disallowance of a deduction based only on "professional recognition
and standing" in I.T. 1520. In 1933, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (Commissioner) recognized the inconsistency by revoking
I.T. 1520,62 and issued General Counsel's Memorandum (G.C.M.)
11654.63 Research expenditures incurred in the performance of
one's work were not "personal" under G.C.M. 11654; they would be
54. See Gunn, supra note 21, at 474.
55. See, e.g., O.D. 984, 5 C.B. 171 (1921); O.D. 892, 4 C.B. 209 (1921).
56. I.T. 1520, 1-2 C.B. 145, 145-46 (1922).
57. Id.
58. See Silverman v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1328, 1328-29 (1927), acq.

VI-2 C.B. 6 (1927).

59. 2 B.T.A. 23 (1925).
60. For a discussion of the distinction between "indirect" and "incidental"
educational expenses, see text at note 37 supra.
61. 2 B.T.A. at 23-24. There was no showing in Shutter that the convention had any educational function. See id. at 23. In Silverman v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927), however, the Board did not differentiate
between a church convention and a chemistry convention even though the
typical academic convention, with its presentation of papers, round table discussions, and the like might be more "educational." See id. at 1328-29.
62. See I.T. 2688, XII-1 C.B. 251 (1935).
63. XII-1 C.B. 250 (1933).
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currently deductible, however, only if they were "ordinary and
necessary" expenses and not capital expenditures."
Thus, by 1933 the major issue concerning both "indirect" and
"incidental" educational expenditures was that of current deductibility as opposed to capital expenditure treatment. Neither O.D.
892 nor O.D. 984 were affected by G.C.M. 11654; "direct" educational expenses were presumed to be "personal" and therefore nondeductible.6 5 The possibility that "direct" educational expenditures might be business-related though capital in nature had still
not been considered by the Commissioner in 1933. In that same
year, however, Justice Cardozo suggested in Welch v. Helvering 86
that educational expenses might properly be capitalized:
Unless we can say from facts within our knowledge that
these are ordinary and necessary expenses according to the
ways of conduct and the forms of speech prevailing in the
business world, the tax must be confirmed. But nothing
told us by this record or within the sphere of our judicial
notice permits us to give that extension to what is ordinary
and necessary. Indeed, to do so would open the door to
many bizarre analogies. One man has a family name that
is clouded by thefts committed by an ancestor. To add
to his own standing he repays the stolen money, wiping
off, it may be, his income for the year. The payments
figure in his tax return as ordinary expenses. Another man
conceives the notion that he will be able to practice his
vocation with greater ease and profit if he has an opportunity to enrich his culture. Forthwith the price of education becomes an expense of the business, reducing the
income subject to taxation. There is little difference between these expenses and those in controversy here. Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good
will of an old partnership. . . . For many, they are the
only tools with which to hew a pathway to success. The
money spent in acquiring them is well and wisely spent.
It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of a busi-

ness.OT

64. id. at 250-51.
65. For a discussion of O.D. 892 and O.D. 984, see notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
66. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
67. Id. at 115-16 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). For a discussion of
another portion of Justice Cardozo's opinion in Welch, see note 8 and accompanying text supra.
In Welch, the Supreme Court held that payments made by an officer of
a bankrupt corporation to creditors of the corporation in order to restore the
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Justice Cardozo's dictum could be read to disallow the current
deductibility of the costs of education for either of two reasons.
First, since reputation and learning are "akin to capital assets,"
a current deduction would be improper. 68 And since education will
"enrich his culture," even if the taxpayer's costs are properly considered expenses, they are personal and therefore not deductible. 69
In Osborn v. Commissioner,70 the Tax Court denied a deduction for the costs incurred by a professor who received no compensation while he engaged in research to write three books. 71 He hoped
these efforts would build his reputation and eventually lead to a
professional appointment. 72 For the first time, the Commissioner's
denial seems to have been based, at least in part, on the theory that
the expenditures were capital in nature. 73 Since Osborn had no
reasonable expectation of making a profit from his books, and especially since he was receiving no compensation at the time the expenditures were made, Osborn was deemed not to be carrying on a
trade or business when he made the expenditures. 74 The court
noted that the expenditures were made in anticipation of future
income from a future trade or business and constituted "the cost of
the capital structure from which his future income [was] to be
derived." 75 Thus, the expenditures were like any other expenditures made in anticipation of entering a new trade or business or
profit-seeking activity. 76 Osborn, then, fit within the purview of
G.C.M. 11654, 77 falling on the "capital expenditures" side of "business expenditures."
The watershed between the first and second phases in the development of the law in this area is marked by the Tax Court's
officer's personal reputation and permit him to do business with those creditors
in his own name were not deductible. 290 U.S. at 112. Thus, Justice Cardozo's statement quoted in note 8 supra is clearly dictum.
68. The Code prohibits the current deduction of capital expenditures as
expenses. See I.R.C. § 263 (1981).
69. Id. § 262.

70.
71.72.
73.

For the text of § 262, see note 29 supra.

3 T.C. 603 (1944).
Id. at 605.
Id. at 604.
See id. at 605.

74. Id.
75. Id.

76. For a discussion of the meaning of "carrying on a trade or business,"
see notes 23-36 and accompanying text supra.
77. For a discussion of G.C.M. 11654, see text accompanying notes 63-64
supra.
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decision in Hill v. Commissioner and its reversal by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.7 8 Hill was a school teacher in Virginia who was required by state law to renew her teaching license
every ten years either by attending summer school or by passing
an examination on five selected books.79 Hill chose to satisfy the

requirement by attending school at Columbia University. 0

The

Tax Court disallowed all her expenses.81 Relying on Deputy v.
du Pont,82 the court stated that "ordinary" meant "of common or
frequent occurrence in the type of business involved." 88 Since
Hill had not shown that Virginia school teachers usually obtained
recertification by attending summer school, the court would not
assume that such attendance was "ordinary" and the Commissioner's
determination that the expense was "personal" was held to be "pre-

sumptively correct." 84

Both O.D. 892 and the regulations were

quoted with approval, but without any discussion.8 Justice Cardozo's dictum in Welch was also quoted for the proposition that
the Commissioner's determination is presumptively correct, but
nothing was made of Justice Cardozo's concept of- learning as a
capital asset.86
Thus, as of the beginning of 1950, "direct" expenditures for
education were not deductible simply because they were "personal."
Certain "indirect" expenditures for education might be deductible,
but even these might not be currently deductible because they

were capital expenditures.
78. 13 T.G. 291 (1949), rev'd, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).

79. 13 T.C. at 292.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 295.
82. 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
83. 13 T.C. at 294, quoting Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
84. 13 T.C. at 294-95.
85. Id. at 294. See O.D. 892, 4 C.B. 209 (1921). For a discussion of O.D.
892, see note 49 and accompanying text supra. The regulations under the
1939 Code simply disallowed a deduction for the "expenses of taking special
courses or training." See 26 C.F.R. § 29.23 (a)-15 (b) (Supp. 1944).
86. 13 T.C. at 293. Hill's recertification had a definite useful life of 10
years. See id. at 292. Therefore, capitalization treatment would have
resulted in an amortization deduction. See I.R.C. § 167 (1981).
In. most
cases, the characterization of an expense as "personal" will produce the same
result as the characterization of an expense as "capital" because. of the often
insurmountable burden on the taxpayer to prove the useful life of the expenditure. For a suggested solution to this problem, see notes 814-16 and accompanying text infra..
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B. 1950 to 1958
In reversing the Tax Court's decision in Hill, the Fourth
'Circuit for the first time permitted a deduction for a "direct" educational expenditure. In reaching this conclusion, the court of
,appeals specifically ruled that educational expenditures should be
held to the same standards of deductibility as other "ordinary and
necessary" "trade or business" expenses.8 7 Thus, the court equated
"ordinary" with "a response that a reasonable person would normally and naturally make under the specific circumstances" 88
rather than apply the more restrictive standard of a de facto "usual"
way of doing things as required by the Tax Court.8 9 Quoting the
Cardozo dictum and other non-education cases on the proper meaning of "ordinary," 90 the court specifically rejected the Commis
sioner's argument that educational expenditures were unique and
not subject to the same meaning of "ordinary and necessary" as
other trade or business expenditures. 91 Since Hill had attended
summer school "to maintain her present position, not to attain a
new position," and "to preserve, not to expand or increase" and "to
carry on, not to commence" 92 a trade or business, she fit the
statutory requirement of "carrying on" a "trade or business." The
court of appeals quoted O.D. 892, but distinguished it on the
grounds that Hill went to summer school to enable her to continue in her existing position. 93 The Fourth Circuit did not consider the possibility that, although the expenditure was businessrelated, it could be a capital expenditure rather than an expense.
Since Hill's license would be renewed for a ten year term as a
result of her attendance at Columbia, the business expenditure
arguably should have been amortized over its ten year useful life. 94
Soon after its loss in Hill, the IRS issued I.T. 4044,95 which
permitted a deduction for a teacher's summer school expenses if
87. 181 F.2d at 908.
88. Id.
89. See notes 83-84 and accompanying text supra.
90. See 181 F.2d at 909-10.
91. Id. at 910-11.
92. Id. at 909.
93. Id.
94. For a discussion of the more usual situation, in which the taxpayer
cannot bear the burden of proving the useful life of his capital expenditures,
see :note 140 and accompanying text infra. See also I.R.C. § 167 (1981).
95. 1951-1 C.B. 16.
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they were "for the purpose of maintaining her position." 96 However, I.T. 4044 continued to deny a deduction for any expenses
incurred "for the purpose of obtaining a teaching position, qualifying for permanent status, a higher position, [or] an advance in
salary schedule, or to fulfill the general cultural aspirations of the
teacher." 07 The ruling denied these nondeductible expenses as
"personal," again ignoring the probability that expenditures for
all but the last named purpose were business-related capital expenditures rather than personal expenditures. 98
Hill and I.T. 4044 did not begin an era of easy deductibility
of educational expenditures. For example, in Larson v. Commissioner,99 a mechanic, whose employer suffered from a wartime
shortage of skilled personnel, enrolled for a bachelor's degree in
engineering in the evening division of a local university. 10 0 After
two years of part-time education, his employer gave him a position
as an industrial engineer, but he left that employer soon thereafter.101 He received his degree three years after that. 10 2 The Tax
Court disallowed any deduction for Larson's schooling, distinguishing Hill on the grounds that Hill sought only to maintain her
present position, not to attain a new position. 10 3 Larson admitted
04
that he undertook the studies to increase his earning capacity.
The court found, however, that "whether the expenses were undertaken as purely personal matters to improve petitioner's education
and cultural attainments or in order to achieve improvement in
his professional status, a choice we are not now required to make,
the result would be identical." 10 The court did not attempt to
define "improvement in his professional status" any further, but it
implied that any increase in earning capacity would suffice.' 00 Thus,
maintenance of one's present position was permissible, but "im96. Id. at 17.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 16-17.

99. 15 T.C. 956 (1950).
100. Id. at 957.

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 957-58.
104. Id. at 958.

105. Id.
106. Id. Under the current regulations, however, qualifying for a new
trade or business as an engineer might be more relevant. See note 285 and accompanying text infra.
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251:

provement" (whatever that meant) was fatal to a deduction. And,
.as an alternative ground, the court repeated the "personal" or "cultural" reason for disallowance in spite of the obvious. connection
10 7
between. Larson's schooling and his present employment.
The Tax Court and the Service further limited the usefulness
,of Hill by emphasizing the statutory element of "necessary" and
construing it narrowly. Hill was required to be recertified by state
law; if she were not recertified she could not continue in her present job. 08 Thus, because of the employer's requirement, Hill
easily satisfied the "necessary" requirement. The question remained, however, whether expenditures which were not mandatory
could satisfy this requirement.
In Welch, Justice Cardozo had implicitly defined "necessary"
as "appropriate and helpful." 109 Although this was dictum, 110 it
is the generally accepted definition of "necessary" for all section
162 contexts."i Since the Hill court did rely on Welch, the fact
that Hill's expenditures were mandated by her employer should
not have been deemed essential to that decision.
However, the Tax.Court apparently disagreed. In Cardozo v.
Commissioner,"2 an associate professor of history and romance
languages who went to Europe for research and study one summer
attempted to deduct the costs of the trip. 1 3 Although the taxpayer, acting pro se, failed to introduce evidence to establish any
business nexus for the trip 114 and testified that he was concerned
with prestige and possible advancement, thus implying a capital
investment rather than an expense, 15 the Tax Court relied on
neither of these possible grounds for its decision. Rather, in an
eight to six decision, the court denied the deduction because there
was no showing that the taxpayer's employer had required him
to make the trip."8 Since he made the trip "voluntarily," the court
107..
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

15 T.C. at 958.
See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
See note 67 supra.
See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
17 T.C. 3 (1951).
Id. at 4-5. The taxpayer claimed a deduction in the amount of $1,144.

Id' at 4.

114. Id. at 6. Nothing in the university's rules required the taxpayer to
make such a trip to retain his position. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 6-7, citing Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950);
O.D. 892, 4 C.B. 209 (1921).
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determined that it could not have been "necessary."'" Similarly,
in Lampkin v. Commissioner,n" the Tax Court denied a deduction
for the expenses of a doctoral dissertation since there was no showing that the doctorate was necessary for the taxpayer to hold his,
job as a college teacher."19
The Service did its part in treating "necessary" more narrowly
for educational expenditures than for other business-related expenditures. 20 Indeed, the first proposed regulations under the 1954
Code would have permitted an employee an educational expense
deduction under section 162 only if the employer required the education. 12
The final regulations 122 treated an expenditure as
"necessary" if it either was required by the employer or was "customary." 123
The second major deviation from the concept that education is
never deductible came from the Second Circuit in Coughlin v. Commissioner. 24 Coughlin had been a partner for many years in a law
firm engaged in general practice. 25 . The partners had agreed that
Coughlin would handle the federal tax matters that came to the
firm, and they expected him to keep abreast of the changes and
developments in the federal tax laws. 2 In addition to subscribing
to various publications and attending various bar meetings, Coughlin attended the annual Tax Institute at New York University. 127
117. 17 T.C. at 4. The opinion in Cardozo and the significance accorded
to this pro se case have been severely criticized by one commentator. See Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 1089, 1099-1101, 1104 n.70 (1964).

118. 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 576 (1952).
119. Id. at 577. The court did note, however, that while the university did
not impose an express dissertation requirement upon the taxpayer, "some pro,
gram was 'expected' of him."

Id.

Due to the absence of an express academic

requirement, the court distinguished Hill and ruled against the taxpayer. Id.
120. See Loring, IRS Denying Educational Expense That Would Be Ordinary and Necessary for Business, 9 J. TAx. 280 (1958). Even after promulgation
of the 1958 regulations, which tempered the "mandatory" rules, "necessary" was

still sometimes rigidly construed in the educational context. See Davis v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 175 (1962). See also notes 88 & 89 and accompanying text
supra.
121. See Prop. Reg. § 1.162-5(d), 21 Fed. Reg. 5093 (1956).
122. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67.
123. See notes 149-51 & 157 and accompanying text infra. See also Rev.
Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 C.B. 69.
124. 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'g 18 T.C. 528 (1952).
125. 203 F.2d at 308.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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'Coughlin took a deduction for the tuition and traveling expenses of
attending the Tax Institute1 28 The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's disallowance of the deduction because of the "educational
and personal nature of the object pursued by the petitioner." 129
The court relied upon O.D. 984 and the Cardozo dictum from
Welch as authority for its holding, 830 but gave no further explanation for its decision. Apparently, the Tax Court equated education
of any kind with personal expenditures. The court did not discuss
Hill, but noted that the Fourth Circuit therein "expressly limited
its decision to the facts" before that court.18 '
In reversing the Tax Court, the Second Circuit first noted that
Coughlin claimed the deduction as an ordinary and necessary expense incurred in the practice of his profession.132 The court did
not :treat Coughlin's expenses under some restrictive category called
"education expenses"; instead, the court treated these expenditures
as it would have treated any other expenditures in a business context1 38s and, therefore, determined whether the expenditure was
"ordinary" and "necessary," and whether it "proximately resulted"
from the taxpayer's practice of his profession.1 34 Coughlin was not
"required" to attend the Institute in the sense that Hill was required to attend summer school since he would not lose his license
to practice law or his membership in his firm if he did not attend.185
However, as the court noted, "he was morally bound to keep so
informed and did so in part by means of his attendance at this session of the Institute. It was a way well adopted to fulfill his professional duty to keep sharp the tools he actually used in his going
128. Id. Coughlin's expenses for tuition, travel, board, and lodging
amounted to $305, which he claimed as a deductible ordinary and necessary
expense of his trade or business under the 1939 Code. Id.
129. 18 T.C. at 530.
130. Id. at 529, citing Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); O.D. 984,
5 C.B. 171 (1921). For a discussion of O.D. 984, see note 50 and accompanying
text supra. See also note 8 and accompanying text supra.
131. 18 T.C. at 530, citing Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir.

1950).
132. 203 F.2d at 308. See note 128 supra.
133. 203 F.2d at 308-09.

134. Id. The court of appeals noted that the expenses would be "ordinary"

if they were customarily incurred by lawyers in similar practices.

Id.

If such

expenses were appropriate and helpful, they were "necessary" within the definition of "necessary" announced in Welch. Id. at 309, citing Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). For the definition of "necessary" in Welch, see note
67 and accompanying text supra.
135. 203 F.2d at 309.
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trade or business." 186 After Coughlin, then, educational expenditures were not personal per se. 187 They could well be businessrelated if the proper nexus were shown.' 81 And, since even businessrelated payments would not be currently deductible if they were
capital expenditures (the other branch of the Cardozo dictum), 13
the court went on to distinguish Coughlin's expenditures from those
made to acquire a capital asset on the grounds that the "evanescent
character of that for which the petitioner spent his money deprives
it of the sort of permanency such a concept embraces." 140 In other
words, while some education may produce a capital asset, some education is short-lived and is properly an expense.
The 1954 Code was passed soon after Coughlin was decided,
1 41
and accorded no special treatment to educational expendituies.
The proposed regulations under the 1954 Code 142 limited allowable
education expenses to those required by the taxpayer's employer.14
Thus, before the promulgation of the 1958 regulations, taxpayers
making educational expenditures could look only to Hill and
Coughlin for guidance on the issue of whether their educational
expenditures were deductible. The true significance of these two
136. Id.
137. Id. The court stated:
It may well be that the knowledge [the taxpayer] thus gained incidentally increased his fund of learning in general and, in that sense,
the cost of acquiring it may have been a personal expense; but we
think that the immediate, overall professional need to incur the expenses in order to perform his work with due regard to the current
status of the law so overshadows the personal aspect that it is the
decisive feature.
Id.
138. See note 137 supra.
139. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
140. 203 F.2d at 309-10.
141. Congress has occasionally considered the problem of business-related
educational expenses, but, until 1978, when it passed § 127, permitting an exclusion for employer payment of certain employee education benefits, it had
never acted. See note 2 supra. For example, in 1947 Senator Pepper proposed
a deduction for teachers' expenses incurred in connection with their jobs. See
Hearings on Individual Income Tax Deduction Before the Senate Finance
Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 563 (1947), (statement of Senator Pepper). The
following year, Senator Kern proposed a credit for the costs of business-related
training and education. See Hearings on Reduction of Individual Income
Taxes Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1948) (statement of Senator Kern).
142. See 21 Fed. Reg. 5091, 5093 (1956).
143. Id. at 5093. The proposed regulations provided in pertinent part:
"Expenditures made by an employee for his education as a requisite to the, continued retention of his salary, status, or employment as a result of an express
requirement of his employer may be deductible...... Id.
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cases, however, lay not in the fact that under limited circumstances
certain teachers and professionals could properly claim a deduction
for education. Rather, the- two courts of appeals had in effect said
that business-related educational expenditures were to be treated
like any other business-related expenditure. If the taxpayer could
show that the expenditure was an ordinary and necessary expense
of carrying on a trade or business, the fact that the expenditure was
for education was irrelevant.
C. 1958 to 1967
1. The 1958 Regulations in General
The 1958 regulations 144 constituted the first systematic analysis
of many of the problems inherent in the area of educational expenditures 145 and, in general, greatly liberalized deductibility. 146
The key to deductibility under the 1958 regulations was the taxpayer's subjective "primary purpose" in making a particular educational expenditure. 47 This primary purpose standard had both an
1 48
affirmative and a negative component.
The affirmative primary purpose aspect of the 1958 regulations
had two alternate tests.1 49 The taxpayer had to show: either: 1) a
144. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67-68.
.145. Until the 1958 regulations were issued, there was no systematic analysis
of the issue of whether "direct" educational expenses were deductible. For a
definition of "direct" educational expenses, see text accompanying notes 36-38
supra. For examples of the few cases in which deductions for "direct" educationlal expenses were permitted, see Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307
(2d Cir. 1953); Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950). For a discussion of Coughlin, see notes 124-40 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of Hill, see notes 78-86 and accompanying text supra.
146. See notes 157-60 and accompanying text infra.
147. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67-68.
148. See notes 149-55 and accompanying text infra.
149. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67. Section 1.162-5
(a) provided:
Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are deductible
if they are for education (including research activities) undertaken
primarily for the purpose of:
(1) Maintaining or improving skills required by the taxpayer
in his employment or other trade or business, or
(2) Meeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's employer,
or the requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a
condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his salary, status or
employment.
Whether or not education is of the type referred to in subparagraph
(1) of this paragraph shall be determined upon the basis of all the facts
of each case. If it is customary for other established members of the
taxpayer's trade or business to undertake such education, the taxpayer
will ordinarily be considered to have undertaken this education for
the purposes described in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph. Ex-
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primary purpose of his education was to "[m]aintain or improve
skills required" in his present trade or business, whether or not he
was an employee; 110 or 2) the education was expressly required by
his employer as a condition to keeping his present job."" But even
if the taxpayer satisfied either affirmative purpose test, no deduction
was allowable if the education was for either of two negative primary purposes: 152 1) to obtain substantial advancement in his prespenditures for education of the type described in subparagraph (2) of
this paragraph are deductible under subparagraph (2) only to the extent that they are for the minimum education required by the tax
payer's employer, or by applicable law or regulations, as a condition
to the retention of the taxpayer's salary, status, or employment. Expenditures for education other than, those so required may be deductible under subparagraph (1) of this paragraph if the education
meets the qualifications of subparagraph (1). A taxpayer is considered
to have made expenditures for education to meet the express requirements of his employer only if the requirement is imposed primarily for
a bona fide business purpose of the taxpayer's employer and not primarily for the taxpayer's benefit. Except as provided in the last
sentence of paragraph (b) of this section, in the case of teachers, a
written statement from an authorized official or school officer to the
effect that the education was required as a condition to the retention
of the taxpayer's salary, status, or employment will be accepted for the
purpose of meeting the requirements of this paragraph.
Id.
p 150. Id. § 1.162-5(a)(1). See note 149 supra. See also Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1953) (expenses which provided
means for petitioner to "keep sharp the tools he actually used in his
going trade or business" held deductible). The provisions of § 1.162-5(a)(1)
should have eliminated any notion that absolute necessity of the educational
expenditures was required for a deduction. But old concepts die hard. See
Davis v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 175 (1962).
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(2), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67. See note 149
supra. Cf. Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906, 909 (4th Cir. 1950) (expenses
which enabled petitioner to continue in her position held deductible).
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67-68. Section 1.1625(b) provided:
Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are not deductible if they are for education undertaken primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new position or substantial advancement in position, or primarily for the purpose of fulfilling the general educational
aspirations or other personal purposes of the taxpayer. The fact
that the education undertaken meets express requirements for the new
position or substantial advancement in position will be an important
factor indicating that the education is undertaken primarily for the
purpose of obtaining such position or advancement, unless such education is required as a condition to the retention by the taxpayer
of his present employment. In any event, if education is required
of the taxpayer in order to meet the minimum requirements for qualification or establishment in his intended trade or business or specialty
therein, the expense of such education is personal in nature and
therefore is not deductible.
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ent position or to obtain a new position; 153 or 2) to fulfill the
taxpayer's "general aspirations" or "personal purposes." 114 In the
extreme case of education which qualified one for a new "trade or
business or specialty," as opposed to a mere-new "position" within
the same trade or business, one did not have to look'at"primary
purpose" at all-the regulations denied any deduction. t5
This somewhat confusing interplay of affirmative and negative
primary purposes was clarified by a set of "key questions" posed by
Revenue Ruling 60-97.156 In most cases, the taxpayer would have
already satisfied the minimum requirements for his present position,
and most employers do not expressly require their employees to
further their education. Thus, in most instances, only the "maintaining or improving skills in one's present trade or business" and
the "new position or substantial advancement" factors were relevant.
The "maintaining or improving skills" component of the primary purpose test could best be satisfied if the taxpayer could show
that it was "customary for other established members of the tax153. Id. Although not phrased in terms of Justice Cardozo's dictum in
Welch, this disallowance clearly is based upon the capital theory espoused
therein. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67-68. This disallowance was presumably derived from the other branch of Justice Cardozo's
dictum in Welch. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
155. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67. For the text
of § 1.162-5(b), see note 152 supra.
156. Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 C.B. 69, 74. Revenue Ruling 60-97 provided
in pertinent part:
The following is the suggested order in which questions should be
resolved in determining the deductibility of expenses incurred for education:
Has the taxpayer met the minimum requirements for qualification or establishment in his intended position?
If "no," no deductions are allowable.
If "yes," is education undertaken primarily to meet employer requirements to retain taxpayer's position?
If "yes," the taxpayer is entitled to deductions unless (1) the education leads to qualifying the taxpayer in his intended trade or business and the taxpayer knew of this employer requirement before
assuming his position with his employer, or (2) the employer's requirement is imposed primarily for the benefit of the taxpayer and not
primarily for a bona fide business purpose.
If "no," is it customary for other established members of taxpayer's trade or business occupying positions similar to that of the
taxpayer to undertake education of the type pursued by the taxpayer?
If "yes," the taxpayer is considered to have undertaken education
for the purpose of maintaining or improving needed skills and is entitled to deductions.
If "no," the taxpayer must show by other means that his primary
purpose was to maintain or improve needed skills. If the education
undertaken meets express requirements for a new position or substan-
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payer's trade or business to undertake such education." 157 But
even if the taxpayer could not show such a custom, he could still
show the requisite purpose "by other means." 158
The negative purpose component of the primary purpose test
was more difficult to apply. As the regulations provided, the fact
that the education "meets express requirements for the new position or substantial advancement in position" was an important factor indicating the proscribed purpose. 59 While there was no detailed definition of "new position" or "substantial advancement in
position," it was clear that mere qualification for a new position or
for substantial advancement would not per se cause disallowance
if in fact either of the positive aspects of the primary purpose test
were satisfied. 6 0 But if the level of education went beyond mere
qualification for a new position and qualified the taxpayer for a
new trade or business-or if it went beyond "substantial advancement" and qualified him for a "specialty"-the expenses of the education were not deductible regardless of the taxpayer's positive
primary purpose. 161 Revenue Ruling 60-97 112 amplified the provisions of the regulations and specifically disallowed expenses of a
complete course of study, such as study leading to a law degree,
since the course of study would qualify the taxpayer for a new
tial advancement, the taxpayer must show that the education was not
undertaken primarily for the purpose of meeting those requirements.
Id.
157. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67 (emphasis added).
158. Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 C.B. 69, 74. See Campbell v. United States,
250 F. Supp. 941, 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966). In Campbell, a "pioneer" in the field
of forensic pathology employed in a city examiner's office was deemed to be
within the "appropriate and helpful" test in spite of the absence of custom
and, thus, was allowed to deduct his expenses incurred in attending night law
school. Id.
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67 (emphasis added).
160. See Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 C.B. 69, 70-71. The relevant part of the
ruling provides:
[E]xpenses voluntarily undertaken primarily for the purpose of maintaining or improving skills required by a taxpayer in his employment or other trade or business are deductible as well as those incurred primarily because required as a condition to retention of his
salary, status or employment; that expenses incurred primarily for
either of these two purposes are deductible whether the taxpayer is
self-employed or is engaged in the performance of services as an employee; and the fact that academic credit, a degree, a new job, or
advancement may result does not preclude a deduction so long as, the
education is primarily undertaken for one of the two purposes specified in the regulations as causing the expenses to qualify for deduction.
Id. at 71.
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b); T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67-68.
162. 1960-1 C.B. 69.
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trade or business.168 Interestingly -enough, many of the most significant cases under the 1958 regulations 'involved law school expenses, wherein the provisions of the regulations and Revenue Ruling 60-97 were seemingly ignored.16 The primary purpose 'approach proved to be unworkable,
however. Section 1.162-5(a) of the 1958 regulations, Revenue
Ruling 60-97, and the case law'all held the issue of primary pur163. Id. at 73-74, 78. The pertinent part of the ruling provides:
If a taxpayer who is established: in his position undertakes education
which is a part of a complete course of study that the taxpayer intends
to pursue, such as that required to obtain a Bachelor of Laws degree, and such complete course of study will lead to qualifying the
taxpayer in a new trade or business or specialty therein, it will be
considered, for purposes of this Revenue Ruling, that such education
was undertaken to qualify the taxpayer in such new trade or business
or specialty. Accordingly, the cost: of such education will not be deductible.
...[If the education required by the employer represents a complete course of study which will lead to qualifying the taxpayer in a
new trade or business or specialty therein, it will be considered,
for*purposes of this Revenue Ruling, that the requirement was imposed .primarily for the benefit of the employee and not primarily
for a bona fide business reason of the employer and, accordingly,
the cost of such education will not be deductible.
Id. at 73-74. Example 10 of the ruling provides:
A trust officer in a bank undertakes to study law. The knowledge
of the law will be helpful in discharging his duties. His employer
does-not require him to engage in such studies. He registers for the
entire regular curriculum leading to a bachelor of laws degree. Since
the taxpayer is pursuing a complete course of education in law which
will lead toward qualifying him in that field, in which he was not
previously qualified, his expenses for such education are considered to
have been incurred for the purpose of qualifying in that field and
are, therefore, not deductible. Also, if the bank imposes upon the taxpayer, as a condition to the continued retention of his position with
it, the requirement that he pursue a complete law course, the cost of
such. education is not deductible because the requirement is considered
to be imposed primarily for the employee's benefit and not primarilyfor a bona fide business purpose of the employer.
Id. at 78.
164. See, e.g., Sandt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962) (law
school expenses of research chemist taking courses to qualify for promotion to
patent chemist held not deductible); Rylaarsdam v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M.
(CCH) 707 (1966) (law school expenses of "contract coordinator" who examined
requirements of employer's contracts with United States government held not
deductible); Pfeffer v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 785 (1963) (law school
expenses of chemical engineer employed as patent liaison engineer held not
deductible since primary purpose of chemical engineer was to become lawyer
rather than to improve skills as patent liaison engineer). But see Kilgannon v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 619 (1965) (law school expenses of certified
public accountant held deductible since degree was obtained to improve skill as
accountant); Charlton v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 420 (1964) (law school
expenses of certified public accountant held deductible); Frazee v. Commissioner,
22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1086 (1963) (law school expenses of Air Force employee who
drafted regulations and policy and procedure documents held deductible).
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pose to be a question: of fact.'6 s. However, since triers of fact
could differ in their findings, essentially identical situations could
and did produce contrary results 16 and these fact findings often
turned on vague statements made by the taxpayer years before. 1 67
Finally, since the determining issues were factual, 6 , little or no
appellate review was possible; thus the coherence normally supplied by appellate review was missing.
2. The Night Law School Cases
The inadequacies of the subjective primary purpose standard
are best illustrated by the "night law school" cases. 16 9 Law is one
of the few professions for which one can prepare while engaged
in the full-time practice of some other trade or business. 170 And,
165. Compare Condit v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1962), aff'd
per curiam, 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964) with Welsh v. United States, 210 F.
Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), aff'd per curiam, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964). In
Condit, the Sixth Circuit failed to find that the primary purpose of a taxpayer's
law degree was to maintain and improve his skills in his present employment
despite the fact that he retained his position as an accountant after his admission to the bar. 329 F.2d at 153-54. The Welsh court, however, found that an
Internal Revenue agent's primary purpose for attending law school was to maintain his position, even though the agent left the Service and commenced the
practice of law almost immediately after his admission to the bar. Id. at 146.
For further discussion of Condit and Welsh, see notes 172-89 and accompanying
text infra.
166. See note 165 supra. Compare Spitaleri v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 988
(1959) (law school expenses of practicing accountant held not deductible) with
Kilgannon v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 619 (1965) (law school expenses
of accountant held deductible) and with Charlton v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M.
(CCH) 420 (1964) (accountant's law school expenses held deductible).
167. See, e.g., Deveraux v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1961); Lane
v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 989 (1962). In Deveraux, an assistant professor who commenced study for a doctorate in 1954, in order to induce the
faculty at his university to grant him permanent tenure rather than terminate
his employment, was allowed a deduction for the expense incurred in procuring
such degree. 292 F.2d at 640. Although the taxpayer was granted tenure in
1955, he continued his doctoral studies. Id. at 638. The Deveraux court relied
on this fact and the taxpayer's testimony that he felt a "moral obligation" to
continue his doctoral studies. Id. In Lane, a professor's educational expenses
incurred in pursuance of a doctorate were held deductible since the court found
that the professor's primary purpose in obtaining the degree was to maintain
or improve the skills required in his employment as a professor. 21 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 992. Among the evidence considered by the court was the fact that
in 1957, five years before the case was decided, the petitioner stated to the head
of his department that "he might wish to enroll in some university courses in
the field of business because it had been his intention and desire for some time
to improve his knowledge in those areas . . . in order that he might better
demonstrate to his accounting students the functions of accounting." Id. at 990.
168. See Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597, 599 (N.D. Ohio 1962),
afi'd per curiam, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964).
169. See notes 172-96 and accompanying text infra.
170. The existence of a full-time trade or business is necessary to satisfy the
.,presently active" aspect of the "carrying on" test of § 162(a). See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
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while law school does qualify one for an entirely new trade or
business, it also provides skills which. are useful to many other
types of trades or businesses, such as insurance, accounting, patent
work, and even working for the IRS. 171 Finally, of course, law
school graduates are probably more likely to contest and litigate
their disputes with the IRS than any other group, as evidenced
by the cases that follow.
Three part-time law students in Ohio litigated the deductibility
of their law school tuition at about the same time. 1 72 James Condit
was an accountant who attended law school at night and attempted
to deduct the costs of attending law school as ordinary and necessary expenses of maintaining and improving his skills as an accountant. 7 8 Martin Welsh and James Engel were Internal Revenue agents who attended law school at night and each attempted
to deduct his costs as ordinary and necessary expenses of maintaining and improving his skills as a revenue agent. 1 74

All three men

had filed applications with the Ohio bar during their first year of
law school and each of them had affirmatively answered a question
concerning whether they wished to make the legal profession their
life's work. 175 At their trials several years later, each man attempted
to explain his response to the question and Engel even had his superiors testify that legal knowledge would help him in his job as a
revenue agent.17 6

All three men were admitted to the Ohio bar

soon after graduation, but only Welsh left his job to practice law
171. See note 164 supra and authorities cited therein. Since the study of
law can be connected with many trades or businesses, it can satisfy the "proxi-

mate relationship" aspect of the "carrying on of a trade or business" test of
§ 162(a).

See note 28 and accompanying text supra.

172. See Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), aJ'd
per curiam, 329 F.2d 145
(CCH) 1306 (1962), aff'd
Commissioner, 21 T.C.M.
tioners sought to deduct

(6th Cir. 1964); Condit v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M.
per curiam, 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964); Engel v.
(CCH) 1302 (1962). In this triad of cases, the petithe expenses they incurred in pursuing their first

degrees in law rather than graduate law degrees. For a discussion of the different problems posed by graduate legal education, see notes 480-554 and accompanying text infra.
173. Condit v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306, 1308-09 (1962), aff'd
per curiam, 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964).
174. Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597, 599 (N.D. Ohio 1962), aff'd
per curian, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964); Engel v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M.

(CCH) 1302, 1304 (1962).
175. Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597, 599 (N.D. Ohio 1962), abf'd
per curiam, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964); Condit v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1306, 1308 (1962), aff'd per curiam, 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964); Engel
-v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1302, 1304 (1962).
176. Engel v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1302, 1305 (1962).
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after his admission to the bar.177 Condit and Engel, though admitted to the bar, remained in the non-legal positions they had
when they had commenced their legal studies. 78 The Tax Court
found against both Condit and Engel since neither had borne the
burden of showing that the primary purpose of his law school
studies was to maintain and improve the skills involved in his present position, in spite of the fact that each remained in that position. 179 The Tax Court deemed Condit's and Engel's answers on
the bar application to be almost conclusive of their intent at the
time they began their legal studies, and, at least in Condit's case,
the Tax Court felt that qualification for the minimum standards
of a new profession required disallowance of the expenditures. 8 0
In Welsh v. United States,18 ' the taxpayer, unlike Condit and
Engel, did not go to the Tax Court; he paid the tax and sued for a
refund in district court.182 Welsh's contention that his law school
expenses were deductible rested solely on his own testimony regarding his intent at the commencement of his legal studies. 83 He
testified that other Internal Revenue agents attended law school
84
and remained with the Service even after admission to the bar.
The judge, as trier of fact, had to determine Welsh's primary purpose at the commencement of his legal studies.' 6 Since people do
change their minds, the judge found that the fact that Welsh
changed both his job and his profession almost as soon as his studies
177, Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597, 598 (N.D. Ohio 1962), afJ'd
per cutriam, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964).
178. Condit v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306, 1309 (1962), aIJ'd
per curiam, 329 F.2d 153, 154 (6th Cir. 1964); Engel v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1302, 1306 (1962).
179. Condit v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306, 1309-10 (1962), af'd
per curiam, 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964); Engel v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1302, 1306 (1962).
180. Condit v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306, 1310 (1962), afl'd
per curiam, 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964). It should be noted that § 1.162-5(b)
of the 1958 regulations automatically disqualified expenses incurred for the
purpose of obtaining a new position, and Revenue Ruling 60-97 specifically
disallowed law school expenses. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1
C.B. 67; Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 C.B. 69, 73.
181. 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), af'd per curiam, 329 F.2d 145
(6th Cir. 1964).
182. 210 F. Supp. at 597.
183. Id. at 599.
184. Id.

185. Id.
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were, completed did not necessarily reflect his original primary
purpose.18 0 The district court judge found that Welsh's primary
purpose at the time of the commencement of his studies was to
maintain his position as a revenue agent and not to change his
trade or business to that of a lawyer.ls 7 The district court specifically rejected the Service's argument that the acquisition of any
new skill not required by one's present position precluded deductibility.1 81 An appeal was taken by both Condit and Welsh, but not
by Engel. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the decisions in both appeals on the same day despite the fact that
the two cases are seemingly irreconcilable; however, since primary
purpose is purely a question of fact, the decision of each trial court
had to be affirmed. 8 9
It should be noted that those courts which allowed a deduction
for law school expenses found, of necessity, that the affirmative
primary purpose test of the regulations 190 effectively overrode both
the negative primary purpose test 'l and also the "qualification for
a new trade or business" proscription. 9 2 In allowing a deduction,
the courts effectively held that once the purpose of maintaining or
improving skills required in one's present position was proven to be
the primary purpose for an educational expenditure, the existence
186. Id. at 600.
187. Id. at 601.
188. Id. at 600-01.
189. See Welsh v. United States, 329 F.2d at 146; Condit v. Commissioner,
329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964) (per curiam). Some indication of how small issues
of fact could possibly affect the result of a case can be seen in Schultz v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1372 (1964). In Schuttz, an estate and gift tax
agent for the IRS, who attended law school in Texas, stated in an interview at
the commencement of his studies that he did not intend to practice law after
his admission to the bar. Id. at 1373. The agent told examiners of the Houston
Bar Association that he felt obligated to attend law school because of earlier
statements that he made during an employment interview with the IRS in
which he expressed an interest in studying law and in securing a law-related
position with the IRS. Id. at 1372-73. The Tax Court found that his primary
purpose in undertaking legal studies was to improve his skills as a revenue agent,
largely because of his answer to the bar questionnaire. Id. at 1373. The court
made this finding despite the fact that the taxpayer left the Service's employ
and began employment with an accounting firm shortly after receiving his law
degree. Id. If this distinction without a difference becomes determinative of
deductibility, under a primary purpose test many future part-time law students
will answer their bar applications in terms of a negative present intention, reserving the right to change their minds. Presumably, the bar interviewer will
understand that their apparent lack of enthusiasm is tax-motivated and will- not
penalize the applicant.
190. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67.
191. See id.
192 See Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 C.B. 69, 73-74, 78.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 1
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 27: p. 237

of either negative purpose was irrelevant since such purpose could
not also be the primary purpose.193 This approach may make semantic sense-only one purpose may be the primary one-but it
effectively reduced the interplay of positive and negative purposes
contemplated by the regulations 194 to a simple search for the single
purpose which was primary. There can be no other explanation
for the courts' blatant disregard of the blanket "no new trade or
business" rule in the regulations; 111presumably, those courts felt
that the automatic denial rule was simply not consistent with the
statute when a positive primary purpose existed. 196
3. The Psychoanalyst Cases
While law students supplied most of the test cases in the "no
new trade or business" area, physicians and psychologists supplied
most of the test cases in the "no new specialty" area. 197 For example, in Watson v. Commissioner,'"5 a physician, who already was
a specialist in internal medicine, felt the need to undergo personal
psychoanalysis in order to help him diagnose his patients' psychosomatic ailments. He regularly traveled from his home in Columbus,
Ohio to his analyst in Detroit and attempted to deduct the costs
of his transportation to Detroit, his meals and lodging there, and the
193. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964) (Internal
9489 (N.D. Tex.
Revenue agent); Fortney v. Campbell, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
1964) (estate tax examiner); Kilgannon v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 619
(1965) (accountant); Schultz v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1372 (1964)
(estate and gift tax agent); Charlton v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 420
(1964) (accountant); Baum v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 206 (1964) (claims

adjuster); Brennan v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1222 (1963) (revenue
agent); Frazee v. Commissioner, 22

T.C.M. (CCH) 1086 (1963) (Air Force em-

ployee drafting regulations).
Several cases have denied a deduction for law school expenses either because
of the taxpayer's failure to prove the proper positive primary purpose or because of the automatic denial rule for acquiring the skills of a new trade or
business. See, e.g., Condit v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964); Sandt
v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962); Huene v. United States, 247 F.
Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Jones v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 866 (1970);
Lezdey v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 485 (1964); Pfeffer v. Commissioner,
22 T.C.M. (CCH) 785 (1963).
194. See text accompanying notes 155-59 supra.
195. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67-68.

See also

notes 152-64 and accompanying text supra.
196. For a similar conclusion, see Comment, The Deductibility of Educational Expenses: Administrative Construction of Statute, 17 BUFFALO L. REv.
182, 191 (1967).
197. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67-68. See also
notes 152-64 and accompanying text supra.
198. 31 T.C. 1014 (1959).
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265..

fees for the analyst. 199 The Commissioner attacked -the expenditures as not customary for an internist, and further argued that
Watson was acquiring a specialty. 2°0 The Tax Court found that
Watson did not intend to become a specialist, and that in fact-he
continued his former practice, presumably with sharper ..skills. 01.
The fact that internists did not undergo such training "customarily"
was not determinative; Watson could and did show that his primary
purpose was to maintain and improve his skills in -his trade, or
20
business by other means. 20 2 Although there were four dissenters, 3
there is no dissenting opinion in Watson. Nowhere did the court
mention the provisions in the regulations and Revenue Ruling 60-97
which disallowed a deduction for any education which qualified one
for a new specialty regardless of primary purpose.20 4 As in the "new
trade or business" cases which were won by law students, the Watson
court apparently believed that the "no specialty" rule was out-

weighed by a finding of a proper positive primary purpose. If the
taxpayer did not as a matter of fact intend to use training which
qualified him for a new specialty, the fact that he met the minimum
qualifications of that specialty was irrelevant.
A few months after Watson, the same court decided Namrow
v. Commissioner.2°5 Namrow and Maxwell were practicing psy.
chiatrists in Washington, D.C.20 6 They enrolled at the Washington
Psychoanalytic Institute for a three part course of study which would
take five to six years to complete. 207 All students had to undergo
analysis themselves, attend courses and seminars in analysis, and
conduct supervised analyses of patients themselves.208 Only physicians who had had psychiatric residencies were accepted, into the

program, and each of them had to agree not to call himself an
analyst until he completed the program.2 0 9 The Commissioner disallowed any deduction under the "no specialty" language of the
199. Id. at 1015.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1016.

202. Id.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 1017.
See notes 156-63 and accompanying text supra.
33 T.C. 419 (1959), aff'd, 288 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1961).
33 T.C. at 420.
Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 422.
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Namrow argued that this aspect of the regulations

was not applicable since neither the American Medical Association
nor the American Psychiatric Association recognized psychoanalysis
as a specialty.2 11 In addition, he testified that he already used some
2 12
techniques of psychoanalysis in his prior practice of psychiatry.
The' Tax Court disallowed any deduction because the course of
study clearly gave him a new skill and in fact it was manifest that
Namrow intended to specialize in this new field.2 1s Because of this
214
intefft to specialize, Watson was felt to be clearly distinguishable.
The Tax Court treated psychoanalysis as a specialty, in spite of the
official nonrecognition, because a majority of physicians in fact regax'ded it as a specialty. 2" Five judges dissented, stating that Namrow was already practicing in his specialty."2'
On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed on the grounds that there was sufficient evidence
to support the Tax Court's finding of fact that Namrow intended to
specialize.217 Although the Fourth Circuit seemed to feel that there
was strong evidence that Namrow was not specializing, the Tax
2
Court's findings were deemed not to be clearly erroneous. "'
210. Id. at 428, citing Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B.
67-68.
: 211. 33 T.C. at 432. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Black noted that
the Advisory Board for Medical Specialties also did not recognize psycho.
analysis as a specialty. Id. at 436 (Black, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 428.
213. Id. at 431, 434.
214. Id. at 434. For a discussion of Watson, see notes 198-205 and ac
companying text supra.
215. 33 T.C. at 431-32.
216. Id. at 438 (Black, J., dissenting). Judges Harron, Tietjens, Withey,
and Forrester joined in Judge Black's dissenting opinion. Judge Black noted
that "psychoanalysis is but one of the several techniques used by psychiatrists
in their practice and is not a specialty within itself; . . . undergoing professional analysis improves the skill of a psychiatrist in administering the psychiatric treatment of psychotherapy." Id.
217. 288 F.2d at 652-53.
218. Id. at 652. In support of the Tax Court's findings, the Fourth Circuit stated:
The preponderance of evidence plainly shows that neither an ordinary
physician nor one who has had sufficient additional training to practice psychiatry is considered qualified to practice psychoanalysis unless
he has submitted to long and intense additional education and training in the psychoanalytic field. These requirements are . . . based
. . on the body of medical opinion . . . in representative and recognized medical societies and particularly in the formation of the
psychoanalytic institutes in great centers of population which set the
standards that are accepted in practice.
Id. at 651.
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In Carlucci .v. Commissioner,219 an industrial psychologist employed by an insurance company enrolled at a university for a doctorate in industrial psychology. 220 His employer did not require
this education, but most of his coworkers either had the degree or
were working toward it.221 The Tax Court found, that. since. Carlucci already was an industrial psychologist, he was not going to
school to meet the requirements of that position.222 The court further found that Carlucci did not intend to specialize but rather intended to maintain the skills of his present position. 22 3 Therefore,
224
the court held that the educational expenses were deductible.
In Gilmore v. Commissioner,25 a practicing psychiatrist and
teacher attempted to deduct her expenses of attending a psychoanalytic institute. 226 Gilmore conceded that Namrow was correctly
decided, but she attempted to distinguish her situation. 22 7 Unlike
Namrow and Maxwell, Gilmore had been a psychiatrist for many
years and she had had prior Freudian training. 228 However, she
testified that psychoanalysis was a separate medical specialty, and
she in fact became an analyst. 229 The Tax Court found against
219. 37 T.C. 695 (1962).
220. Id. at 696-97.
221. Id. at 697. Between 25% and 83% of those employed in psychological research had doctoral degrees in industrial psychology. Id...
222. Id.
223. Id. at 697-98. From this finding of fact, the Tax Court reasoned
that doctoral education was customary for other members of the taxpayer's
trade, and that such "customariness" supported the inference that the. taxpayer understood the education to be a means of maintainin or improving
the skills required by him in his employment. Id. at 701, citing Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-5(a)(2), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67.
224.. 37 T.C. at 702.
225. 38 T.C. 765 (1962).
226. Id. at 766, 769. The petitioner was practicing psychiatry in New
Haven, Connecticut and teaching part-time for the Department of Psychiatry
at Yale University. Id. at 766.
227. Id. at 771.
228. Id. at 772. The petitioner contended that in Namrow the taxpayers
were just beginning, their careers. Id. The Tax Court, however, found no
merit in this argument since the petitioner had no background in psychoanalysis and could not, therefore, hold herself out as a qualified psychoanalyst
until she graduated from the institute. Id. The court also found the. petitioner's prior exposure to Freudian analysis to be of little significance since
such exposure was not equivalent to an intensive study of psychoanalysis.: Id.
The petitioner further sought to distinguish Namrow on the grounds that
she was encouraged to study psychoanalysis by her employer's fellowship grant,
whereas no such encouragement was given in Namrow. Id. The Tax Court
rejected this distinction unequivocably. Id.
229. Id. at 771. After completing her training, the petitioner engaged in
the practice of both psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Id.
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Gilmore.2380 Given her concession that Namrow was correctly decided and her own view that psychoanalysis was a specialty, it is
difficult to imagine how the court could have found otherwise under
the 1958 regulations.
The final case in this series was Greenberg v. Commissioner.-31
In Greenberg, a practicing psychiatrist who attended a psychoanalytic institute asked the Tax Court to overrule its Namrow
and Gilmore decisions and rule that the expenses of attending the
institute were deductible.23 2 A majority of the court declined to do
so. 233 In reaching its decision, the majority noted certain deficien2 34
dies in the testimony of the taxpayer, who was the sole witness.
For example, although he said that his reason -for taking the training was to improve his skills as a psychiatrist, Greenberg did not
say that this was his primary reason. 2 " Nowhere did he say that
he did not intend to practice as an analyst, and there were "indications" in his testimony that he would.2 6 The majority concluded
that the record "would hardly warrant a finding that petitioner
did not intend to hold himself out as a practicing psychoanalyst
when he completed his 6 year course at the institute." 237 In effect,
the Tax Court majority was spelling out a precise set of questions
for attorneys of-.students of psychoanalysis in future trials. With
proper preparation, then, the next taxpayer would be able to bring
himself within the scope of Watson and keep himself outside the
238
scope of Namrow and Gilmore.
230. Id. at 772. The court failed to find that the primary purpose of the
peti.tioner's study 'was to improve her skills as a psychiatrist or teacher of
psychiatry. Id. at 771.
231. 45 T.C. 480, rev'd, 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1966).
232. 45 T.C. at 481-82. The petitioner argued that the court should
follow the reasoning of the dissent in Namrow. Id. at 482. For a discussion
of* the dissenting opinion in Namrow, see note 216 and accompanying text
supora.
233. 45 T.C. at 482.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. The court gleaned from the petitioner's testimony an intent to
treat some patients at the hospital at which he used psychoanalysis, to use
psychoanalysis in his private practice, and to receive patients referred to him
for psychoanalytic treatment. Id.
237. Id. at 483.
238. Presumably, if the taxpayer testified that his primary purpose was to
maintain or improve the skills involved in his present vocation and that he
did not intend to practice the specialty of psychoanalysis, educational expenses would be deductible. However, the Tax Court in Greenberg expressly stated that it was not indicating whether "a plan not to practice
(which could be legitimately abandoned the day after graduation 6 years
later) would be a factual difference that would point to a legal distinction
between this case and Namrow." Id.
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Two judges concurred in Greenberg, stating that under the
1958 regulations one's acquisition of a new skill, "whether or not
that skill will aid him in the carrying on of an existing trade or;profession" is personal and nondeductible under section 262 of the
Code.2 39 Four judges dissented with three opinions.2 40 Judge Fay,
who heard the case, based his dissent on the primary purpose test,
which turned on all the facts. 2 41 Based largely upon his observation of Greenberg as a witness, Judge Fay believed that Greenberg
in fact undertook the training to maintain and improve his psy-:
chiatric practice rather than to qualify himself to practice as an
analyst. 242 Even if Greenberg was acquiring a new skill, this did
not, in judge Fay's view, preclude a deduction under Carlucci;243
for Judge Fay, the issue was whether any alleged new skill helped
the taxpayer to maintain or improve his present skills. 244 Judge
Dawson dissented because he believed that the primary purpose
test was essentially factual and that the majority therefore should
have accepted Judge Fay's factual conclusion of such a primary
purpose. 245 Furthermore, Judge Dawson felt that educational expenditures should be treated as deductible expenses in the same
fashion as other ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses
under section 162(a). 246 Finally, Judge Dawson felt that Namrow
substituted a result oriented standard-whether the doctors involved in fact became capable of practicing a specialty-for the
primary purpose standard, and that, under the 1958 regulations,
239. Id. at 483 (Withey, J., concurring). Judge Bruce joined in. the
concurring opinion. Id. at 483 (Bruce, J., concurring). Judge Hoyt. concurred only in the result. Id. at 483 (Hoyt, J., concurring).
240. See id. at 483 (Fay, J., dissenting); id. at 486 (Dawson, J., dissenting);
id. at 488 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). Judges Forrester and Fay joined in
all the dissenting opinions. See id. at 486 (Fay, J., dissenting); id. at 488
(Dawson, J., dissenting); id. at 488 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 485 (Fay, J., dissenting). Judge Fay pointed out that the !petitioner's uncontradicted testimony indicated that he undertook psychoanalytic
training to help him do research, teach, and maintain a small private practice of
psychiatry. Id. at 484 (Fay, J., dissenting).
I
242. Id. at 485 (Fay, J., dissenting). In reaching this conclusion, Judge
Fay relied on the petitioner's statement that some doctors undertake psychoanalytic training for the sole purpose of improving their practice of psychiatry.
Id.

243.. Id., citing Carlucci v. Commissioner, 37 TC. 695 (1962).
244. 45 T.C. at 485 (Fay, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 486 (Dawson, J., dissenting).

246. Id. at 486-87 (Dawson, J., dissenting).
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248
this -was incorrect.2 47 On appeal, the First Circuit reversed,
stating that the acquisition of a specialty is not "inconsistent with
the improvement of skills required for the practice of a preexisting
24 9
profession" and, therefore, does not preclude a deduction.

4. Travel and Education
The final, problem under the 1958 regulations concerned
travel as a component of education. The regulations provided that
any travel which was incidental to any otherwise deductible education expense was itself deductible, subject to the usual limitations on business travel.250 Thus, if a taxpayer was "away from
home" in order to obtain a deductible education, his travel expenses, including meals and lodging, were part of his education
deduction. Similarly, if a taxpayer was not away from home for his
otherwise deductible education, transportation expenses other than
commuting expenses were deemed to be a part of his deductible education expenses. Few problems arose in this context, except those
involved in the mechanics of computing the amount deductible,25 1
since the travel deduction was automatic if the underlying educational expense was deductible. This portion of the 1958 regulations
25 2
was carried over verbatim to the current regulations.
247. Id. at 487 (Dawson, J., dissenting). Judge Dawson stated:
The majority in Namrow did not concern itself with the alleged purp~ose of the two psychiatrists to improve their skills. Having decided
that psychoanalysis was a specialty, they concluded that the expenses
could not be deducted unless the psychiatrists were already psychoanalysts before taking the training. Thus the majority substituted

result for primary purpose.

Id. (emphasis by Dawson, J.). In reversing the Tax Court, the First Circuit
adopted Judge Dawson's rationale. See 367 F.2d at 666. See also notes
248-49 and accompanying text infra.
248. 367 F.2d at 668.

249. Id. at 666. The court of appeals further noted:
[M]ost occupations require a bundle of skills. And, to the extent one
is engaged in a learned profession, he must employ a multiplicity of
skills. The fact that what is newly acquired by a taxpayer may be
recognized as a "skill" or a "specialty"-or, as is usually the case,
another group of skills-is irrelevant if the taxpayer's primary pur-pose is to add to his equipment in carrying on his pre-existing vocation.
Id.
250. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 68.
251. For an illustration of the difficulties of computing the expenses of
transportation between two places of business, one of which is a school, see
Burton v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 243 (1971); Boerner v. Commissioner,
30 T.C.M. (CCH) 240 (1971).
252. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 40.

See notes

424-67 and accompanying text infra.
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A completely different aspect of travel in the context. of education concerned what may be termed "travel as education" or ;indirect education." Under some circumstances, travel itself arguably constitutes an educational experience. The 1958 regulations
generally denied a deduction for travel as education,28 but a few
courts did permit such a deduction.m4 However, in 1964 the Service permitted a teacher on a sabbatical leave to. deduct travel expenses "directly related" to his duties as a teacher, 255 and the courts
soon expanded the Service's ruling to encompass all travel as education.5 6 The 1967 regulations codified this expanded "directly
related" standard without the primary purpose test inherent in the
7
older standard.2
5. The Problems With the 1958 Regulations
The night law school and psychoanalyst lines of cases illustrate
the difficulties inherent in any test based upon a subjectiye standard.
Inequities between seemingly similarly situated taxpayers were apparent.258 Predictability of result was therefore impossible. Furthermore, as certain apparently minor factors, such as answers to bar
questionnaires concerning intent to practice law,m9 were shown
to be important for tax purposes, and as attorneys learned what
questions and answers would convince a trier of fact,260 the wellprepared taxpayer was much more likely .to win than one -who
handled his case pro se. These difficulties would have been quite
troublesome with a simple primary purpose test--one which sought
the- taxpayer's single most important reason for seeking the education involved. But the old regulations compounded the difficulties
by creating a confusing interplay of positive and negative factors
with an automatic disallowance for qualification for, as opposed to
actual change to, a new trade or business or specialty. 26 1 This
complex interplay of factors, coupled with a lack of. specificity :as
253. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c), T.D. 6291,. 1958-1 C.B. 68..

254. See, e.g., Duncan v. Bookwalter, 216 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1963);
Sanders v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1960).

255. See Rev. Rul. 64-176, 1964-1 C.B. 87.
256. See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Marlin v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 560 (1970).'
257. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B..39-40.
258. See notes 172-89 and accompanying text supra.
259. See note 189 supra.
260. See notes 231-38 and accompanying text supra.
261. See notes 156-64 and accompanying text supra. .
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to:whdt constituted a "trade or business" or a "specialty," made the
results of any case seem capricious.
..... The 1958 regulations had served their purpose. After decades
of -nondeductibility, the principle that education expenditures
could be treated under section 162 of the Code was established.
In spite of their deficiencies, these regulations did highlight many
of the issues involved in classifying an educational expenditure
as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
In 1967 the Treasury issued new regulations which are still
in effect. 262 : These regulations kept the four factors-two positive
and. two negative-of the prior regulations, 26 3 but the subjective
primary purpose standard was replaced with an objective result
264
oriented standard and the "no specialty" test was eliminated.
And, to prevent the courts from ignoring the negative factors which
were carried over from the 1958 regulations, one had to look to
the negative or disqualifying factors before one ever reached the
positive or qualifying factors. 265 Many other substantive changes
were made. 26 0 But while the 1967 regulations solved some problems
inherent in the prior approach, they have created their own
problems.
D. 1967 to the Present

The regulations issued in 1967 liberalized deductibility in some
situations and restricted deductibility in others. 267 These regulations are still in effect, and they have been upheld consistently by
the courts.2 18 It-is significant, however, that in most of the cases
the dollar sum involved for each taxpayer was quite small.2 6 9 Since
262. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 36-41.

263. See notes 144-55 and accompanying text supra.
264. See notes 281-83 and accompanying text infra. For the text of the
1958 regulations, see notes 149 & 152 supra.
265. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39.

266. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39-40
with Treas. Reg § 1.162-5(c), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 68.
267. See notes 325-31 and accompanying text infra. But see notes; 332-33
and accompanying text infra.
268. See note 568 and accompanying text infra.
269. See,. e.g., Widzowski v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 197 (1978)
($240 expended for real estate courses by social worker not deductible); Davis
v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1014 (1976) (disallowed graduate school expenses
of $752); Reinhard v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1529 (1975) (disallowed
law school expenses of hospital administrator of $1,756.40); Taubman v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 814 (1973) ($764 for law school expenses); Betz v.
Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 119 (1971) (expenses of $751 incurred by
television repairman obtaining degree in engineering technology disallowed);
Denman v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 439 (1967) (expenses of $694 incurred inobtaining engineering degree disallowed).
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few taxpayers have hired an attorney or taken an appeal of an
adverse decision, virtually all the cases have been tried by the taxpayer pro se before the Tax Court 270 with sparse appellate review. 27' This article will question the validity of the current regulations and suggest that in spite of the Commissioner's near perfect
record in defending them, to some extent the regulations are contrary to the statute and thus invalid.272 Before this critique is made,
however, the present regulations will be analyzed.
1. The Pattern of the 1967 Regulations
Regulations section 1.162-5 consists of five paragraphs lettered
(a) through (e). 278 Paragraph (a) gives a so-called general rule of
deductibility. This unambiguously "solves" the interplay of factors problem of the 1958 regulations by stating the primacy of the
negative factors.27 4 No education expenditure can be deductible
unless it can first survive the negative tests of nondeductibility contained in paragraph (b).275 Those expenditures which have survived the negative tests of paragraph (b), and only those, are then
to be tested against the positive factors of deductibility contained
in paragraph (c).276 Two parenthetical phrases complete paragraph
(a): the first states that research may be included in educational
270. See, e.g., Widzowski v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 197 (1978);
Davis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1014 (1976); Taubman v. Commissioner, 60
T.C. 814 (1973); Betz v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 119 (1971); Denman

v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 439 (1967).
271. Few cases have reached the federal appellate courts. For examples of
those that have, see, e.g., Sharon v. Commissioner, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.
1978) (taxpayer's college, law school and bar review course expenses found to
be minimal educational requirements of job and therefore nondeductible);
Melnik v. United States, 521 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1975) (expenses incurred by
Internal Revenue agent in obtaining law degree held nondeductible).
272. See notes 555-649 and accompanying text infra.
273. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 36-41.
274. Id. § 1.162-5(a). Paragraph (a) states:
Expenditures made by an individual for education (including research
undertaken as part of his educational program) which are not expenditures of a type described in paragraph (b)(2) or (3) of this section are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses (even
though the education may lead to a degree) if the education(1) Maintains or improves skills required by the individual in his
employment or other trade or business, or
(2) Meets the express requirements of the individual's employer,
or the requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as
a condition to the retention by the individual of an established employment relationship, status, or rate of compensation.
Id.
275. Id.
276. See id. § 1.162-5(c).
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expenses,2 77 so that "indirect" education expenses are treated the
same as "direct" education expenses, 278 and the second states that
the fact that education may lead to a degree does not preclude
279
deductibility.
Paragraph (b) of section 1.162-5 states the alternate tests of
disallowance.2 80 As will be seen, most of the controversies under
the current regulations have arisen under these negative tests. Paragraph (b) begins by giving the Commissioner's reasons for disallowing certain education expenditures: 281
Educational expenditures described in subparagraphs (2)
and (3) of this paragraph are personal expenditures or constitute an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital
expenditures and, therefore, are not deductible as ordinary
and necessary business expenses even though the education
may maintain or improve skills required by the individual
in his employment or other trade or business or may meet
the express requirements of the282individual's employer or
of applicable law or regulations.
Under this theory, the Commissioner disallows any expenditures
for education which permit the taxpayer to satisfy the minimum
educational requirements of his current trade or business. 23 Also
disallowed are any expenditures for any education which qualify
277. Id. § I.162-5(a).
278. For a discussion of the distinction between direct and indirect education expenses, see notes 37-38 & 56-64 and accompanying text supra.
279. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37.
280. Id. § 1.162-5(b).
281. Id.
282. Id. (emphasis added).
283. Id. § 1.162-5(b)(2). Paragraph (b)(2) states:
(i) The first category of nondeductible educational expenses within
the scope of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph are expenditures made
by an individual for education which is required of him in order to
meet the minimum educational requirements for qualification in his
employment or other trade or business. The minimum education
necessary to qualify for a position or other trade or business must be
determined from a consideration of such factors as the requirements
of the employer, the applicable law and regulations, and the standards of the profession, trade, or business involved. The fact that an
individual is already performing service in an employment status does
not establish that he has met the minimum educational requirements
for qualification in that employment. Once an individual has met the
minimum educational requirements for qualification in his employment or other trade or business (as. in effect when he enters the employment or trade or business), he shall be treated as continuing to meet
those requirements even though they are changed.
(ii) The minimum educational requirements for qualification of a
particular individual in a position in an educational institution is
the minimum level of education (in terms of aggregate college hours
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275

the taxpayer for a new trade or business.284 Each test is stated objec2
tively; the primary purpose language has been entirely eliminated. 85
or degree) which under the applicable laws or regulations, in effect at
the time this individual is first employed in such position, is normally required of an individual initially being employed in such a
position. If there are no normal requirements as to the minimum
level of education required for a position in an educational institution, then an individual in such a position shall be considered to have
met the minimum educational requirements for qualification in
that position when he becomes a member of the faculty of the educational institution. The determination of whether an individual is a
member of the faculty of an educational institution must be made on
the basis of the particular practices of the institution. However, an
individual will ordinarily be considered to be a member of the faculty of an institution if (a) he has tenure or his years of service are
being counted toward obtaining tenure; (b) the institution is making
contributions to a retirement plan (other than Social Security or a
similar program) in respect of his employment; or (c) he has a vote in
faculty affairs.
Id.
284. Id. § 1.162-5(b)(3). Paragraph (b)(3) states:
(i) The second category of nondeductible educational expenses
within the scope of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph are expenditures
made by an individual for education whih is part of a program of
study being pursued by him which will lead to qualifying him in
a new trade or business. In the case of an employee, a change of
duties does not constitute a new trade or business if the new duties
involve the same general type of work as is involved in the individual's
present employment. For this purpose, all teaching and related duties shall be considered to involve the same general type of work.
The following are examples of changes in duties which do not constitute new trades or businesses:
(a) Elementary to secondary school classroom teacher.
(b) Classroom teacher in one subject (such as mathematics) to
classroom teacher in another subject (such as science).
(c) Classroom teacher to guidance- counselor.
(d) Classroom teacher to principal.
(ii) The application of this subparagraph to individuals other than
teachers may be illustrated by the following examples:
Example (1). A, a self-employed individual practicing, a profession other than law, for example, engineering, accounting, etc., attends
law school at night and after completing his law school studies receives a bachelor of laws degree. The expenditures made by A in
attending law school are nondeductible because this course of study
qualifies him for a new trade or business.
Example (2). Assume the same facts as in example (I) except that
A has the status of an employee rather than a self-employed individual,
and that his employer requires him to obtain a bachelor of laws degree.
A intends to continue practicing his nonlegal profession as an em*ployee of such employer. Nevertheless, the expenditures made by A
in attending law school are not deductible since this course of study
qualifies him for a new trade or business.
. Example (3). B, a general practitioner of medicine, takes a 2-week
c ourse reviewing new developments in several specialized fields of medi-.
cine. B's expenses for the course are deductible because the course
maintains or improves skills required by him in his trade or business
and does not qualify him for a new trade or business.
Example (4). C, while engaged in the private practice of psychiatry, undertakes a program of study and training at an accredited psy-
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Paragraph (c) 288 briefly restates both the "maintains or improves" test derived from Coughlin 287 and the "employer requirement" test derived from Hill.288

Since there were few problems

under the positive tests of the prior regulations, these tests are briefly
stated and no examples are given. 2 9 Emphasizing the primacy of
paragraph (b) over paragraph (c), the statement of each positive
test is followed by a reminder that any expenditure apparently
deductible under paragraph (c) can be rendered nondeductible by
paragraph (b).2 90

These positive tests are also stated objectively

and the primary purpose language has been eliminated.
choanalytic institute which will lead to qualifying him to practice
psychoanalysis. C's expenditures for such study and training are deductible because the study and training maintains or improves skills
required by him in his trade or business and does not qualify him for
a new trade or business.
Id.

285. For an examination of the basis of this disallowance provision, see
notes 713-23 and accompanying text infra.
286. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39. Paragraph (c)
provides:
(1) Maintaining or improving skills. The deduction under the
category of expenditures for education which maintains or improves
skills required by the individual in his employment or other trade or
business includes refresher courses or courses dealing with current developments as well as academic or vocational courses provided the
expenditures for the courses are not within either category of nondeductible expenditures described in paragraph (b)(2) or (3) of this
section.
(2) Meeting requirements of employer. An individual is considered to have undertaken education in order to meet the express requirements of his employer, or the requirements of applicable law
or regulations, imposed as a condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his established employment relationship, status, or rate of
compensation only if such requirements are imposed for a bona fide
business purpose of the individual's employer. Only the minimum
education necessary to the retention by the individual of his established employment relationship, status, or rate of compensation may
be considered as undertaken to meet the express requirements of the
taxpayer's employer. However, education in excess of such minimum
education may qualify as education undertaken in order to maintain or improve the skills required by the taxpayer in his employment
or other trade or business (see subparagraph (1) of this paragraph).
In no event, however, is a deduction allowable for expenditures for
education which, even though for education required by the employer or applicable law or regulations, are within one of the categories
of nondeductible expenditures described in paragraph (b)(2) and (3)
of this section.
287. For a discussion of Coughlin, see notes 124-40 and accompanying text

supra.

288. For a discussion of Hill, see notes 78-94 and accompanying text supra.
289. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39.
290. Id.
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The final two paragraphs deal with the travel aspects of an
29
educational expense. Paragraph (d) deals with travel as education, '
and paragraph (e) deals with travel incident to other educational
29 2
expenses.
2. The Disqualifying Tests
Although an early comment on the 1967 regulations suggested
that the automatic disallowance tests of section 1.162-5(b) were not
warranted under the statute,293 these regulations have been con29 4
sistently upheld.
The disqualifying tests of paragraph (b) are the heart of the
regulations. The (b)(2) and (b)(3) tests 295 are the most litigated
areas of the current regulations and contain the greatest changes
from the prior regulations. Thus, any discussion of the present
regulations must begin with this paragraph. When discussing the
(b)(2) and (b)(3) disqualifying tests, one should bear in mind the
Commissioner's reasons for disqualification. As stated in subparagraph (b)(1), disqualification of an educational expense turns on the
"personal" or the "inseparable personal and capital" nature of the
29 6
education involved.
The (b)(2) test disqualifies any educational expenditure which
is required of a taxpayer in order to satisfy the "minimum educational requirements" of his "employment or other trade or business." 297 Whether a given position has a minimum educational
requirement, and if it does, what the minimum standard is for that
position, are both questions of fact.298 The minimum educational
requirement is that standard which was in effect at the time the
particular taxpayer began working at his present position. If the
educational standards of a taxpayer's present position are raised
after the taxpayer had already met the prior standards of that position, the minimum educational requirements test will not deny a
291. Id. § 1.162-5(d).
292. Id. § 1.162-5(e).

293. See Comment, supra note 196, at 205-08.
9521
294. See, e.g., Melnick v. United States, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 521 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1975); Taubman v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 814 (1973); Weiszman v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1106
(1969), aff'd per curiam, 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971).
295. See notes 282-85 and accompanying text supra.
296. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37. For the text
of § 1.162-5(b)(1), see note 282 and accompanying text supra.
297. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37. For the text
of § 1.162-5(b)(2), see note 283 supra.
298. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37.
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deduction for the expenses of meeting the new requirements. 29 '
Thus, once one has qualified for a position he remains qualified for
that position regardless of any future changes in the minimum
qualifications. 30 0
The "minimum educational requirements" are those of the
taxpayer's "employment or other trade or business." 301 At first
reading, this language seems to refer to the standards of the taxpayer's actual trade or business, whether that trade or business is
carried on as an employee or as an independent contractor. How30 2
ever, the Commissioner has argued in Toner v. Commissioner
that this phrase should be read expansively, so that it refers either
to the taxpayer's present employment or to another trade or business. 803 Although this reading would seem to render the "no new
trade or business" standard of the (b)(3) regulation superfluous
since there is no way to differentiate a "new" trade or business from
"another" trade or business, five judges of the Tax Court have
agreed with the Commissioner. 34 However, since ten Tax Court
judges and a panel of three judges of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit specifically rejected this argument, 3°5 it would seem
that the Commissioner's position is incorrect and that the referent
of the "minimum educational requirements" test should be that
of the taxpayer's actual trade or business.
Since minimum educational requirements are most common
in the teaching profession, the regulations go into great detail as
to what constitutes the minimum requirements for teachers. 06
299. Id.
300. See Kamins v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1238 (1956).
301. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(i), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37. For the text
of § 1.162-5(b)(2)(i), see note 283 supra.
302. 71 T.C. 772 (1979), rev'd, 623 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1980).
303. 71 T.C. at 775.
304. Id. at 782.
305. See 316 F.2d at 319-20. The seven dissenting and three concurring
judges of the Tax Court in Toner felt that this was an unwarranted reading of
the regulations because such a reading would make subparagraph (b)(2) so broad
as to make subparagraph (b)(3) redundant. See 71 T.C. at 782 (Drennen, J.,
concurring); id. at 782-83 (Sterrett, J., concurring); id. at 783-84 (Chabot, J.,
concurring); id. at 786 (Fay, J., dissenting); id. at 787-88 (Goffe, J., dissenting).
Since minimum qualification for another trade or business-one in which the
taxpayer is not presently engaged-is much the same thing as qualifying for a
new trade or business, the plurality's opinion was quite surprising. The Third
Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court, unanimously held the Tax Court plurality's
reading of the phrase to be incorrect. See 623 F.2d at 319-20.
306. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(ii), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37. Clause
(iii) of subparagraph (b)(2) contains several examples, all but one of which deal
only with teachers. See id. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(iii).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss2/1

42

Schoenfeld: The Educational Expense Deduction: The Need for a Rational Approa

1981.82]

THE EDUCATIONAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION

Thus, for example, there usually are certain minimum college credit
requirements for a regular position as an elementary or secondary
school teacher. If a teacher is hired with fewer than the number of
required credits, the expenses of earning the credits needed to satisfy the minimum requirement is not deductible.30 7 This is true
even if the unaccredited appointee is already -performing all the
duties of a regular teacher. However, if a teacher was hired when
only a bachelor's degree was required for a regular appointment,
and the minimum qualification was raised thereafter to five years of
college, he may deduct. the expenses of a fifth year. 08 This is
apparently true even if the teacher in question had not satisfied the
four-year requirement when he was hired 309 or if a teacher in the
same school system who had been hired after a fifth year of college
became a requirement would not be entitled to a deduction for his
expenses for the fifth year of college. For some unexplained reason, possession of required credits in "professional education"
courses, as opposed to total credits toward a degree, is not considered
10
to be a minimum standard in this context
Whenever minimum educational requirements are not specified,
the regulations state that a teacher meets the minimum requirement
"when he becomes a member of the faculty of the educational institution." 311 This "member of the faculty" status is a question
of fact and may differ among educational institutions; but usually
one is a faculty member if he is tenured or on a tenure track, votes
12
on faculty affairs, and participates in the school's retirement plan.
In practice, this "faculty status" rule will apply primarily to teachers
at colleges and universities, rather than those in elementary or secondary schools,8 18 and most taxpayers whose faculty status is in
question will be teaching assistants at universities who may do some
teaching while working toward their graduate degrees. In most
307. Id. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(iii), Example 1.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. For the text of § 1.162-5(b)(2)(ii), see note 283 supra.
312. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(ii), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37.
313. The "faculty status" of an elementary school teacher was at issue in
Toner. For a discussion of Toner, see notes 302-05 and accompanying text

supra; notes 346-52 and accompanying text infra. Reversing the Tax Court,
the Third Circuit stated that the taxpayer became a full member of the faculty
when she was first employed because she was so treated by her employer in all
relevant respects. See 623 F.2d at 319.
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cases, such student teaching assistants are not faculty members.3 1 4
As has been said of one such teaching assistant, he "worked because
he studied. He did not study because he worked." 311
These "faculty status" cases often can be categorized as "paraprofessional versus professional" or as "apprentice versus master"
cases. As will be seen in the discussion of what constitutes a new
trade or business under the (b)(3) test, 1 6 an apprentice teacher-one
who is not yet fully qualified by the standards of his institution-is
not yet a teacher. Thus it can be said that the apprentice fails both
the (b)(2) test, because he is still seeking the minimum for a fully
qualified teacher, and also the (b)(3) test, because he is qualifying
for the new trade or business of being a teacher. This overlap can
occur at the university level 317 or at the elementary school level. 318
The Commissioner and the courts often do not differentiate the
(b)(2) test from the (b)(3) test in this context. 319 In the "apprentice" cases it does not matter, but there is often a similar blurring
of the line between the (b)(2) and (b)(3) tests in some other areas
20
where it does matter.
Since minimum educational requirements are rare outside the
teaching profession, it is not surprising that the (b)(2) regulation
contains only a single example concerning a non-teacher. 32' This
example deals with a law student who is hired by a law firm after
completion of his second year and is required by that firm to finish
law school at night while working full time.3 22

The expenses of

323
finishing law school and of a bar review course are disallowed.
Possibly this is another "apprentice" case; but, since he is clearly
qualifying for a new trade or business, it seems that this disallow-

314. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(iii), Example 2, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37.
See also Davis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1014 (1976); Jungreis v. Commissioner,
55 T.C. 581 (1971).

315. Jungreis v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 581, 593 (1971) (Tannenwald, J.,
concurring).

See also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(iii), Example 3, T.D. 6918,

1967-1 C.B. 38.
316. See notes 334-56 and accompanying text infra.
317. See Jungreis v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 581 (1971).
318. See Diaz v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1067 (1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 995
(2d Cir. 1979).
319. See id.
320. For a discussion of this blurring of the (b)(2) and (b)(3) tests, see note
324 and accompanying text infra.
321. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(iii), Example 3, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B.
38.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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ance should be based on the (b)(3) test rather than trying to fit it
3 24
-within (b)(2).
Since most "employments" or "other trades or businesses" out.side teaching do not have minimum educational requirements, most
,cases turn on the "no new trade or business test" of (b)(3).
The (b)(3) test automatically disqualifies any otherwise deductible education expense whenever the taxpayer's education in question is "part of a program of study.., which will lead to qualifying
him in a new trade or business." 325 This factor was derived from
somewhat similar language in the 1958 regulations "26 and in Revenue Ruling 60-97327 issued under those regulations. The current
version of this disqualifying test differs from the pre-1967 version in
two important respects. First of all, the subjective primary pur328
pose test was dropped and replaced by an "objective" standard.
Secondly, the disallowance is limited to qualification for a new
trade or business; a deduction is permitted even if the taxpayer will
qualify for a new position or specialty. 29 These two changes have
solved two major problems under the prior regulations. First, since
the "no specialty" rule has been dropped, psychiatrists may now
deduct the costs of becoming psychoanalysts 330 and dentists may
deduct the costs of full-time study of orthodontics while continuing
a part-time practice of general dentistry. 331 Second, since a first
degree in law is always part of a program which qualifies one for a
new trade or business,3 3 2 the present regulations effectively deny a
324. Toner presented a similar situation in which the (b)(2) and (b)(3) tests
were confused. Although the Tax Court plurality and the Commissioner seemed
to confuse the tests, the Third Circuit properly differentiated between them in
reversing the Tax Court. See 623 F.2d at 319-20. For a discussion of Toner,
see notes 302-05 and accompanying text supra; notes 346-52 and accompanying
text infra.
325. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(i), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 38-39. For the
text of this provision, see note 284 supra.
326. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67-68.
327. 1960-1 C.B. 69, 74. For the pertinent text of this Revenue Ruling,
see notes 156 & 160 supra.
328. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37 with
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67. For the text of these provisions, see notes 149 & 274 supra.
329. Id.
330. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), Example 4, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39.
See Voigt v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 82 (1980) (clinical social worker permitted
deduction for her own psychoanalysis). For a discussion of this problem under
the 1958 regulations, see notes 197-249 and accompanying text supra.
331. Rev. Rul. 74-78, 1974-1 C.B. 44.
332. Graduate programs in law often will generate a deduction, however.
See notes 480-554 and accompanying text infra.
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deduction for any law school expenses because a finding of a proper
primary purpose can no longer save the deduction as it did in
Welsh.338

The (b)(3) regulations rely heavily on the concept of a new
trade or business. However, they contain no definition of that
phrase, except the statement: "In the case of an employee, a change
of duties does not constitute a new trade or business if the new
duties involve the same general type of work as is involved in the
individual's present employment." 334 Indeed, there is no elaboration on this except as it pertains to teachers. 335 For example, the
regulations do not explain why they are limited to employees, since
the self-employed may change activities within the same general
type of work. 36 They also do not say whether an employee may
change employers if he stays in the same general type of work with
his new employer. Most peculiarly, the parameters of the concept of
"same general type of work" are not defined. Since this phrase is
not relevant anywhere else in tax law, or in any other area of law,
and since this is the only standard of what is the same trade or
business, some guidance in areas other than teaching would have
been useful. It is conceded, possibly too broadly, that "all teaching
and related duties . .. involve the same general type of work." 837
Examples of teaching in this broadly defined trade or business include elementary and secondary school classroom teachers, counselors, and school principals within that single trade or business.8 88
For all practical purposes, once one has become a fully qualified
teacher,33 9 virtually any change in position is possible without putting that teacher into a new trade or business.8 40 This very liberal
333. For a discussion of Welsh, see notes 181-89 and accompanying text
supra. But see Chariton v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 470 (1964) (law
school expenses held deductible since degree obtained to improve skills as accountant).
334. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(i), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 38-39.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Becoming a fully qualified teacher would satisfy the "minimum educational requirement" test. For a discussion of this test, see notes 297-306 and
accompanying text supra. A teacher's aide, whose duties are found to be substantially different from those of a fully qualified teacher, will not be deemed
to be in the same trade or business when she becomes a teacher. Diaz v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1067 (1978), af'd, 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1979). Similarly,
graduate assistants at a university are not university teachers. Jungreis v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 581 (1970).
340. See note 339 supra and authorities cited therein.
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approach was' expanded further to permit a teacher who was fully
qualified to teach in one state to deduct the cost of education qualifying her to teach in another state a4 or in another country. 42 A
deduction was allowed to a college professor who obtained a doctorate to become a junior college president, thus implying a similar
flexible definition of trade in "trade or business" for higher education.3 43 It is not clear whether the same flexibility will be permitted
for an elementary or secondary level classroom teacher who wishes to
move into the college or university level.3 44 While there is the
liberal approach in the (b)(3) test that all teachers do the same
general type of work, there seems to be a more restrictive approach
in the (b)(2) minimum qualification test dealing with "member of
45
the faculty" status.3

In some circumstances, the Commissioner has argued that, in
spite of the clear language of the regulations, all teachers are not
in the same trade or business. In Toner, the taxpayer was an elementary school teacher in a parochial school.3 46 Her employer required that starting elementary teachers possess a high school diploma and that if they did not possess a bachelor's degree they
must take six college credits each year until such a degree was
obtained. 47 Mrs. Toner had completed two years of college when
she was first hired and continued working towards her bachelor's
degree as a part-time student.348 The Commissioner disallowed any
deduction for the expenses of Mrs. Toner's education.3 49 The Tax
Court, in a confusing set of opinions, found for the Commissioner
341. Rev. Rul. 71-58, 1971-1 G.B. 55.
342. Laurano v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 723 (1978). In Laurano, a Canadian
who was fully licensed to teach in Canada was required to take additional
credits to become certified to teach in New Jersey. Id. at 725. Non-teachers,
moving from one jurisdiction to another, cannot claim a deduction for education expenses required by that move. See Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515
(1976), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978); Horodysky v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
490 (1970).
343. Rev. Rul. 68-580, 1968-2 C.B. 72.
344. See Bouchard v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1098 (1977). The

Bouchard court stated in dictum that the move from kindergarten teacher to
college professor would not constitute the "same general type of work." Id.
at 1100..
345. For a discussion of this factor, see notes 311-15 and accompanying
text supra.
346. 71 T.C. at 772.
347. Id. at 773-74.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 775.
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under a combination of (b)(2) and (b)(3) reasons.uO The three
concurring judges in the Tax Court felt that Mrs. Toner was qualifying for a new trade or business,ul but, in reversing the Tax Court,
the Third Circuit specifically found that clause (b)(3)(i) of the regulations applied to the duties of a fully qualified parochial or public
elementary school teacher, stating that all teaching involves the
"same general type of work." 32
Having devoted so much space to giving a virtual blanket immunity against the "no new trade or business" rule to teachers, it
is surprising that the (b)(3) regulations treat non-teachers in only
a few examples. For example, law school expenditures 353 are specifically denied for both self-employed professionals M4 and employees.Yr No mention is made of the "same general type of work"
approach to "new trade or business" in this context. Indeed, the
regulations disallow law school expenses even if the taxpayer is
required to attend law school, and even if he continues in the same
profession or position after completing law school and never practices law.3s6 Quite clearly, the Commissioner does not apply the
"same general type of work" approach to law school education,
even if one's activities do not change as a result of the education.
350. Id. at 782. The deficiency notice sent to the taxpayer in Toner re-

ferred only to the "minimum requirements" test of subparagraph (b)(2). However, the five judge plurality of the Tax Court read the (b)(2)(i) language
concerning qualification for the taxpayer's "employment or other trade or business" to include qualifying for another trade or business, thereby overlapping
the (b)(3) test. Id. at 777-78. See note 324 and accompanying text supra. The
three Tax Court judges who concurred found against the taxpayer under a
(b)(3) approach although this issue was not pleaded or argued. See 71 T.C. at
787-90 (Goffe, J., dissenting).
351. See 71 T.C. at 782 (Drennen, J., concurring); id. at 782-83 (Sterrett,
J., concurring); id. at 783-84 (Chabot, J., concurring).
352. 623 F.2d at 320, quoting Treas. keg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(i), T.D. 6918,
1967-1 C.B. 38-39. Whether the Commissioner will continue to maintain that
parochial school teachers are not "teachers" after his loss in Toner cannot be
predicted. Possibly this argument was used to articulate the government's feeling that anyone without a college degree cannot be a teacher. At oral argument before the Third Circuit, the government argued that expenses of a
bachelor's degree could never be deductible. Thus, the government's position
could have been that a teacher without a degree is not the same thing as a
teacher with a degree. The (b)(3) regulations, however, use the "same general
type of work" approach rather than qualifications to determine the parameters
of a trade or business. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B.
38-39. Moreover, subparagraph (a)(1) permits a deduction even if the education
leads to a degree; it does not specify whether the degree must be an undergraduate or a graduate degree. Id. § 1.162-5(a).
353. See note 332 and accompanying text supra.
354. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), Example 1, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39.
355. Id., Example 2.
356. Id.
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One may justifiably ask whether the "same general type of
work" test is useful at all. For teachers, its applicability is so broad
that it means little; for law students, its inapplicability to any situation makes it mean even less. One. might "save" the rule by assuming that the teacher and law student situations are so obvious
that the rule is not really needed and that it should be applied
only to more ambiguous situations. However, there are no examples to indicate how the rule might work in such cases. The
rule might be "saved" in part if it is understood only to mean that
qualifying for a specialty does not violate the new trade or business
rule-a generalist and a specialist might thus be considered as doing
the same general type of work. This might be inferred from the
regulations' allowance of the educational expenditures involved
when a psychiatrist becomes a psychoanalyst.A5 7 However, if the
Commissioner wished to say that the educational expenses of specializing within a field are deductible but that education transcending specialization within a field really qualifies one for a new trade
or business and thus is not deductible, the language used in the
regulations achieves that result in quite a roundabout fashion.
Furthermore, it is not certain that these regulations apply to other
specialization situations such as graduate law programs. 8
The
remaining example in the regulations merely restates the holding
in Coughlin that a short refresher course maintains one in his
present trade or business.3 9 It is therefore submitted that the
.same general type of work" concept of the regulations is useless.
If the regulations render an education expense nondeductible because it qualifies one for a new trade or business, a more meaningful measure of the exact boundaries of "trade or business" should
have been placed in those same regulations. 300
Many taxpayers have contested the (b)(3) regulations, but the
Commissioner has emerged victorious in all the reported cases except Toner.8 61 For example, no law school student has won a deduction under the new regulations, whether he was an accountant, 6 2
357. Id., Example 4.
358. See notes 480-554 and accompanying text infra.
359. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), Example 3, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B.
39.
360. For further discussion of this issue, see notes 608-33 and accompanying
text infra.
361. For a discussion of Toner, see notes 346-52 and accompanying text
supra.
362. See O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 781 (1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d
1406 (7th Cir. 1975).
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insurance claims adjuster, 863 industrial arts teacher,38

officer, 30.

6

teacher,8 67

patent examiner,' mathematics
enue agent,836 hospital administrator 69 doctor, 7 0
systems analyst. 8 1 This automatic disallowance for
penses will be criticized below.
In. addition to law students, other taxpayers

probation

Internal Revor computer
law school exwho arguably

were improving their skills in their present trades or businesses
have been found to be qualifying for new trade or businesses. For
example, a hospital orderly who was studying to become a hospital
administrator,3 72 a nurse studying to become a doctor,3 73 a pharmacy intern studying to become a registered pharmacist,374 a clerk
in a brokerage house studying to become a registered representative,37 5 and a public accountant studying to become a certified
public accountant3 76 were all denied deductions for their educational expenses. But while it is easy to see that a hospital orderly
and a hospital administrator are doing different tasks, it is not easy
to perceive that the difference is substantially greater than that
between a teacher and a school principal. Similarly, the difference
between a certified public accountant and a public accountant is
arguably no greater than that between a high school science teacher
and a first grade teacher.377 Apparently, both the Commissioner
and the courts have taken a "hard line" approach to what is a new
trade or business for all fields except teaching, and some medical

specialties.
363. Connelly v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 376, aff'd, 72-1 U.S. Tax
9188 (1st Cir. 1971).
364. Wright v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 31 (1973).
365. Feistman v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 129 (1974).
366. Lunsford v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 64 (1973).
367. Bouchard v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1098 (1977).
368. Melnick v. United States, 521 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1975).
369. Reinhard v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1529 (1975).
370. Anderson v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9578 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
371. Dinsmore v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008 (1977).
372. Hague v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 126 (1978).
373. Cannon v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1130 (1977).
374. Antzoulatos v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1426 (1975).
.,375. Kandell v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1227 (1971).
376. Glenn v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 270 (1974).
377. The taxpayer is confronted by serious problems of proof as to what
would constitute a separate trade or business in light of the lack of guidance
provided by the regulations. See Taubman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 814, 819
(1973).
Cas.
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":. It must be emphasized that the (b)(3) tests deny a deduction
for any education which qualifies a taxpayer for a new trade or
business. There is no need to show that the taxpayer intended to
enter that new trade or business since the 1967 regulations are objective and primary purpose no longer plays any role. 78 Even if
the taxpayer ultimately stays in the same trade or business, no deduction is allowed if: the education qualifies him for some other trade
or business.8 79 This absolute disqualification of any education,
which hypothetically, theoretically, or incidentally qualifies a taxpayer for a trade or business that he never had any realistic expectation of entering, is a serious defect in the present regulations. 88 0
3. The Qualifying Tests
Educational expenses which have not been disqualified under
either subparagraph (b)(2) or subparagraph (b)(3) must still satisfy
either of the two tests of paragraph (c) of regulations section
1.162-5 in order to be deductible. 881 Subparagraph (c) (1) 8 restates the "maintains or improves" standard of the 1958 regulations-without "primary purpose"-derived from Coughlin.383 Subrestates the "requirements of the employer"
paragraph (c)(2)
standard of the 1958 regulations-again without "primary purpose"
-derived from Hillsss Neither subparagraph of the regulations
contains any examples or elaboration, and, in fact, few problems
have arisen under either provision.
There are two areas, however, in which the "maintains or improves" test has been involved. First, if a taxpayer is not carrying
on a trade or business at the time he is studying, no deduction can
be allowed under section 162 of the Code. 8 6 This effectively denies any educational expense deduction to those who have not yet
entered a trade or business, including apprentices. It also denies
378. See note 285 and accompanying text supra.
379. See note 356 and accompanying text supra.
380. For further discussion of this issue, see notes 589-95 and accompanying
text infra.

381. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39.
382. Id. § 1.162-5(c)(1).

For the text of § 1.162-5(c)(1), see note 286 supra.

383. For a discussion of Coughlin, see notes 124-40 and accompanying text
supra.

384. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(2), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39. For the text of
subparagraph (c)(2), see note 286 supra.
385. For a discussion of Hill, see notes 78-94 and accompanying text supra.

386. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1981). This rule was derived from the "carrying on"
language of § 162(a) rather than from the regulations. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
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a deduction to those who had been in a trade or business at some
prior time but had taken a leave or retired before incurring the
expenses in question. Second, a taxpayer who clearly is in a trade
or business cannot deduct an expense unless that expense is proximately related to that trade or business.88 7
In the context of educational expenses, one who is a full-time
student is not in a trade or business and, consequently, the educational expenses of a full-time student are never deductible,38 8 even
if he is participating in his school's work-study program. 8 9 Consider
the following hypothetical. Suppose that a full-time law student
graduates, passes the bar, works for three summer months in a law
firm, and then enrolls as a full-time student in a graduate tax program open only to law school graduates. It is arguable that his
status as a full-time student continues, uninterrupted by the threemonth clerkship and unaffected by his being licensed to practice
law.8 90 Alternatively, it could be argued that he entered the trade
or business of law upon his admission to practice and that he took a
temporary leave to take courses proximately related to his trade or
business. 391 If the recent law school graduate instead took a two-day
seminar in trial practice, the argument for deductibility is probably
stronger since it is more customary for recently admitted lawyers
to take such practice seminars, but the standard for entry into a
trade or business should be the same in this situation as it is for the
graduate tax program. If the time of entry into a trade or business
387. See note 386 supra.
388. Roberts v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1000 (1979); Cornish v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. 235 (1970).
389. Gallery v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 257 (1971).
390. See Johnson v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. La. 1971); Randick v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 195 (1976). Educational expenses were
disallowed for a college graduate with a degree in engineering who commenced
his graduate education after employment as an engineer for one year in Reisine
v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1429 (1970). In Houston v. Commissioner,
32 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (1973), a taxpayer who entered the military as a pilot
after completing one year of study for a master's degree in business administration and two summers of work in engineering was denied a deduction for the
costs of the degree because he had not established himself in the trade or business of engineering. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) at 686-87, 690. Thus it is the amount
of time practicing one's profession that seems to be relevant to the question of
deductibility, not just elapsed time after the first degree or base qualification
for a profession. Reisine seems extreme if it is construed to stand for the
proposition that one year's practice does not constitute entry into a profession.
391. See Ruehmann v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 675 (1971) (expenses of bachelor of laws degree disallowed, but expenses of post-graduate legal
degree allowed because taxpayer was practicing law after he received first degree
and was admitted to bar). For a discussion of the deductibility of post-graduate
legal education, see notes 480-554 and accompanying text infra.
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depends on facts such as whether the lawyer has a legal or a moral
obligation to return to the same firm after he earns his graduate
degree, the objective approach of the regulations becomes somewhat
subjective.
A taxpayer who has engaged in a trade or business and then
retires, takes a leave of absence, or otherwise no longer actively performs that trade or business presents another problem. If a taxpayer takes a leave of absence from his employer or otherwise tem
porarily ceases to engage in his trade or business, he will be deemed
to remain in that trade or business for that temporary period. 392
Ordinarily, the Commissioner will consider a suspension of activities
for one year or less to be temporary; 393 but a taxpayer's indefinite
suspension-longer than a year and with no specific plans to reenter
the trade or business-will not qualify as "temporary" in the Commissioner's judgment.3
The courts are more liberal, and have
found that a taxpayer is still carrying on a trade or business during a
hiatus if he realistically intends to resume that trade or business,
whether or not with the same employer, at some indefinite future
time. 89 This "carrying on" continues after the taxpayer has completed his education, even if he cannot find a new position, so long
as he is actively seeking such employment. 896 Obviously, one who
has retired is no longer engaged in a trade or business and cannot
claim an education expense deduction.3 9 7 Suppose, however, that a
professional goes into semi-retirement. Even at a reduced level of
392. Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968).
393. Rev. Rul. 68-591, 1968-2 C.B. 73. The Commissioner has stated that
the Service will ordinarily follow Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292 (7th

Cir. 1968), in situations in which the suspension of activities is for one year or
less. See Rev. Rul. 68-591, 1968-2 C.B. 73. See also Rev. Rul. 77-32, 1977-1
C.B. 38. For a discussion of Furner, see note 392 and accompanying text supra.
394. See Rev. Rul. 77-32, 1977-1 C.B. 38; Rev. Rul. 68-591, 1968-2 C.B. 73.
395. Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968). Rev. Rul. 68591 specifically disallowed the Furner "normal incident of the trade or business"
approach in limiting the "temporary" period to one year. See Rev. Rul. 68-591,
1968-2 C.B. 73. The Tax Court finds the ruling not persuasive and treats the
issue of what is "temporary" as a question of fact. See Hitt v. Commissioner,
37 T.C.M. (CCH) 333 (1978) (three year doctorate program in nursing); Picknally v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1292 (1977) (three year doctorate program in education); Sherman v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1191 (1971)
(two year program for master's degree in business administration). None of
these cases used the "normal incident" language of Furner, but the approach
was the same.
396. Picknally v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1292 (1977).
397. Estate of Sussman v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1430 (1978).
In Sussman, the taxpayer had retired and had no income from his former profession during the taxable year in issue, and there was no evidence that he
attempted to seek further work. Id. at 1431.
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activity he should be able to "keep his tools sharp," but there is
no authority allowing or denying a deduction for the semi-retired.
Even if it is determined that a taxpayer is engaged in a trade
or business, no educational expense can be deductible unless the taxpayer demonstrates a proximate relationship between his trade or
business and his education. The existence of such a nexus is a question of fact. 398 While the factual nature of this issue makes generalizations difficult and minimizes the value of precedent, some
illustrations may prove helpful. For example, the following taxpayers could not show the required nexus: an instructor in an Army
artillery school who took courses in psychology and public administration; 899 a teacher who researched solar eclipses; 400 a certified
public accountant, who flew private planes to audits, who took flying
lessons; 401 a consulting aeronautical engineer and retired Navy pilot
who sought to deduct the cost of maintaining his plane; 402 a research
engineer who studied French and chemistry; 403 a methods and controls analyst matriculating as a part-time student toward a bachelor
of science degree who took courses in philosophy, sociology, and
economics;

404

an engineer-manager who studied philosophy;

405

an

Air Force dental anesthesiologist based in Germany, but about to
leave for home, who studied German; 406 a salesman of television air
time who took a doctorate in American civilization; 407 an airline
pilot who took a master's degree in business administration; 408 an
engineer, not in management, who took a master's in business; 409
398. Schwartz v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 877, 889 (1978), citing Baker v.
Commissioner, 51 T.C. 243 (1968). Since Schwartz was decided under the cur,rent regulations and Baker was decided under the 1958 regulations, in all probability the factual nature of the question of whether education has the requisite
nexus with a given trade or business would be the same under both sets of regulations. In Shaw v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 626 (1969), the court found
that the result on the facts before it would be the same under either set of regulations. See id. at 631. This article will assume that the pre-1967 cases dealing
with the "maintains or improves" test would have been decided the same way
under the current regulations.
399. Rev. Rul. 61-133, 1961-2 C.B. 35.
400. Feldman v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 444 (1967).
401. Katz v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 87 (1968).

402.
403.
404.
405.

Fischer v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 164 (1968).
Joyce v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1333 (1969).
Coughlin v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 459 (1969).
Mullen v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 925 (1970).

406. Stebbins v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 789 (1971).
407. Gross v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1098 (1972).
408. Silverton v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 142 (1978).

409. McIlvoy v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 987 (1979).
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and public school teachers who took courses in income taxation,
foreign languages, and travel. 410 Other cases denying a deduction,
but arguably closer to the line, involved: a Chicago policeman who
took pre-law courses in college; 411 a probation officer who studied
sociology; 412 and several military officers who studied for bachelor's
or master's degrees in order to avoid an almost forced retirement
under an "up or out" system. 418 Close cases in which the requisite
nexus was held to have existed include: a Navy officer in personnel
administration who took a master's in personnel administration; 414
an administrative assistant for housing who took courses in housing
and public administration; 415 an osteopath, who was a part-time
medical examiner of pilots, who sought to deduct his flying expenses;

416

a newspaper photographer, who also free-lanced, who took

flying lessons; 417 and a Baptist minister who obtained his college
degree. 418 If a taxpayer has two trades or businesses, the requisite
nexus may be shown with respect to either and an appropriate proportion of his educational expenses may be deducted. 419

In most

cases the result is obvious. While "a precise correlation is not
necessary [the taxpayer must sustain] his burden of proof to justify
[the court's] concluding that there was a sufficient nexus between
the educational expenditures and [his] trade or business." 420
It must be remembered that the regulations make the "no new
trade or business" test superior to the "maintains or improves"
410. Reilly v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1010 (1979).
411. Carroll v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 213 (1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 91 (7th

Cir. 1969).
412. Shepherd v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 219 (1976).
413. Baker v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1192 (1971) (bachelor's
degree); Kendrick v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 339 (1967) (master's
degree).
414. Rev. Rul. 69-199, 1961-1 C.B. 51.
415. Ciorciari v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 784 (1963).
416. Shaw v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 626 (1969).
The court
opined that the taxpayer's medical and flying experiences were helpful in understanding the health requisites of a pilot. Id. at 631. See note 398 and accompanying text supra.
417. Aaronson v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 786 (1970). The court
found that the lessons enabled the taxpayer to get to distant assignments and
take aerial photos more easily. Id. at 788.
418. Glasgow v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 310 (1972), afJ'd per
curiam, 486 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1973).

419. Tyne v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 1112 (1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 385 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1967).
420. Schwartz v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 877, 889 (1978). See note 398 and
accompanying text supra.
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test.421 In other words, even if an educational expense bears a
nexus to the taxpayer's trade or business, no deduction is allowable
if that education is also part of a course of study qualifying the taxpayer for a new trade or business. Thus, an unlicensed accountant
who took five courses which related to accounting during the taxable year was allowed a deduction for only four of the five because
the fifth course also helped qualify him as a certified public accountant. 4 2 And, of course, anyone attending law school as a
regular student cannot claim a deduction for his expenses no matter
how closely related any particular course may be to his trade or
423
business.
4. Travel and Education
The last two paragraphs of the current regulations deal with
travel expenses involved in education. 424 Paragraph (d) deals with
travel as a form of education.4 5 Although the language of the
present paragraph (d) is more permissive than the analogous provision of the prior regulations4 26 relatively few taxpayers have been
able to show that their alleged "travel as education" was more than
a vacation. 42 7 Paragraph (e) deals with the expenses of travel which
421. See note 290 and accompanying text supra.
422. Cooper v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 955 (1979).
423. See, e.g., Vetrick v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 392 (1978);
Grover v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 598 (1977); Melnick v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d
1065 (9th Cir. 1975).
424. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-5(d), -5(e), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39-40.
425. Id. § 1.162-5(d) Paragraph (d) provides:
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,
expenditures for travel (including travel while on sabbatical leave) as a
form of education are deductible only to the extent such expenditures
are attributable to a period of travel that is directly related to the
duties of the individual in his employment or other trade or business.
For this purpose, a period of travel shall be considered directly related
to the duties of an individual in his employment or other trade or
business only if the major portion of the activities during such period
is of a nature which directly maintains or improves skills required by
the individual in such employment or other trade or business. The
approval of a travel program by an employer or the fact that travel is
accepted by an employer in the fulfillment of its requirements for retention of rate of compensation, status or employment, is not determinative that the required relationship exists between the travel involved and the duties of the individual in his particular position.
Id.
426. See Krist v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 1345, 1346 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'g
31 T.C.M. (CCH) 3977 (1972). The analogous provision of the prior regulations
is Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 68. For a discussion of this
provision, see notes 286-90 and accompanying text supra.
427. See notes 430-37 and accompanying text infra.
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are "incident" to an otherwise deductible educational expense. 428
These "incidental travel" provisions are nearly identical to those
429
of the prior regulations.
"Travel as education" is an inherently suspect category. The
regulations require that any such period of travel must be "directly related to the duties of the individual in his employment or
other trade or business." 430 This standard can be satisfied "only if
the major portion of the activities during such period is of a nature
which directly maintains or improves skills required by the individual in such employment or other trade or business.".4 3 ' To
apply this test, one must first identify the particular skills required
by the taxpayer's trade or business and then consider the taxpayer's
activities during the travel in question. 43 2 In order to merit a
deduction, a "major portion" of those activities must "directly main428. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e), T.D. 6918, 1967.1 C.B. 40. Subparagraph
(e)(1) provides:
If an individual travels away from home primarily to obtain education the expenses of which are deductible under this section, his
expenditures for travel, meals, and lodging while away from home are
deductible. However, if as an incident of such a trip the individual
engages in some personal activity such as sightseeing, social visiting,
or entertaining, or other recreation, the portion of the expenses attributable to such personal activity constitutes non-deductible personal
or living expenses and is not allowable as a deduction. If the individual's travel away from home is primarily personal, the individual's
expenditures for travel, meals and lodging (other than meals and
lodging during the time spent in participating in deductible educational pursuits) are not deductible. Whether a particular trip is primarily personal or primarily to obtain education the expenses of which
are deductible under this section depends upon all the facts and circumstances of each case. An important factor to be taken into consideration in making the determination is the relative amount of time
devoted to personal activity as compared with the time devoted to
educational pursuits. The rules set forth in this paragraph are subject to the provisions of section 162(a)(2), relating to deductibility of
certain traveling expenses and section 274(c) and (d), relating to allocation of certain foreign travel expenses and substantiation required,
respectively, and the regulations thereunder.
Id.
429. Compare id. with Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d), T.D. 6291, 1951-1 C.B. 68.
For a discussion of paragraph (d) of the 1958 regulations, see notes 250-51 and
accompanying text supra.
430. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39-40.
of paragraph (d), see note 425 supra.
431. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39-40.
of paragraph (d), see note 425 supra.

For the text
For the text

432. See Krist v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1973), re7/g 31
T.C.M. (CCH) 397 (1972). The Krist court stated: "In order for a § 162(a)
deduction to be allowed for travel expenses, there must be an identification of
the particular job skills that are improved through the travel.". 483 F.2d at 1350.
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tain or improve" one or more skills of that trade or business. 433

This is a question of fact.434 In general, the triers of fact are most
likely to allow a deduction where the traveler did not act like a
tourist, but spent most of his time pursuing business related activity. 4M There is no authority defining either the phrase "major
portion" or the. word "directly" in the regulations. Since there
must be a proximate relationship between any deductible business
expense and the taxpayer's trade or business, it would seem that the
word "directly" adds little to the requirement of proximity; perhaps it serves to remind one that a tenuous or indirect connection
43 6
cannot justify a deduction for travel as education.
The fact that a taxpayer's employer approves of the travel as
education and treats it as a satisfaction of required "professional
growth credits" or other requirements of the employee's position
or status is not determinative of the requisite direct nexus between
the travel and the skills required to maintain or improve the employee's position. 43 7 This makes sense since the employer's position
433. See note 431 and accompanying text supra. In interpreting this test,
the court in Krist v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'g 31
T.C.M. (CCH) 397 (1972), noted: "All travel has some educational value, but
the test is whether the travel bears a direct relationship to the improvement of
the traveler's particular skills." 483 F.2d at 1351.
434. See, e.g., Haynie v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1326, 1328 (1977);
Krist v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'g 31 T.C.M. (CCH)
397 (1972). This test places a substantial burden of proof on the taxpayer. See
Krist v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d at 1348. See also Dehlke v. Commissioner, 26
T.C.M. (CCH) 663 (1967); James v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 385 (1964).
435. Compare Haynie v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1326 (1977) with
Steinmann v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1251 (1977) and with Krist v.
Commissioner, 483 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'g 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 397 (1972).
In Haynie, the taxpayer, an assistant high school principal, was permitted a deduction for the expenses of her travel to 44 countries at which she visited
secondary schools and universities and discussed educational concepts and problems with teachers, administrators, and government officials. 36 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 1327-29. In Steinmann, the taxpayer, an assistant professor of management,
was allowed a deduction for the expenses of his trip to Europe to visit manufacturing companies and universities. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1252-53, 1254-55.
In Krist, the Second Circuit denied a deduction to the taxpayer, a first grade
teacher, for her expenses of six months of travel since she spent only five days
actually conducting business, even though she used the skills she acquired on
her trip in her teaching. 483 F.2d at 1349-51. See also Dehlke v. Commissioner,
26 T.C.M. (CCH) 663 (1967); Neschis v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 927
(1963).
436. Krist v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir. 1973). The relationship "must be substantial, not ephemeral." Id. at 1351.
437. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39-40. For the text
of paragraph (d), see note 425 supra. This paragraph renders Sanders v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1960), a case antedating promulgation of the
1967 regulations, of dubious value today. In Sanders, a school teacher was
allowed a deduction for her traveling expenses to Europe. 19 T.C.M. (CCH)
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usually is not adverse to the employee's and the employer may
agree to the travel as education as an alternative to a more pedestrian way of satisfying the requirement.
Paragraph (d) of the regulations specifically provides that any
allowance under its provisions is subject to paragraphs (b) and (e)
of the regulations. 488 The reference to paragraph (b) obviously is
intended to restate the primacy of its disallowance provisions 4.9
over any possible allowance under paragraph (d).440

The reference

to paragraph (e) shows that in addition to the requirements spelled
out in paragraph (d) itself, any travel as education expense must
also qualify under the tests of paragraph (e).
Paragraph (e) of the regulations deals with the travel aspects of
education as a business expense. 441 It applies to travel which is
incidental to otherwise deductible educational expenses. 442 For
example, if a taxpayer attends a refresher course and it is determined
under the previous paragraphs of the regulations that the expenses
are deductible, in addition to the direct costs of the refresher course
such as tuition and books, the costs of meals, lodging, and other
travel expenses required by that course are deductible if, under
paragraph (e), the taxpayer was "away from home" 443 to attend
the refresher course. 444 If he was not away from home, local transportation expenses which are not commuting expenses may be
deductible. 445 In effect, paragraph (e) applies the general business
at 327. In allowing the deduction, the court relied in part on a board of education rule requiring a teacher of the taxpayer's status to attend summer school
or go on approved travel at least once every five years. Id. at 325-27. See also
Greenlee v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 875 (1966).

438. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39-40.

For the text

of paragraph (d), see note 425 supra.
439. For a discussion of the "minimum educational requirement" and "no
new trade or business" tests of paragraph (b), see notes 281-85 & 295-380 and
accompanying text supra.
440. This primary rule is stated in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), T.D. 6918,
1967-1 C.B. 37. See notes 274-79 and accompanying text supra.
441. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 40. For the text of
paragraph (e), see note 428 supra.
442. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 40.
443. Id. The term "away from home" is also used in the Code and 1958
regulations in regard to the deductibility of travel expenses as business expenses in general. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2, T.D.
6306, 1958-2 C.B. 64.

1982

444. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 40. See generally
1360.03.
STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH)
445. See 1982

STAND. FED.

TAx REP. (CCH)

1360.03.
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travel rules 44 in the context of education as a business endeavor. 447
Thus, deductibility of any travel expense depends upon whether
the travel is "primarily business" or whether it is "primarily personal." 448 Whether such a trip is primarily business or primarily
personal is a question of fact. 449 An important factor in determin-

ing whether a trip is primarily for business or personal reasons is
the relative amounts of time spent on business and personal activities during that trip. 45 0 If an educational trip is primarily business, only that portion which is attributed to personal activities is
not deductible. 4 1'

If an educational trip is primarily personal,

only the meals and lodging for the business portion are deductible.4 52

It is therefore apparent that most of subparagraph (e)(1)

of the regulations adds nothing to the general business travel provisions.
446. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2, T.D. 6306, 1958-2
C.B. 64.
447. See 1982 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
1360.03 ("the rules for
deductibility of such travel expenses are the same as for other travel expenses").
448. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1), T.D. 6306, 1958-2 C.B. 64; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-5(e)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 40. For a statement of § 1.162-5(e)(1),
see note 428 supra. Section 1.162-2(b)(1) provides:
If a taxpayer travels to a destination and while at such a destination engages in both business and personal activities, traveling expenses to and from such destination are deductible only if the trip
is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business. If the trip
is primarily personal in nature, the traveling expenses to and from
the destination are not deductible even though the taxpayer engages in business activities while at such destination. However, expenses while at the destination which are properly allocable to the
taxpayer's trade or business are deductible even though the traveling
expenses to and from the destination are not deductible.
1958-1 C.B. at 65-66.
449. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 40. See also
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(2), T.D. 6936, 1958-2 C.B. 64.
450. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 40. The fifth sentence of paragraph (e) provides: "An important factor to be taken into account in making the determination [of whether the trip is 'primarily business' or 'primarily personal'] is the relative amount of time devoted to
personal activity as compared with the time devoted to educational pursuits."
Id. Similarly, § 1.162-2(b)(2) of the 1958 regulations provides: "The amount
of time during the period of the trip which is spent on personal activity compared to the amount of time spent on activities directly relating to the taxpayer's trade or business is an important factor in determining whether the
trip is primarily personal." 1958-1 C.B. at 66.
451. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e) (1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 40; Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1), T.D. 6936, 1958-2 C.B. 64. For the text of subparagraph
(e)(l), see note 428 supra.
452. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (e)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 40; Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1), T.D. 6936, 1958-2 C.B. 64. For the text of subparagraph
(e)(l), see note 428 supra.
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. .The last sentence of subparagraph (e)(1) provides that paragraph (e) is limited by the rules of sections 162(a)(2) and 274(c) and
(d) of the Code.458 The reference to section 162(a) is somewhat
redundant since this provision deals with the "away from home"
test discussed above. 454 However, the test of section 162(a)(2) goes
well beyond the the "primarily personal" versus "primarily busi-

ness" dichotomy. Thus, the cross reference to section 162(a) assures that such issues as what constitutes the taxpayer's "home," 0 5
when the taxpayer is away from home 451 overnight, 45 7 and whether
he is away temporarily or indefinitely 458 will be incorporated into
paragraph (e) where required. Furthermore, the cross reference
to subsections (c) and (d) of section 274 of the Code assures that
the allocation for allowable foreign travel provisions4 5 9 and the
453. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e) (1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 40.
of subparagraph (e)(1), see note 428 supra.
454. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (1981).
and accompanying text supra.

For the text

For a discussion of this test, see notes 441-52

455. This has been a hotly disputed issue. See, e.g., Rosenspan v. United
States, 438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971) ("home" means
place of residence; traveling salesman with no place of residence has no
home); Flowers v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 U.S. 465 (1946) ("home" means place of residence); Rev. Rul. 73529, 1973-2 C.B. 37 (taxpayer's home is his regular or principal place of business
or regular place of abode).
456. See Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971) (taxpayer without a "home" can never be "away
from home").
457. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967) (upholding Commissioner's ruling that taxpayer traveling on business may deduct cost of meals
only if trip requires stop for sleep or rest).
458. See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 351 (1979) (taxpayer may take deduction only if away from home temporarily); Rev. Rul.
60-189, 1960-1 C.B. 60, 64 (Service will not normally question temporary nature
of employment if anticipated and actual duration are less than one year).
See also Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-2 C.B. 86.
459. See I.R.C. § 274(c) (1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4, T.D. 6758, 1964-2
C.B. 79-84. Section 274(c) of the Code provides:
(1) In general.-In the case of any individual who travels outside the
United States away from.home in pursuit of a trade or business or
in pursuit of an activity described in section 212, no deduction. shall
be allowed under section 162 or section 212 for that portion of the
expenses of such travel otherwise allowable under such section which,
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, is not
allocable to such trade or business or to such activity.
(2) Exception.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the expenses of any
travel outside the United States away from home if(A) such travel does not exceed one week, or
(B) the portion of the time of travel outside the United States
away from home which is not attributable to the pursuit of the
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substantiation requirements 40 apply to educational travel expenses.
Finally, it must be remembered that all the limitations imposed by paragraph (e) also apply to paragraph (d) of the regulations.4 61 Thus, all potential travel as education expenses which
have satisfied the "major portion" of activities test and the "directly maintains or improves" test spelled out in paragraph (d) 462
must -also meet the "primarily business or primarily personal" test,
the various aspects of the "away from home" test, the foreign travel
limitations, and the substantiation requirements, all of which are
4
directly or indirectly within paragraph (e). 63
Relatively few problems exist with respect to travel as an incident to education under paragraph (e). If the underlying education is deductible under paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of the regulations, any required travel or local transportation expenses are also
taxpayer's trade or business or an activity described in section
212 is less than 25 percent of the total time on such travel.
(3) Domestic travel excluded.-For purposes of this subsection, travel
outside the United States does not include any travel from one point
in the United States to another point in the United States.
I.R.C. § 274(c) (1981).
460. See I.R.C. § 274(d) (1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5, T.D. 7226, 1975-1
C.B. 153. Section 274(d) of the Code provides:
No deduction shall be allowed(!) under section 162 or 212 for any traveling expense (including meals
and lodging while away from home),
(2) for any item with respect to an activity which is of a type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation, or with respect to a facility used in connection with such an
activity, or

(3) for any expense for gifts, unless the taxpayer substantiates by
adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating his own statement

(A) the amount of such expense or other item,
(B) the time and place of the travel, entertainment, amusement,
recreation, or use of the facility, or the date and description of the
gift,
(C) the business purpose of the expense or other item, and
(D) the business relationship to the taxpayer of persons entertained, using the facility, or receiving the gift. The Secretary or his
delegate may by regulations provide that some or all of the requirements of the preceding sentence shall not apply in the case of an
expense which does not exceed an amount prescribed pursuant to such
regulations.
I.R.C. § 274(d) (1981).
461. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39-40.
notes 425-37 and accompanying text supra.

See also

462. See notes 430-37 and accompanying text supra.
463. See notes 441-60 and accompanying text supra.
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deductible. 46 4 Most of the issues concerning deductibility of incidental travel therefore turn on whether the underlying education
is itself deductible rather than on whether the travel .or transportation aspect is deductible. 4 0 For example, the "temporary versus
indefinite" problem in business travel would most likely arise as a
"carrying on" problem in an education context.46 6 The substantiation requirement of section 274(d) of the Code has eliminated the
"educated guess" aspect of the deductible-nondeductible alloca48 7
tion for dual purpose travel.
5. Conventions and Seminars
Although a full discussion of the deductibility of the expenses
of attending conventions and educational seminars as business expenses is beyond the scope of this article, 4 6 it is clear that the

requisite business nexus for conventions and seminars may be present. Conventions often involve various meetings with at least some
purpose of keeping participants in touch with the problems of
their profession or business. And educational seminars by definition attempt to provide an educational experience for the participants. While the "primarily business versus primarily personal"
test

4

9

applies to domestic conventions and seminars, 470 section

274(h) of the Code 471 spells out specific limitations on foreign con464. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 40. However, if
as an incident to the trip the individual engages in some personal activity, the
portion of the expenses attributed to such personal activity is not deductible.
Id. For the text of this regulation, see note 428 supra.
465. See notes 273-423 and accompanying text supra.
466. See notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra.
467. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1930). In
Cohan, the taxpayer had kept no account of his traveling expenses. Id. at
543. The Second Circuit held that the trial court should "make as close an
approximation as it can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer whose
inexactitude is of his own making." Id. at 544. See generally J. CHOMMIm,
45 (2d ed. 1973)..
468. For an expanded discussion of this issue, see Postlewaite, supra note
38, at 258-59.
469. See text accompanying note 448 supra; Postlewaite, supra note 38, at
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §

258-59.
470. See Postlewaite, supra note 38, at 255-57.
471. I.R.C. § 274(h) (1981). This section provides in part:
(3) Transportation costs deductible in full only if at least onehalf of the days are devoted to business related activities.-In the
case of any foreign convention, a deduction for the full expenses
of transportation (determined after the application of paragraph (2))
to and from the site of such convention shall be allowed only if at
least one-half of the total days of the trip, excluding the days of
transportation to and from the site of such convention, are devoted
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ventions and seminars. 47 2

At no time has the Code or the regulations required consideration of whether the site of a convention or
seminar bore a reasonable relationship to the alleged business
purpose.473 Thus, even under the stricter foreign travel rules of
section 274(h), a relatively small amount of education can justify
much pleasurable travel. 47 4

For example, if a taxpayer has four

hours of business on a given day, it is a "business day" and meals
and lodging, are deductible; 475 and, if only half the total days are
to business related activities. If less than one-half of the total days
of the trip, excluding the days of transportation to and from the
site of the convention, are devoted to business related activities, no
deduction for the expenses of transportation shall be allowed which
exceeds the percentage of the days of the trip devoted to business related activities.
(4) Deductions for subsistence expenses not allowed unless the individual attends two-thirds of business activities.-In the case of any
foreign convention, no deduction for subsistence expenses shall be allowed except as follows:
(A) a deduction for a full day of subsistence expenses while
,
at the convention shall be allowed if there are at least 6 hours
of scheduled business activities during such day and the individual
attending the convention has attended at least two-thirds of these
. activities, and
(B) a deduction for one-half day of subsistence expenses while,
at the convention shall be allowed if there are at least 3 hours
of scheduled business activities during such day and the individual
attending the convention has attended at least two-thirds of these
activities.
Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), a deduction for subsistence
expenses for all of the days or half days, as the case may be, if the
convention shall be allowed if the individual attending the convention has attended at least two-thirds of the scheduled business activities, and each such full day consists of at least 6 hours of scheduled
business activities and each such half day consists of at least 3 hours
of scheduled business activities.
Id. § 274(h)(3)-(4).
472. Id. §274(h) (1981). Originally, §274(c), added to the
Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 975, provided
tion of expenses between business and personal activities, whether
domestic or foreign. The Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
78 Stat. 56-57, repealed these provisions for domestic travel.

Code by the
for an allocathe travel was
88-272, § 217,

473. See I.R.C. § 274(h) (1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4, T.D. 6758, 1964-2
C.B. 79-84. For example, while Miami might be a superb site for any
February meeting, it might be difficult for an association of Wisconsin insurance salesmen to show a business reason why Miami was the place for their
annual business meeting.
474. See How M.D. Means Medical Deduction For Doctors at Sea, Wall
St. J., June 19, 1980, at 1, col. 4.
475. LR.C. § 274(h)(4) (1981).

This section allows a deduction for sub-

sistence expenses if two-thirds of six hours of scheduled business activities are
attended. Id. See note 471 supra.
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business days, coach class transportation 4 6 to the site is also deductible in full.477 Thus, in the foreign convention context, Congress has

in effect defined "primarily business." Although there is no similar
set of rules for domestic conventions, 47 8 section 274(h) does represent one way of handling the problem of mixed motivations for
educational travel. But the objective nature of these tests encourages the participants in such seminars to take advantage of these
tests, using them as the norm instead of the minimum.
Finally, it must be noted that, except for foreign conventions, 479
the tests in the travel area of educational expenses are subjective
and turn on the primary purpose of the taxpayer. Apparently,
primary purpose is still a part-albeit a small part-of section 1.162-5
of the 1967 regulations.
6. Post-GraduateLegal Education
It is clear that the present regulations deny any deduction for
the expenses of a first degree in law.480 In addition, post-graduate
legal education still presents many unresolved problems. 481 In general, the same issues are involved whether the post-graduate education consists of a short term continuing legal education seminar or
institute or whether it consists of a long term program for an advanced degree. 48 2 But, while the issues are the same, the different
contexts may yield different solutions.
First, it is often difficult to determine when one enters the trade
4
or business of practicing law.48 3 In Ruehmann v. Commissioner,4
48 Dura law student was admitted to the bar before he graduated.
476. The deduction for transportation cannot exceed the lowest coach fare

or economy rate available. I.R.C. § 274(h)(2) (1981).
477. Id. § 274(h)(3) (1981). See note 475 supra.
478. One set of more limited domestic travel rules did previously exist.
See note 472 supra.
479. See notes 471-78 and accompanying text supra.
480. See notes 362-71 and accompanying text supra. This deduction is
denied under § 1.162-5(b), which disallows the deduction of any expenses for
education necessary to meet the minimum requirements of a'trade or business.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37-39. For a more thorough
discussion of this regulation, see notes 280-380 and accompanying text supra.
481. For a discussion of many of the issues in this area, see Comment, The
Deductibility of Post Graduate Legal Education Expenses, 27 U. FLA. L."REv.
995 (1975)..
482. See text accompanying note 507 infra.
483. See notes 484-504 and accompanying text infra.
484. 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 675 (1971).
485. Id. at 676. Ruehmann took the Georgia bar exam during the summer
after completing two years of law school. Id. He was notified that he had
passed the bar examination on December 10, near the middle of his third
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ing the summer between his second and third years of law school
and during Christmas vacation of his third year, Ruehmann worked
as a law clerk for an Atlanta firm. 486

He was hired as an associate

by that same firm and began work during June after his graduation.48 The firm had a policy of offering permanent employment
to graduates even if they planned to clerk for a judge or earn an
advanced degree. 48

Ruehmann in fact went to Harvard for a mas-

ter's degree in law the following autumn after working as a lawyer
for three months. 489 In the Tax Court, the government argued
that Ruehmann had never engaged in a trade or business before
going for his master's degree. 490 Basing its determination on Ruehmann's membership in the bar before beginning full-time employment and the fact that he did the same work as other inexperienced
lawyers in the firm, 491 the court found that Ruehmann was engaged
in the trade or business of practicing law from June to September.492

Since the court read the government's brief as conceding

that under the 1967 regulations Ruehmann could deduct the expenses of his graduate law program if the court found that he was
engaged in the trade or business of practicing law before entering
Harvard,493 it held that Ruehmann was entitled to a deduction for
school year, and was admitted to the bar on December 16. Id. This was
possible under Georgia law at the time. Id. at 676 n.l.
486. Id. at 676.
487. Id. at 677. The offer of permanent employment was made prior to
December 1 of Ruehmann's third year of law school, in accordance with the
law firm's usual policy. Id. This offer was made even though the members
of the firm did not know whether a military obligation would permit Ruehmann to come to the firm on a continuing basis. Id. The firm had an understanding with Ruehmann that if he were required to serve in the military,
he could return to the firm as an associate after his years of service, barring a
change in circumstances. Id. This was not the usual understanding reached
by the firm with employees who worked for the firm before serving in the
military. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id. Ruehmann attended Harvard Law School from September 1967
until June 1968. Id. Shortly before his graduation from Harvard, Ruehmann
was notified that he was to be called into active duty in the army within the
next few months. Id. During the period between graduating and reporting
to the army in September, Ruehmann worked for a Boston law firm. Id. at
667-68.
490. Id. at 678.
491. Id. at 677. Ruehmann not only did the same type of work as other
lawyers of comparable experience, but he also was paid the same salary as
other beginning lawyers who were members of the bar. Id.
492. Id. at 680.
493. Id. at 679-80. The court also read the government's brief as admitting that "the 1967 regulations do not deny the educational expense deduction merely because the expenses were incurred in pursuit of a chosen spe-
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these expenses under the current regulations. 494

There was no

specific mention of the fact that Ruehmann had a long term arrangement to return to the firm or the fact that the firm regularly
granted leaves for such graduate work, but the court did profess to
rely on all the facts. 4965

I..

In three other cases, courts applying the current regulations
have disallowed a deduction for expenses incurred in pursuit of a
master of laws degree. 49

1

However, these cases may be distinguished

from Ruehmann. Although, as in Ruehmann, all three taxpayers
continued for graduate law degrees after they graduated from- law
school, none of them worked during the intervening summer and
only one of them had been admitted to the bar before starting
graduate work.4

97

Additionally, unlike Ruehmann, there is no

cialty." Id. at 679. Additionally, the court interpreted the government's brief
as conceding that:
[T]he work taken by petitioner at Harvard Law School did improve
the skills required in the practice of law [and the] graduate work in
law was not necessary to meet the minimum educational requirements
of a legal position or the legal profession and was not a program
of study in law which qualified petitioner in a new trade or business
within the meaning of the new regulations.
Id. at 680. The court went on to interpret the government's brief as conceding
that, if Ruehmann was practicing law before entering graduate school, "he
continued to be engaged in that trade or business while attending graduate
school at Harvard." Id. It is not clear how significant these concessions were
to the court's decision.
494. Id. at 679-80. The court, however, did not allow Ruehmann to deduct his education expenses for his third year of law school after he was admitted to the bar, Id. at 679. The court concluded that this education was
still part of Ruehmann's study to lead him to qualify as a lawyer, since it. was
customary for lawyers in Georgia to obtain a bachelor of laws degree before
beginning their law practice. Id. at 680.
495. Id.
496. See Johnson v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. La. 1971); Wassenaar v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1195 (1979); Randick v. Commissioner, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) 195 (1976).
497. In Johnson v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. La. 1971)i it was
not only stipulated that the taxpayer entered a tax program following his
admission to the bar, but the court also stated that he "was never actively
engaged in the practice of law." Id. at 908. On the basis of this statement,
it may be inferred that Johnson did not work the summer before entering
his graduate program. The Johnson court also noted, in dictum, that the taxpayer should be denied a deduction because he was pursuing a new specialty. Id.
at 908. This seems to be a mistaken application of the 1958 regulations' "no
new specialty" test to the 1967 regulations. In Wassenaar v. Commissioner,
72 T.C. 1195 (1979), the court specifically mentioned that the taxpayer, was
not employed during the summer following his law school graduation. Instead, he took the bar exam in July and passed in October, after he began
his graduate program. The taxpayer was not officially admitted to the bar
until after finishing this program. Id. at 1197. In this case, the court mentioned that being a member in good standing of a profession is not the same
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mention of a commitment for long term employment. 49 8 Since
many if not most law graduates begin their full-time legal careers
before they are admitted to the bar, and since bar admission usually
follows as a matter of course within a year, technical admission to
the bar should not be determinative of when one enters the trade
or business of being an attorney. 409 Possibly, commencement of
permanent employment as a lawyer is the most relevant time to
determine the beginning of "carrying on" as opposed to "being a
member of" that profession. 00 One case, denying a deduction
under the "carrying on" requirement, specifically distinguished
Ruehmann on the grounds that the taxpayer performed no law work
during the intervening summer, yet placed little significance on the
fact that the taxpayer was not yet admitted to the bar by the summer and had no long term commitment to work for a law firm.6 01
Since the "carrying on" test is one of fact, it would be helpful to
know if all three of the Ruehmann factors are essential. It is
arguable that admission to the bar plus one day of practice equals
"carrying on" the trade or business of practicing law.502 Moreover, actual practice is arguably the most relevant factor in "carrying on" and, if so, Ruehmann holds that three months of practice
is enough. 0 3 With the apparent growth of graduate degree proas carrying on that profession for purposes of § 162(a) of the Code. Id. at
1199-1200. In Randick v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 195 (1976), the court
again stated that the taxpayer was not employed during the summer before
he commenced his graduate program. Id. at 195. The taxpayer was admitted to the bar two months after beginning his graduate program. See id.
The court again stated that being a member in good standing of a profession
is not the same as carrying on that profession. Id. at 198. In denying the
deduction, the court distinguished Ruehmann on the grounds of Randick's
lack of employment during the intervening summer. Id. The court also did
not deem that being a law clerk, filling out tax returns, or other law-related
part-time duties constituted the practice of law. Id. at 197-99.
. 498. See Johnson v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. La. 1971);
Wassenaar v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1195 (1979); Randick v. Commissioner, 35

T.C.M. (CCH) 195 (1976).
499. This seems to be in accord with what was said in Wassenaar v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1195 (1979), and Randick v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M.
(CCH) 195 (1976). For a discussion of Randick, see note 497 supra.
500. Although the courts in Wassenaar v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1195
(1979), and Randick v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 195 (1976), did not
phrase the test in this exact language, it is possible that they did favor such
an approach. See note 497 supra.
501. See Randick v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 195 (1976). See note
497 supra.
502. See Comment, supra note 481, at 1017.
503. See id., where it is stated that Ruehmann seems to indicate that
three months of engaging in the same kind of work as an attorney meets the
"carrying on" test. However, it is concluded that "Ruehmann can be more
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grams in law, this question should soon be answered. On balance,
the "carrying on" requirement seems more attuned to the actual
practice requirement; 1o4 formal admission to the bar for the employee of a law firm normally will not affect the type of work that
he performs. Other than to permit him to appear in court and to
sign as an attorney of record, few of his duties will change on -the
date of his admission to the bar.
As more and more lawyers wish to earn advanced degrees,
more and more graduate programs have arisen. Since most of these
are part-time programs, the "carrying on" issue will not be relevant,
at least after the first semester, as long as the part-time student also
has a full-time legal position and is admitted to the bar before the
end of his first semester of graduate work. 505 Since most candidates
for post-graduate degrees will meet these two tests by the January
after earning their first legal degrees, they will be within the
Ruehmann rule for an allowance.5 0 6 And, if part-time graduate
students can legitimately deduct most of their tuition, why discriminate against full-time students?
The tests for determining whether one is carrying on the trade
or business of practicing law should therefore be the same whether
the education involved is a long term advanced degree program Or
a short term continuing education program. There are no cases
properly construed as authority for the proposition that all the facts or circumstances determine whether a taxpayer is engaged in carrying on a trade
or business rather than merely temporary employment before continuing his
education." Id. (footnote omitted). In Reisine v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1429 (1970), the court denied a deduction for educational expenses to
a taxpayer who pursued an advanced degree in engineering as a full-time
student after being employed for a year as an engineer. 29 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 1430. In denying the deduction, the court distinguished Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968), by the fact that Reisine had decided
to resume his education shortly after beginning work and his graduate program was for an indefinite period of time. 29 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1430. For
a discussion of Furner, see notes 246-49 and accompanying text supra. It is
submitted that it is incorrect to say that one is not "carrying on" a trade or
business after he has actively pursued that trade or business for a year. Instead, Reisine should be read as a failure to meet the "indefinite versus temporary" test of Furner. See notes 392-95 supra.
504. See note 500 and accompanying text supra.
505. The Ruehmann test would certainly seem to be met. For a discussion of Ruehmann, see notes 484-95 and accompanying text supra. Perhaps
the "carrying on" issue would be in doubt if the taxpayer only worked part
time. But see note 511 and accompanying text infra.
506. See notes 484-95 supra. It may still be necessary for the taxpayer to
prove a relationship between the education undertaken and the trade or business skills being maintained or improved, as in Coughlin. See Comment,
supra note 481, at 1017-18. For a discussion of Coughlin, see notes 124-40 and
accompanying text supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

69

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 1
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 27: p. 237

dealing with short term programs and the "carrying on" requirement, probably because ,most of these programs attract those who
clearly have been practicing law. But if one attempts to deduct
such expenses before his bar admission or before he begins fulltime legal employment, the Commissioner could use the arguments
against a deduction that he used in the Ruehmann context. 07 .
Assuming that one has reached the stage of "carrying on" the
trade or business of an attorney, in most instances there should be
little problem with the "temporary versus indefinite" suspension of
activities. 0s Since earning a full-time master of laws degree normally takes one year or less, the suspension of activities falls within
Revenue Ruling 68-591. 509 If for some reason his educational program lasts for more than one year, the taxpayer will normally be
able to satisfy the courts that the suspension was temporary if he
can prove that he realistically planned to reenter practice after his
studies were completed.510 Of course, there is no such issue if the
master's is taken on a part-time basis or if the program is short
term, continuing education, since there is no suspension of fulltime practice.5 1'
The "carrying on" test has been the only impediment to a
deduction for post-graduate legal education so far. But even if a
law school graduate clearly satisfies all the Ruehmann tests,5 12 and
thus is clearly carrying on the trade or business of practicing law,
some problems remain under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the regulations. 51 8
In practice, there are few problems under paragraph (b) 514 because post-graduate education will normally neither satisfy the
507. For a discussion of Ruehmann and cases in this context in which the
deduction was denied, see notes 483-504 and accompanying text supra.
508. See notes 392-95 and accompanying text supra.
509. 1968-2 C.B. 73. See note 393 and accompanying text supra.
510. The doctor of juridical science degree does normally take more than
one year, but this research degree probably would not fit into the "maintains or improves" test for a practitioner. See notes 534-39 and accompanying
text infra. A particular taxpayer may, however, desire to take additional
time to complete his master's program.
511. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit stated in Furner v. Commissioner, 393
F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968), that enrollment for study is not deemed to interrupt
regularity if the study is part time during the school year, while the teacher
is also performing teaching duties. Id. at 294. For a discussion of Furner, see
notes 392-95 and accompanying text supra.
512. See notes 484-504 and accompanying text supra.
513. See notes 514-54 and accompanying text infra.
514. For a discussion of the current § 1.162-5(b), see notes 295-380 and
accompanying text supra.
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minimum qualifications for any legal position 1 nor qualify a
practicing attorney for a new trade or business. 516 While it is
theoretically possible for a young attorney's employer to require
a master of laws degree of all new employees, 51T it is much more
likely that a law firm would express a preference rather than an
absolute requirement for such graduate work. 518 The (b)(3) regulations are somewhat troublesome in this context. 51 9 For example,
20 an attorney had practiced as a legal
in Booth v. Commissioner,6
advisor to the Governor of Alabama for more than two years when
he resigned to form a partnership with two other attorneys. 2 1 The
three partners agreed that Booth would become the firm's tax
expert, and the firm sent Booth to New York University for a master's in taxation, reimbursing him for his expenses and giving
him his one-third share of the profits generated while he was at
N.Y.U. 522 The Tax Court, applying the 1958 regulations, disallowed any deduction since Booth was acquiring new skills for the
specialty of tax law and was preparing for a new position,5 23 each
24
of which was a disqualifying factor under the 1958 regulations.
The present regulations disallow education expenses only if they
would either qualify one for a new trade or business or satisfy the
minimum requirements for one's present position; 525 no disallow"

515. This is the applicable test under § 1.162-5(b)(2). See notes 283 &
297 and accompanying text supra.
516. This is the applicable test under § 1.162-5(b)(3). See notes 284 &
325 and accompanying text supra.
517. See Comment, supra note 481, at 1018, where it is noted that "the
requirements of the particular employer are among the factors to be considered under the regulations . . . in determining whether the taxpayer has
completed the minimum education necessary to qualify for a position or other
trade or business."
Id., citing Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(b)(2)(i), T.D. 6918,
1967-1 C.B. 37.
518. If so, subparagraph (b)(2) does not seem to disqualify the deduction,
although the minimum educational requirement is a question of fact.
519. See notes 520-33 and accompanying text infra.
520. 35 T.C. 1144 (1964).
521. Id. at 1145. Booth graduated from law school and was admitted to
the state bar in 1954. Id. He opened his own office, in which he practiced
for about two months before becoming the governor's assistant legal advisor.
Id.

522. Id. Booth previously had taken no tax courses nor handled any tax
cases. Id. On his return from New York, Booth had specialized exclusively
in tax cases. Id. at 1146.
523. Id. at 1148.
524. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 67-68. For a discussion of this regulation, see notes 152-55 & 159-68 and accompanying text supra.
525. Treas. Reg. § 1,162-5(b), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37-39. For a discussion of this regulation, see notes 293-380 and accompanying text supra.
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ance occurs for qualification for a new position or specialty.5 26
Thus, as far as paragraph (b) is concerned, Booth would have been
decided for the taxpayer under the current regulations. 527
It must be remembered, however, that in Toner the Commissioner attempted to narrow the scope of teaching ,28 in the face of a
specific regulation stating that all teachers do the same general
type of work. 529 There is no regulation concerning the scope of
the profession of practicing law-or of any other trade or business
besides teaching.13 0 Thus, an assertion by the Commissioner that a
tax lawyer does not do the same general type of work as a general
practitioner would place the burden of disproving that assertion
upon the taxpayer,3 1 who would be hard pressed to overcome the
Commissioner's presumption of correctness without benefit of the
favorable regulation under which Toner was decided. 8 2 Possibly,
certification of specialties in law will bring this issue to the fore,
but, at least until, a general practitioner cannot practice tax law,
the "new trade or business" test should not apply in this situation.13
When applied to post-graduate legal education expenses, the
affirmative tests of paragraph (c) may prove troublesome. 63 4 For
526. See note 329 and accompanying text supra.
527. See Comment, supra note 481, at 1014. The court in Johnson v. United
States, 332 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. La. 1971), said in dictum that a deduction should
be disallowed for education expenses incurred in pursuit of a new specialty. Id.
at 908. The Ruehmann court correctly indicated otherwise. See note 427
supra. The Ruehmann case, combined with the regulations' allowance of a
deduction for a psychiatrist becoming an analyst in § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii) and with

Rev. Rul. 74-78, 1974-1 C.B. 44, which allows a deduction for a dentist becom-

ing an orthodontist, would seem to assure that specialization in law does not
disqualify the deduction under § 1.162-5(b). See notes 330-31 and accompanying text supra. Specialization may still pose problems under paragraph (c)
of the regulations. See note 546 and accompanying text infra.
528. For a discussion of Toner, see notes 302-05 & 346-52 and accompanying
text supra.
529. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 38-39.
530. Comment, supra note 481, at 1018-19.
531. The taxpayer, in challenging the Commissioner's decision, has the
burden of proof. See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 298 (2d ed.
1973).
532. For a discussion of challenges to the Commissioner's findings concerning the applicability of subparagraph (b)(3), see notes 361-76 and accompanying text supra.
533. See Comment, supra note 481, at 1011, 1013.
534. See notes 540-48 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of
1.162-5(c), see notes 382-423 and accompanying text supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss2/1

72

Schoenfeld: The Educational Expense Deduction: The Need for a Rational Approa

1981-82]

THE EDUCATIONAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION

short term continuing education programs, Coughlin 535 has been
approved by the regulations, which speak of education which "maintains or improves skills required by the individual in his employment or other trade or business." 536 Relatively few problems have
arisen in this context.8 7 Although the education must relate to the
taxpayer's actual practice, 538 except for "cruise" or "resort" seminars, 539 it is not likely that a practicing attorney would often
spend his time or his money to attend a program not within his
actual practice. Even if he wished to expand the horizons of his
practice, a short seminar is not sufficient to qualify him for a wholly
new field of expertise.
It is not yet clear, however, how recent trends toward mandatory continuing legal education and certification of specialties will
affect the deductibility of short term post-graduate legal education.5 40 It is arguable that under such programs there is no need
for an attorney to limit his education to those areas in which he is
already practicing because he can qualify under the tests of subparagraph (c)(2). 541 Such an argument should be made on the
appropriate facts, but an attorney-employee who is required to take
a certain number of hours of courses will rarely take courses outside his field of practice. 42 In addition, the Commissioner may
argue that such courses are beyond the employer's minimum re535. For a discussion of Coughlin, see notes 124-40 and accompanying text
supra.
536. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39. This regulation specifically includes "refresher courses or courses dealing with current
developments as well as academic or vocational courses." Id.
537. Comment, supra note 481, at 1008.
538. The "maintains or improves skills" language in the regulations would
seem to require that the education be in areas in which the taxpayer actually
practices. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39. See
also text accompanying note 536 supra. This is further supported by a
statement in Coughlin, which emphasizes that the taxpayer in that case was
"keep[ing] sharp the tools he actually used in his going trade or business."
203 F.2d at 309. See generally Comment, supra note 481, at 1008.
539. For a discussion of the travel rules, see notes 424-79 and accompanying
text supra.
540. See Comment, supra note 481, at 1010-14.
541. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(2), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39. See Comment,
supra: note 481, at 1010-11. The test in subparagraph (c)(2) makes no reference to the skills acquired by the individual, but provides that the education
must only meet express requirements imposed by law. Id. at 1011.
542. Moreover, it has been suggested that, by requiring the attorney not
only to attend a minimum number of hours in continuing legal education,
but also to attend courses related to their specific plan, a mandatory education plan would preserve traditional tax treatment in this area. See Comment,
supra note 481, at 1011.
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quirement and thus the court must look back to the "maintains
5 48
and improves" test.

For long term post-graduate degree programs, the tests of paragraph (c) present other problems. 5 44

When a master of laws degree

is received in a particular field such as taxation or labor law, it
is relatively easy to determine whether the attorney-student has
practiced in that field. Arguably, Booth, which turned on the "no
specialty" issue, would still have the same result today as when it
was decided since there is no indication that the taxpayer therein
had any tax practice as a governor's assistant. 545 Only if Booth had
been a tax advisor to the governor would he have satisfied the tests
of subparagraph (c)(1). 5 46

When an attorney enrolls in a general

master's program, it may be more difficult to find that such a program satisfies the "maintains or improves" test. Most candidates
for a general master of laws degree are either law teachers or hope
to become law teachers, and thus they may be violating the "no new
trade or business" test of subparagraph (b)(3). 547 But, if a practitioner does take a general master's, he should still be able to meet
the (c)(1) requirement by showing that the particular course of study
did maintain or improve his areas of practice. 548 The other issues
discussed for short term continuing education generally would be
5
resolved the same way in degree programs.

49

Post-graduate legal education, then, illustrates many of the
problems inherent in the present regulations. 5 0 Because the "no
new trade or business" test is so vague, it is impossible to know
exactly what constitutes the boundaries of the trade or business of
543. See text accompanying note 536 supra.
544. See notes 545-48 and accompanying text infra.

545. In fact, the indication is that he had no tax practice therein. See
note 522 supra. For a discussion of Booth, see notes 520-27 and accompanying
text supra.
546. See note 538 supra. It is submitted that subparagraph (c)(2) also
does not appear to apply.
547. For a discussion of this test, see notes 325-80 and accompanying text
supra. This statement assumes that a law professor does not do the "same
general type of work" as a practitioner.
548. In Ruehmann, an attorney matriculated for a general master of laws
degree and was found to be entitled to a deduction. See notes 484-95 and accompanying text supra. However, in Ruehmann, the court believed that the
government had conceded the "maintains or improves" test. See note 493
supra.
549. See notes 535-43 and accompanying text supra.
550. See notes 480-549 and accompanying text supra.
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practicing law.551 The, "same general type of work" test is almost
useless in the absence of further exposition and elaboration in the
regulations.5 2 Moreover, because of the vagueness of the boundaries of that trade or business, it is sometimes difficult to pinpoint
when one begins to "carry on" that profession.55 3 Finally, the possible applicability of the "requirements of the employer" test could:
554
be clearer.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT REGULATIONS

The (b)(3) regulations are an unreasonable interpretation of
section 162(a) of the Code in at least two respects. 55 First, the disallowance of education expenses is based upon mere "qualification"
for any new trade or business, even if there is no real possibility that

the taxpayer will ever actually enter the hypothetical new trade or
business. 556 Second, except in very limited circumstances, the regulations do not define what constitutes a new trade or business and,
since the concept of a new trade or business is not one in common

usage either in tax or general law, any regulation based on such a
557
vague standard is invalid.
Since section 162 contains no specific delegation of legislative
authority, the regulations promulgated under that section are interpretative regulations, issued under the general authority of section
7805(a) of the Code, rather than legislative regulations. 558 Thus,
551. See notes 520-33 and accompanying text supra.
552. See notes 528-33 and accompanying text supra.
553. See notes 483-504 and accompanying text supra.
554. See notes 534-49 and accompanying text supra.
555. Although many taxpayers have asserted the invalidity of the (b)(3)
regulations, none have prevailed. Only one commentator has argued that the
present regulations are invalid. See Comment, supra note 196, at 212. This
Comment briefly shows that the (b)(3) regulations could not be based upon
the "carrying on" of a "trade or business" language or upon the "ordinary
and necessary" language of § 162(a), nor could they be based upon the "personal" language of § 262. See Comment, supra note 196, at 204-05. It then
demonstrates that "capital expenditure" treatment would not be warranted on
most facts. Id. at 205-07.
556. See notes 325-53 and accompanying text supra.
557. See notes 334-80 and accompanying text supra.
558. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1976). Section 7805(a) provides:
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to
any person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations
for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations
as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to
internal revenue.
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section 1.162-5 does not have the effect of law that it would have if
it were a legislative regulation.
A frequently cited declaration of the effect of interpretative tax
559
regulations comes from Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co.

In that case, the United States Supreme Court stated: "This Court
has many times declared that Treasury regulations must be sustained
unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes and that they constitute contemporaneous constructions by those
charged with administration of these statutes which should not be
overruled except for weighty reasons." 560 This quotation spells out
both a positive and a negative test for the validity of regulations.
Positively, regulations should not be overruled because they "constitute contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes." 51 Negatively, regulations "must be
sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes." 562 In addition, in several cases the Court has relied
on the so-called "reenactment doctrine," which ascribes congressional
assent to regulations which have existed in a substantially identical
form during repeated congressional reenactments of an underlying
statute. 63 The "contemporaneous construction" approach cannot
apply to these regulations since the 1958 regulations, based on a subjective "primary purpose" standard, were in fact the Commissioner's
"contemporaneous construction" of section 162 of the Code, which
was enacted in

1954.564

The statute was not altered in any relevant

way when substantial changes were made in the regulations in 1967.
The changes seem to have been made because the Service lost some
cases under the 1958 regulations. Those cases which involved some
of the Service's own employees who won deductions and left the
Service must have been especially annoying.565 In any event, the
current regulations are in no way a "contemporaneous construction" of a statute; they were promulgated almost thirteen years after
enactment of the 1954 Code. Furthermore, the concept of "ordi559. 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
560. Id. at 501.
561. Id.
562.
563.
Lykes v.
564.

Id.
See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1959);
United States, 343 U.S. 118, 127-(1952).
See notes 144-63 and accompanying text supra.

565. See Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), afJ'd,
329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964).
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nary and necessary expenses of carrying on a trade or business" as
the basis for a deduction long predates the passage of the 1954.
Code. 566
The reenactment doctrine arose before the codification of the
tax laws into Title 26 of the United States Code in 1939. In fact,
Congress usually passed a new revenue act every other year, even
if it only reenacted the preceding act. Under that system of biennial reenactments, the fiction of congressional ratification made
some sense, since Congress, at least in theory, considered each and
every provision which it was reenacting. This fiction, although
arguable before codification, makes no sense when a portion of the.
Code, such as the introductory clause of Code section 162(a) has
not been "reenacted" at all since 1954. Thus, the reenactment doctrine today actually represents the concept that an administrative
interpretation of a statute which has remained substantially unchanged over a long period, and which has been generally accepted
by the courts, must be accorded great weight. 5 7 It is the fact that
a regulation has endured, after taxpayer assent or after continued
judicial approval, or both, that lies behind the great weight given
to long-standing regulations.
It is submitted, however, that the (b)(3) regulations do not deserve the presumption of validity normally accorded to fifteen-yearold regulations. Although the regulations "have been consistently
approved and used by the courts in deciding whether educational
expenses are deductible," 168 the authority cited by the Tax Court
in Toner as upholding the regulations is more apparent than real.
Except for Jungreisv. Commissioner,50 all the cases cited as weighty
authority by the Toner court were handled pro se.570 Indeed, almost all cases concerning educational expenses which have been
tried under the current regulations have been tried pro se, and few
566. "Ordinary and necessary" expenses of "carrying on" a business has
been the standard for deduction at least since the enactment of the Revenue
Act of 1919, Pub. L. No. 254, 40 Stat. 1066.
567. Cf. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1959); Lykes
v. United States, 343 U.S. 118, 127 (1952). See text accompanying note 563
supra.
•. 568. Toner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 772, 7.76 (1979). See also note 570
infra and authorities cited therein.
569. 55 T.C. 581 (1970).
570. 71 T.C. at 777, citing Davis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1014 (1976);
O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 781 (1974); Bodley v. Commissioner,
56 T.C. 1357 (1971); Jungreis v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 581 (1970); Weiler v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 398 (1970); Weiszman v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1106
(1969).
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have been appealed.5 71 The reasons are obvious. Because the
sums at stake are small, it is not economically feasible to pay attorneys' fees or printing costs.572
Since neither the contemporaneous construction concept nor
the reenactment doctrine support the validity of the regulations,
their validity depends entirely upon their not being "unreasonable
and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes" under the South
Texas standard. 573 The present regulations, however, seem unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes.
The principal statutory provision underlying the educational
expense regulations is section 162(a) of the Code, which allows a
deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." 574 In addition, sections 262 and 263 disallow any deduction for personal expenses or capital expenditures. n Furthermore, regulations section 1.162-5(b)(1) provides:
Educational expenditures described in subparagraphs (2)
and (3) of this paragraph are personal expenditures or constitute an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital
expenditures and, therefore, are not deductible as ordinary
and necessary business expenses even though the education may maintain or improve skills required by the individual in his employment or other trade or business or
may meet the express requirements of the individual's
76
employer or of applicable law or regulations.
There is no explanation as to when or how or why educational expenditures are "personal" or "capital," or when or how or why
they may be "an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenditures." 577 There is only the bald statement in the regula78
tion.6
It is submitted that, under the interplay of sections 162, 262,
and 263, once a substantial business nexus for any expenditure has
571. See notes 270-71 and accompanying text supra.
572. See note 269 and accompanying text supra.
573. See note 559 and accompanying text supra.

574. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1981) (emphasis added). For an analysis of this sec-

tion of the Code, see notes 4-36 andaccompanying text supra.
575. See I.R.C. § 262; id. § 263 (1981). The disallowance for personal or
capital expenditures under the pre-1958 case law and rulings was discussed
at notes 49-143 and accompanying text supra.
576. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37 (emphasis added).
577. Id.
578. Id.
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been shown, section 262 has no further application. The only
remaining issue should be whether the expenditure is an "expense"
and thus deductible under section 162, or a capital expenditure and
not deductible under section 263 but potentially amortizable under
section 167.679

There is no reason to treat a business-related edu-

cational expenditure differently than any other business-related
expenditure. This was the true lesson of Hill and Coughlin which
has been ignored by the regulations. 0° Thus, the regulation quoted
above is incorrect to the extent that it states that even if a primary
business motivation is shown for a deduction under section 162 of
the Code, it can be totally disallowed under section 262.
In analyzing regulations section 1.162-5, it can be said that
paragraph (c) pertains to the requirement of a business nexus,
while paragraph (b) attempts to draw the line between a current
expense and a capital expenditure. That is, the "maintains or improves" test can be said to encompass both the elements of "carrying
on" a trade or business 18 1 and also the required proximate relation8 2
ship between that trade or business and the expense involved.
Paragraph (c) of the regulations thus properly applies the tests of

the Code to the educational context. The (b) (2) regulations deny,
a deduction for the expenditures required to qualify for one's present position. This characterization is quite proper, since one cannot be "carrying on" a trade or business until one has actually entered that trade or business. 8 3 Trying to achieve a status not
presently held, as opposed to maintaining a status already achieved,
should, in theory, be capitalized, but as yet no amortization of an
educational expenditure has been allowed under section 167. 5s 4 As
long as the (b)(2) regulations are interpreted to apply with reference
to the taxpayer's actual employer, they seem to be within the under579. For a discussion of amortization of educational expenses, see notes
713-816 and accompanying text infra.
580. See notes 78-94 & 124-40 and accompanying text supra.
581. See note 386 and accompanying text supra.
582. See note 387 and accompanying text supra.
583. See Frank v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 511 (1953). See also notes 386-87
and accompanying text supra. The (b)(2) and (c) regulations overlap in this
respect.
584. See Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 591
F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). The Tax Court in
Sharon did note, however, that any expenditure which was amortizable, such as
filing for admission to the bar, was to be amortized actuarily over the taxpayer's
remaining life span. 66 T.C. at 525-26. See notes 626-29 and accompanying
text infra.
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lying statute. s8 Insofar as the Commissioner may continue to
argue that they are to be measured by the general standards of the
profession, the discussion below concerning the (b)(3) regulations is
applicable.18 6 The (b)(3) regulations deny a deduction for "expenditures made by an individual for education which is part of a program of study being pursued by him which will lead to qualifying
him in a new trade or business." 581 This provision, coupled with
the way it has been enforced, is contrary to the underlying statute.
Obviously, expenditures which in fact lead a taxpayer into a
new trade or business and which have no nexus with a present
trade or business cannot be expenses of any present trade or business under section 162. In theory, these should be capitalized over
their useful life in the new trade or business. However, no one has
successfully argued for such a deduction.58 8 On the other hand,
when the expenditure is clearly connected to the taxpayer's present
trade or business and clearly would be deductible as a current expense of carrying on that trade or business, the fact that it also
incidentally and hypothetically qualifies the taxpayer for some
other trade or business should not disqualify the deduction. In
effect, the Commissioner can disqualify almost any education expense that may lead to any degree, in spite of the parenthetical
phrase in paragraph (a), because that degree will almost certainly
make some other position theoretically available to the taxpayer. 89
For example, an economist at a large financial institution might
earn a doctorate in economics, a degree which clearly maintains or
improves his skills at that job. But because the degree incidentally
qualifies him for a position on a university faculty, the hypothetical
availability of this new trade or business disqualifies an otherwise
allowable deduction under the (b)(3) regulations. This is true
even if there is no reasonable possibility that the taxpayer will ever
try to teach. Similarly, in Roussel v. Comm issioner,590 a non-flying
safety instructor in a ground school for pilots had been threatened
585. This reading of the regulations is consistent with the holding of the
Third Circuit in Toner v. Commissioner, 623 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1980).

586. This reading of the regulations was urged by the Commissioner in

Toner and was accepted by a five judge majority of the Tax Court. See notes
302-05 and accompanying text supra.
587. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(i), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 38-39.
588. For an example of a recent attempt which failed, see Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), af'd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied; 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
589. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37.
590. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 565 (1979).
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with dismissal because of criticism that he was unable to teach from
a pilot's point of view.5 91 He took flying lessons, after which the
criticism ceased.5 9 2 Although there was no doubt that the flying
lessons improved his teaching by enhancing his ability to communicate with his students, the court denied a deduction because
5 93
the education qualified him for limited commercial pilot's license.
Since the license did not permit him to carry passengers at night
or for distances of more than fifty miles, the court admitted that it
may make "no economic sense for him to pursue the career of a
commercial pilot." 594 But economic reality did not prevent the
court from denying a deduction. 595 It is submitted that any absolute. disallowance due to an incidental and hypothetical new trade
or business which the taxpayer never considered entering is clearly
contrary to the underlying statute.
In essence, the (b)(3) regulations attempt to do what the United
States Supreme Court has said cannot be done in a similar area.
5 96 the government argued for a
In Commissioner v. Duberstein,
"simple test" to determine when a transfer in a business context
is a gift. 59 7 The Supreme Court refused to heed this contention.,,"
In holding that triers of fact must determine the correct tax classification based on their "experience with the mainsprings of human
conduct," 199 the Court remarked: "This conclusion may not satisfy
an academic desire for tidiness, symmetry and precision in this
area. . . . But we see it as implicit in the present statutory treatment . . .", " The Court concluded that "these propositions are
not principles of law but rather maxims of experience that the tribunals which have tried the facts of cases in the area have enunciated in explaining their factual determinations." 601
Experience teaches that almost everyone who graduates from
law school does in fact practice law. But this is a "maxim of ex591. Id. at 566.

592. Id.
Id. at 566-67.
Id. at 567.
Id.
363 U.S. 278 (1960).
Id. at 284-85.
Id.
599. Id. at 289.
600. Id. at 290.
601. Id. at 287.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
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perience," not the rule of law that the regulations make it.602 Not
every law school graduate contemplates practicing law. For example, suppose that two of the three television networks have
Supreme Court reporters in Washington who are attorneys. If the
third network asked one of its established Washington reporters to
go to law school in order to enable him to cover legal news more
closely, the cost of that reporter's attending law school should be
deductible.6 03 The fact that most law school graduates practice
law should not preclude a particular taxpayer from receiving a deduction when it is reasonably clear that the particular taxpayer
will not in fact enter a new trade or business. Denial of a deduction
which is proximately related to a taxpayer's present trade or business because of some hypothetical qualification for another trade
or business makes the (b)(3) regulation unreasonable in that its
absolute disqualification attempts to freeze a "maxim of experience"
into a hard rule of law, contrary to the Supreme Court's philosophy
in Duberstein.6 4
In testing the (b)(3) regulations against the statute, it is apparent that the Commissioner has given excessive weight to sections
262 and 263 at the expense of section 162 insofar as business-related
education is concerned. Possibly this is due to a notion that education is inherently personal. But if education clearly has a substantial business nexus, any incidental personal benefit does not
justify the loss of a deduction.: ° If the reason for the disallowance
is the capital nature of the education, then the capital cost should
39.

602. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), Examples 1 & 2, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B.

603. Of course, if the employer paid for the education, § 127(c)(7) of the
Code would preclude a deduction because §§ 127(a) and (b) would exclude the
payment of tuition and books from the employee's gross income. See I.R.C.
§ 127(a)-(c) (1978). For a discussion of § 127, see notes 652-72 and accompanying text infra.
604. See Note, Duberstein Applied to Appellate Review of Educational Expense Deductions Under Section 162(a), 113 U. PA. L. REv. 297 (1964). The
Note's criticism, however, involved the conclusiveness of paragraph (c) of the
1958 regulations. Id. at 301. The author of the Note agrees with the position
taken herein that the government's position that a deduction should be denied
as a matter of law, rather than after a factual inquiry, was erroneous. Id. at
303 n.29. For a discussion of the Condit and Welsh decisions, see notes 172-89
and accompanying text supra.
605. See Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A
Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 859 (1974).
Halperin argues that travel, meals, lodging, and entertainment are liberally
treated, while education, clothing, and job seeking are treated strictly, and believes that the personal element in some education is so small that disallowance
is improper. Id. at 904. See also Wolfman, The Cost of Education and the
Federal Income Tax, 42 F.R.D. 535, 542 (1966).
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be recoverable by amortization over an appropriate number of
years. 606
Even if some portion of the education in question is personal,
that portion should not fatally flaw the remainder. The personal
element can be completely forgotten when the business element is
clearly dominant, as in the case of meals away from home.60 7 Alternatively, some allocation might be desirable; "inseparable" activities have been made allocable by the regulations by setting an
arbitrary standard. Absolute denial in this instance would be
incorrect.
Furthermore, this hypothetical qualification is for an often illdefined trade or business. 608 Except for teachers, the regulations
do not even attempt to define the parameters of "trade or business"
other than by the vague "same general type of work" standard.60 9
Since, except for teachers, the taxpayer must bear the burden of
showing that he is not qualifying for any new trade or business,
this burden may be almost impossible to sustain.6 10 For example, in
Cangelosi v. Commissioner,06 the taxpayer was an experienced computer programmer whose employer had no minimum educational
requirement for his job. 612 Although Cangelosi had an associate
degree in electronics, his employer "indicated that job-related education would be helpful in maintaining his current position and
would lead to his advancement." 613 Cangelosi enrolled in an
evening program leading to a bachelor's degree in mathematics.6 14
The court apparently assumed that he satisfied the "maintains or
improves" test,615 but the expense was disallowed because the court
found that the issue of whether or not the education in question
qualified the taxpayer for a new trade or business was a question of
606. Wolfman, supra note 605, at 547. See also Halperin, supra note 605,
at 864 n.16.
607. See Halperin, supra note 605, at 921-26.
608. See notes 334-56 and accompanying text supra.
609. See notes 357-80 and accompanying text supra.
610. Even teachers may have a problem. In spite of the regulations, the
Commissioner has argued that some teachers do not do the same general type
of work as others. See Toner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 772 (1979), rev'd, 623
F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1980).
611. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1070 (1977).
612. Id. at 1070.

613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Id.
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fact,618 and, because the Commissioner had determined that it would
qualify Cangelosi for a new trade or business, even though the Commissioner did not allege what that new trade or business would be,
this determination carried a presumption of correctness.8 17 Consequently, the court concluded: "In the absence of any convincing
evidence to the contrary, and on the record as a whole, we hold
that this education would enable petitioner to engage in a new
trade or business." s18
In other words, the taxpayer has the impossible burden of proving the negative when it is not clear what he is
supposed to negate. Cangelosi is another pro se Tax Court case
that was never appealed, probably because of the cost-benefit problem discussed previously. 19
If the Cangelosi court is correct in its holding that the Commissioner need not name the alleged new trade or business, no taxpayer is likely to carry his burden to overcome the presumptive
correctness of the Commissioner's findings that education qualifies
the taxpayer for a new trade or business. Of course, one who is a
teacher and allegedly qualifies for another teaching position may
overcome the presumption by citing the regulations' statement that
all teaching is the same general type of work. 20 But since no profession other than teaching is discussed in the regulations, nonteachers would be forced to negate every hypothetical but unnamed
trade or business imaginable. Indeed, had the deficiency notice
sent to the taxpayer in Toner included a disallowance simply based
on the fact that the taxpayer qualified for a new, unnamed trade or
business, under the Cangelosi standard Mrs. Toner might have
lost. 2' It is one thing to negate qualification for a specific new
616. Id., citing Grover v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 598 (1977). Grover involved a military "basic lawyer" who went to law school. 68 T.C. at 599. Although a "basic lawyer" performed many of the functions of a judge advocate,
on the facts he was like a legal intern seeking to become a lawyer. Id. at 599600. The court in Grover did mention the practice of law as the particular
trade or business for which the taxpayer was qualifying. Id. at 601. In Cangelosi, the Commissioner did not state any particular trade or business for which
the education involved would qualify the taxpayer. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1070.
617. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1070.
618. Id.
619. See notes 569-72 and accompanying text supra.
620. The taxpayer did this in Toner, but only after losing in the trial court.
See notes 346-52 and accompanying text supra.
621. For a discussion of Toner, see notes 302-05 and 346-52 and accompanying text supra.
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trade or business;

622

it is quite another matter to negate every

conceivable new trade or business.

23

Even if. Cangelosi was erroneously decided and the Commissioner.must name the new trade or business for which the taxpayer
is theoretically qualifying under the (b)(3) regulations, the absence
of a precise delineation of what constitutes a new trade or business,
or of exactly when one moves from one trade or business to another,
is a fatal defect in the regulations. If a trade or business is broadly
defined, education qualifying one for a position within that broadly
defined trade or business would satisfy the (b)(3) regulations. But
if the Commissioner adopts the narrowest possible. meaning of a
trade or business, the taxpayer cannot overcome his factual burden
since almost any change of position will not satisfy the (b)(3) regulations. For the teaching profession, the regulations provide a reasonably clear and liberal delineation of the parameters of all positions within that profession. 24 However, except for psychoanalysis
and certain other medical specialities, there is little guidance from
the regulations defining the scope of any profession other than
teaching.s 5 Without the assistance of the regulations, it is virtually. impossible to overcome the Commissioner's presumption of
correctness.
For example, one would ordinarily assume that by any reasonable definition, attorneys in New York do the same general type of
work as attorneys in California and thus are in the same trade
or business. And if an attorney specialized in federal tax law,
many of the remaining differences would disappear. Yet in
Sharon v. Commissioner,626 the Commissioner asserted that a New
York attorney who moved to California was qualifying for a new
trade or business when he prepared for the California bar.627 The
Tax Court found that Sharon qualified for a new trade or business
622. Although this itself is a difficult enough task for all taxpayers other
than "teacher" to "teacher," the taxpayer at least knows what he is attempting

to negate.
623. Thus Mrs. Toner, who was a parochial school teacher earning a
bachelor's degree, would have had to negate qualification for each and every
position which requires a bachelor's degree. Even if it were possible to negate
the presumption of correctness for some change other than teaching-to-teaching,
there is no way one can negate every theoretical and hypothetical new trade or
business, even if one could think of every such possibility.
624. See notes 337-45 and accompanying text supra.
625. See notes 330-37 and accompanying text supra.
626. 66 T.C. 515 (1976), aJ'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 941 (1979).
627. 66 T.C. at 527-31.
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because he could thereafter appear in California courts. 62

The fact

that most attorneys spend most of their time outside the courtroom,
and that office practice in the two states would be virtually identical,
was not considered by the Tax Court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court and again made no reference to the "same general
type of work" standard. 629 Less than two years after its Sharon
decision, the Tax Court considered the case of a Canadian school
teacher who took courses to enable her to qualify to teach in New
Jersey.630 She was permitted to deduct the cost of her New Jersey
education by an opinion which distinguished Sharon on the ground
that teachers are specifically covered by the "same general type of
work" provision. 6 1 The arbitrariness of this distinction is illustrated by the following hypothetical. Suppose a barber working in
one state moved to another state. Even though the regulations are
silent on the trade or business of barbering, the barber should have
a stronger case than the teacher since human hair and heads would
seem to be more alike in the different states than required teaching
credits and curricula. But under Sharon it is difficult to imagine
how any taxpayer could satisfy the trier of fact that the Commissioner's determination of a new trade or business was incorrect
unless he were a teacher and could claim the benefit of the "all
teaching" regulation. 32 Clearly, any new position may require performance of duties which one could not perform before. But by
ignoring the substantial similarities between law practice in different states and instead focusing on the slight differences, the Tax
Court could say that Sharon qualified for a new trade or business.
It is submitted that the fault lies primarily in the regulations' lack
of a definition of "trade or business" rather than in the courts'
rather rigid interpretations of the regulations. However, the courts
must share the blame since they could have attempted a functional
definition of the "same general type of work" standard. 633
628. Id. at 529.
629. 591 F.2d at 1275.

630. Laurano v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 723 (1978).
631. Id. at 728-29.
632. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(i), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 38-39. For
a discussion of this section of the regulations, see notes 337-45 and accompanying text supra.
633. See Vetrick v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 392 (1978). Vetrick
involved an attorney who had been admitted to the bar in Montana after two
years of law school, and who finished law school to gain admission to the Ohio
and Florida bars. Id. at 393. Although Vetrick is more difficult to reconcile
than Sharon, in that a full year of law school was involved rather than a "cram
course," the court could have found for Vetrick because Montana attorneys do
the same general type of work as Ohio and Florida attorneys.
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The case of O'Donnell v. Commissioner63 4 illustrates another
facet of the "same general type of work" standard. The taxpayer
in O'Donnell was a certified public accountant who worked fulltime in the tax department of a "big eight" accounting firm while
attending law school part time at night. 6 a His primary duties at
the accounting firm consisted of researching tax questions, engaging
in tax planning, completing tax returns, and dealing with Internal
Revenue agents.68 6 The Tax Court found that the taxpayer "pursued his legal education in order to improve his accounting and tax
skills and at no time . . .either practiced or intended to practice

law." 637 However, he was denied a deduction because this education qualified him for the new trade or business of practicing law
regardless of his lack of intention to practice. 38 This case apparently fits squarely within the (b)(3) regulations .0 9 However, O'Donnell argued that his trade or business was the "tax accounting
profession," to which both accountants and attorneys may belong,
that he had already satisfied the minimum requirements of that
profession before attending law school, and that he remained in that
same trade or business after completing law school. 40 The court,
assuming arguendo that there was a trade or business of "tax accounting," denied a deduction because, as an attorney, O'Donnell
could theoretically perform more tasks for his clients and he could
branch off into any other area of law practice; thus, he qualified
for a new trade or business. 641 But had the court approached the
matter functionally, it could have found that O'Donnell performed
the same general type of work both before and after the education
in question, and thus that he remained in the same trade or business.042 In rejecting this view, the court ignored the "same general
634.
635.
636.
637.

62 T.C. 781 (1974).
Id. at 782.
Id.
Id.

638. Id. at 782-83.
639. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), Examples 1 & 2, T.D. 6918, 1967-1
C.B. 39. See notes 602-04 and accompanying text supra.
640. 62 T.C. at 783.
641. Id.
642. There are courses such as the N.Y.U. Tax Institute and certain graduate degree programs such as the program at Villanova University School of
Law that are open to tax professionals whether they are attorneys or account.
ants. While it is arguable that the same education may be proximately related
to two separate trades or businesses, the existence of such joint educational
opportunities tends to confirm the existence of a trade or business of "tax
professional."
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type of work" test for determining what is a new trade or business.! 3
But even more important is the fact that no one can know if tax
accounting is in fact a distinct trade or business, and, if it is; what
its parameters are. Even for a well-established, trade or business
like the legal profession, the precise parameters are unclear. Without a reasonably precise definition of "trade or business," the Commissioner's determination is de facto final. For example, although
some medical specialization has been held not to qualify one for a
new trade or business,64 4 there is no assurance that specialization in
law will be similarly treated.645 Suppose the Commissioneri denies
a deduction to a practicing attorney who earns a master of laws degree in taxation 640 because he feels that a tax attorney is in a trade
or business different from that of an attorney. Although any attorney may practice tax law, and although the analogy with medical
specialization is strong, it is quite likely that the Tax Court would
find that on this factual issue the taxpayer had not overcome the
presumptive correctness of the Commissioner's determination.
While the tasks of tax attorneys are substantially similar to those
of general practitioners, they are probably no less similar than those
of New York and California attorneys.
Many of the "new trade or business" cases could be said to
turn on the principle that whenever the state requires a license
for a position or profession, any education required to obtain that
license is not deductible since it qualifies one for a new trade or
business. 47 Neither the regulations nor the cases have articulated
this position and it is unsatisfactory for the licensed specialty within
a profession. This approach, however, does have the virtue of providing greater certainty in determining when one has moved from
one trade or business to another than does the "same general type
of work" test. However, as long as qualification for, rather than
actual performance of the duties of, the purported new trade or
business is the test of disallowance, even this licensing approach is
invalid. And licensing seems to produce harsh results in interstate situations. Thus, on the facts of Sharon, an attorney seeking
643. The usefulness of this test has been severely criticized. See notes 35657 and accompanying text supra.
644. See notes 197-249 and accompanying text supra.
645. See notes 520-48 and accompanying text supra.
646. For a discussion of post-graduate legal education, see notes 480-554 and
accompanying text supra.
647. This licensing approach would also explain the "apprentice" cases.
See, e.g., Antzoulatos v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1426 (1975); Glenn v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 270 (1974).
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to practice in another state does need a license in the second state
even if lawyers in all states perform the same general type of
work.648 Similarly, the barber who moves into another state requires a new license even though he really is staying in the same
6

trade or business.

49

In sum, it is submitted that the (b)(3) regulations are invalid
because they go beyond the underlying statute, turn on a hypothetical and theoretical qualification for an ill-defined concept of
"trade or business," and freeze "maxims of experience" into conclusive rules of law. These regulations were promulgated in response to several taxpayer victories, and, as interpreted by the
Commissioner and the Tax Court, they often present an insurmountable burden of proof for non-teachers.
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

A. Income Exclusion
It is submitted that the "primary purpose" approach of the
1958 regulations 680 and the "objective" approach of the present
regulations "' are unsatisfactory and that a fresh approach is needed.
Dissatisfied with the complexities, inequities, and disincentives
to continued education in the present regulations, 652 Congress in
1978 adopted a new section 127 of the Code, a limited new approach
to the taxation of education. 653 While a full discussion of section
127 is beyond the scope of this article, a brief summary is helpful
in the search for an alternative to the present regulations. This
new section permits an employee to exclude from his gross income
any payments he receives under a qualified "educational assistance
program" established by his employer. 65 4 To qualify, the program
must not discriminate in favor of employees who are officers, owners, or highly compensated, nor in favor of the dependents of such
648. For a discussion of Sharon, see notes 626-29 and accompanying text
supra.
649. See text accompanying notes 631-32 supra.
650. See notes 144-68 and accompanying text supra.
651. See notes 262-85 and accompanying text supra.
652. See S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 100-01 (1978).
653. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 164(a), 92 Stat. 2811
(codified at I.R.C. § 127).

654. I.R.C. § 127(a).
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employees. 655 The exclusion covers an employer's payments for
tuition, fees, books, supplies, and similar items, but does not extend to amounts paid for lodging, transportation, or tools which
the employee may keep.65 6 The new exclusion has no effect on the
prior education deductions available under sections 117, 162, or
212,657 except that no such deductions shall be allowed to the employee for any amount that is excluded from his gross income under
section 127.58 However, items which are not excluded under section 127 may be deducted or excluded if properly within sections
117, 162, or 212.659 There is no requirement that the education be
job-related or that it lead to a degree, 60 but the exclusion is not
applicable to education involving sports, games, or hobbies unless
such activities involve the business of the employer. 66 ' Although
the section 127 exclusion by its terms applies only to educational
benefits provided for employees, 66 2 the term "employees" is defined
broadly enough 663 to allow the benefits of section 127 to be enjoyed by sole proprietors or members of a partnership.6 4 Section
6
127 automatically expires at the end of 1983. 65
The primary limitation imposed by section 127 is that an educational assistance program must be nondiscriminatory. 68 8 Except
for the fact that the study of such things as sports, games, and hobbies generally will not give rise to the exclusion,0 7 no other limits
are placed on the employee-student's choice of courses.66 8 This
virtually unconditional exclusion contrasts sharply with the severe
limitations upon an educational expense deduction under section
655. Id. § 127(b)(2). In addition, payments made by the employer on behalf of owners of more than a five percent ownership interest, or their spouses
or dependents, may not exceed five percent of the employer's total expenditures
for educational assistance. Id.
656. Id. § 127(c)(1).

657. Id. § 127(c)(6).
658. Id. § 127(c)(7).
659. Id. § 127(c)(6).
660. S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1978).
661. Id.
662. See I.R.C. § 127(a).
663. Id. § 127(c)(2) (incorporating by reference the meaning given to "employee" by §401(c)(1) (1981) of the Code).
664. Id. § 127(c)(3).

665.
666.
667.
668.

Id.
See
See
See

§ 127(d).
note 655 and accompanying text supra.
note 654 and accompanying text supra.
S. RE'. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1978).
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1.162-5 of the regulations.66 9 Thus, for example, an accountant
could become a lawyer tax-free under a qualified section 127 program if his employer has such a plan.
The disparity in results between section 127 of the Code and
section 1.162-5 of the regulations cannot be adequately explained
by the qualification requirements for section 127 programs, 670 so
any future reforms should embody a consistent tax treatment of all
expenditures for education. If Congress is satisfied with the operation of section 127 and extends it beyond 1983, the inconsistency
between section 127 and section 1.162-5 of the regulations should
be eliminated by a liberalization of the requirements of the latter.
However, if Congress extends current deductibility to all educational expenditures, it will have made a significant departure from
the present requirement of a business nexus as a prerequisite to
deductibility. 671 In effect, Congress would then be subsidizing all
education as a desirable end per se. This approach, of course,
would eliminate the problems faced by taxpayers under the present
regulations, but such a reform of the existing law would require
specific legislation since educational expenses generally cannot
qualify for a deduction under the present section 162 unless such
expenditures are incurred as ordinary and necessary expenses of
the taxpayer's trade or business.6 72 However, should Congress be
dissatisfied with its experiment and allow section 127 to lapse as
scheduled in 1983, such action should not be considered to be a
ratification of the present regulations, but rather as a decision by
Congress that a tax subsidy for all types of education is not in the
national interest. Such a policy decision necessarily involves more
expansive considerations than those involved in Congress' choice
of the proper tax treatment of business-related education. Therefore, regardless of the fate of section 127, Congress should promptly
reevaluate the tax treatment of a business-related education under
the present Code.
B. Deduction for Business-Related Education
At about the same time that Congress added section 127 to the
Code, 673 the Comptroller General of the United States reported to
39.

669. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), Example 1, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B.
670.
671.
672.
673.

See notes 666-69 and accompanying text supra.
I.R.C. § 162(a) (1981).
Id.
See notes 652-69 and accompanying text supra.
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Congress' Joint Committee on Taxation in response to the Com6 74
mittee's request for suggestions of ways to simplify the tax laws.
The Comptroller General's report considered the scholarship and
fellowship provisions of section 117 and the educational deductions
of section 1.162-5 of the regulations.6 75 The Report reviewed several cases involving taxpayers' challenges to denials of deductions,
concluding that the amounts in controversy are usually quite
small 676 and that most of the taxpayers initiating such contests were
in relatively low tax brackets. 677 Although section 127 was added
to the Code in response to some of the same problems that the
Comptroller General's Report highlighted,678 the Comptroller General stated that the conclusions and recommendations of the Report
were not affected by Congress' passage of section 127.679
The Report began its analysis of the deductibility of job-related
expenses by proposing a two-part approach to the problem. First,
it would be determined whether a particular expenditure is a business expense or a nonbusiness, personal consumption expense; second, if the expenditure is business-related, it would then be
determined whether the expenditure is capital or ordinary in nature.6 a° This approach is consistent with the thesis of this article.
The Report also criticized the present regulations, which were
said to apply the capital versus ordinary analysis improperly to
purely personal expenditures.68 1 According to the Report, the capital expenditure concept is completely irrelevant in determining
whether an expenditure made by a natural person for his own
benefit should be deductible, particularly because such an approach
is inconsistent with the common understanding of the nature of

capital investments. 8

2

The Report stated:

674. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, CHANGES NEEDED IN THE TAX LAWS FOR SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS AND THE DEDUCTION OF JOB RELATED EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES (Oct. 31, 1978) (hereinafter cited as REPORT).
675.
676.
677.
678.

See id. at 8.
Id. at 50-52.
Id. at 46-49.
Compare id. at 1-2 with S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

100-01 (1978). See also note 652 and accompanying text supra.
679. See Letter from the Comptroller General of the United States to the
Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Taxation of the
Congress of the United States (Oct. 31, 1978), reprinted in REPORT, supra note
674.
680. REPORT, supra note 674, at 25.
681. See id. at 26.
682. See id.
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[T]he income tax has been viewed as a personal tax, imposed upon net taxable income regarded as a measure of
financial capacity. This means that for definition of income purposes the individual cannot be regarded as a
depreciable capital asset and any investment which he may
make in his own health, mobility, or education cannot
create a separate amortizable asset. Such expenses can only
be either
personal (consumption) in nature or business
"
related .6
While this analysis is theoretically accurate, the Report did not
discuss the possibility that the education involved might help to
produce an intangible asset such as a license to practice a profession.
The Report had several other. criticisms of the present regulations. The Report criticized the "maintains or improves" test of
the present regulations as difficult to understand.68s The Report
also objected to the "same general type of work" standard used in
the present regulations for determining whether the taxpayer remained in the same trade or business, pointing out that that concept is not defined except for teachers. 8 5 More generally, the Report stated that the present regulations improperly "treat job-related
educational expenses for courses of study which go beyond .the maintenance of basic, minimum skills in the same manner as purely
personal outlays. Neither kind of educational expense is deductible." 1s1 Finally, the Report criticized the confusing structure of
the regulations. 6 7
The Report opined that the unfairness and complexity of the
present regulations was the reason for the numerous challenges by
taxpayers to the Commissioner's disallowance of deductions and the
confusion of the law in this area. ss The Report's observations
concluded with an indictment of the present scheme of the regulations:
The limited deduction allowed by the regulations for educational costs incurred to maintain existing job skills, com683. Id. at 27 (footnote omitted).

684. Id. at 29-30. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B.
39. The Report also criticized the "primary purpose" approach of the 1958
regulations as difficult to administer. REPORT, supra note 674. at 27-28.
685. REPORT, supra note 674, at 29.
6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39.
686. REPORT, supra note 674, at 30.

See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(1), T.D.

687. Id. at 30-32.
688. See id. at 40.
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bined with the disallowance of a deduction for educational
costs incurred either to meet minimum job requirements
or to qualify for a new job or job promotion in the same
general line of business, has created a privileged use of
funds by persons engaged in the teaching profession with
no comparable advantage extended to persons employed in
accounting, law, and other business-related professions. 8 9
To alleviate the shortcomings found by the Comptroller General in the scheme of the existing regulations, the Report proposed
that a new section 192 should be added to the Code to eliminate
the distinction between ordinary business expenses and expenses
which qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business. 690 The
Report maintained that the present distinction between currently
business-related and allegedly capital-related expenditures should be
abandoned since this distinction generates the most controversy
under the present rules and because such a distinction is irrelevant
if one bases the theory of a personal income tax upon the ability
to pay.0 91 The proposed new section would allow a deduction for
certain educational expenses which are paid or incurred "in con689. Id. at 65.

690. Id. at 67. The proposed new section provides:
(a) Deduction allowed-There shall be allowed as a deduction
education expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
(1) in connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer as
a self-employed individual or
(2) in connection with the trade or business of the taxpayer
as an employee.
(b) Definition of education expenses-For purposes of this section, the term "education expenses" means only the expenses paid or
incurred by the taxpayer for
(1) tuition at an educational organization described in section
170(b)(1)(A)(ii)
(2) books and equipment, and
(3) clerical help
which are incident to the course of study for which the taxpayer is
enrolled.
(c) Definition of self-employed individuals-For purposes of this
section, the term "self-employed individual" means an individual who
receives gross earned income from the performance of personal services
(I) as the owner of the entire interest in an unincorporated
trade or business,
(2) as a partner in a partnership carrying on a trade business,
or
(3) as an independent commission agent or broker.
(d) Regulations-The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.
Id.
691. Id. at 67-68.
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nection with a trade or business of the taxpayer." 692 The Report
suggested that this language was not intended to create a new or
additional test, but rather would incorporate the standard-of section
162 of the present Code, which allows a deduction for ordinary and
necessary business expenses.6 93 In order to equate the tax treatment
of the self-employed with those who are not self-employed, the Report suggested that the deduction allowed by the proposed new
section should be deducted from gross income in computing ad69 4
justed gross income under section 62 of the Code.
The Department of the Treasury commented on a preliminary
draft of the Comptroller General's Report. 9 5 The scope of the
proposed new section was unclear to the Treasury; according to
the Treasury, a narrow interpretation would mean that a proximate relationship between the educational expense and the taxpayer's current trade or business would still have to be shown, but
expenses would be deductible even though they increase the taxpayer's earning power. 6 6 On the other hand, the Treasury suggested, a broader interpretation of the proposed new section would
permit a deduction against current income for any educational
expenditure of a taxpayer currently involved in a trade or business,
provided that the education undertaken is generally businessrelated. 697 The Treasury also felt that this approach would not
substantially alleviate the problems pointed out by the Comptroller
General's Report since the proposed new section would require the
inherently difficult differentiation of business-related capital expenditures from personal educational expenditures, a distinction
not required by the present regulations. 698
Further, the Treasury felt that allowing capitalization of educational expenses was an improper approach to the problem,
stating:
A solution to these difficulties proposed by some would be
to permit some educational expenditures that under current law are not deductible to be capitalized and recovered
over a subsequent period of earnings. Even though such
an approach may have theoretical appeal, there would be
692. See note 690 supra.
693. REPORT, supra note 674, at 68.

694. Id. at 69, 71. See I.R.C. § 62 (1981).
695. REPORT, supra note 674, at 82-89 app.
696. See id. at 87 app.
697. See id.
698. Id. at 88 app.
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difficulties in implementing such a proposal. For example,
it would be necessary to fashion rules to determine on an
equitable basis the proper period over which expenses
be amortized, the amortizable amounts applicable
'would
to separate
educational expenses, and the treatment of Unamortized expenses when the employee terminated em*ployment. It would also be necessary to determine
whether educational expenses should be deductible against
u .nearned, passive income and to what extent they should
be deductible against income earned in a trade or business
other than the one to which the education related.6 99
In response to the Treasury's critique of the preliminary draft of
its- Report, the Comptroller General's office maintained its position
that the capital expenditure concept has no bearing upon taxpayers'
educational expenses since taxpayers are the subjects of the income
tax, not its objects. 700 The Report restated the view that if there
is a public policy goal to be served by allowing a deduction for
any job-related education expense, the only relevant dichotomy
should be the distinction between consumption and ordinary business expenditures, as embodied in section 162 of the Code and the
proposed new section.7 0 1

Although the Treasury felt that the

Comptroller General's proposals constituted an unfair discrimination between those who prepared for their life's work while they
were already employed in a trade or business and those who completed their education before entering any trade or business, 702 the
Comptroller General maintained that there is a relevant difference
between these two situations: the person who has already entered
a: trade or business should be entitled to tax deductions for activities
in connection with that trade or business or any related trade or
business, but the person who has not yet entered the job market
703
is making what may be called "preparation for life" expenditures.
It is submitted that the dominant philosophy underlying the
proposals made by the Comptroller General's Report is administrative convenience. In effect, the proposals implicitly adopt the tests
of section 1.165-5(c) of the present regulations as the sole test of
deductibility; once the taxpayer has established himself in a trade
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

79.
80.
89 app.
80-81.
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or business, any education expense proximately related to that trade
or business would be deductible. 7°4 Because the Comptroller General felt that any concept of capitalization is inappropriate when
applied to a person, 7 05 the negative tests of section 1.162-5(b) of the
current regulations would be eliminated. 7 6 As the Treasury noted,
there would be serious problems of inequity between those taxpayers who completed their education on a full-time basis before
entering a trade or business and those taxpayers who completed
their education, at least in part, after entering a trade or business. 70 T
The contrast would be most vivid between those who prepared for
a career in law by going to a full-time day law school and those who
attended a night law school while employed in a law-related business. Because so many trades and businesses are law-related, 70
elimination of the present negative tests, as proposed by the Comptroller General, would virtually assure deduction of law school expenses for almost all who attended on a part-time basis. Furthermore, while, the Comptroller General's Report stated that the language in the proposed new statute, allowing a deduction for
expenses incurred in connection with a trade or business of the
taxpayer, was not intended to be an expansion of the phrase "carrying on'any trade or business" used in the present section 162(a), 7 0
the language of the proposed new section does seem broader and it is
quite likely that virtually any educational expenditure bearing some
relationship to the taxpayer's present trade or business would be
deductible.71 0 If the Commissioner attempts to construe that phrase
narrowly, then little will be saved by the proposed amendmentthe battleground will merely shift from its present focus upon
whether the education is in preparation for a new trade or business
to an inquiry into whether there is a proximate relationship between the education and the taxpayer's present trade or business.
Since the meaning of "trade or business" is not defined in the
Comptroller General's proposals, it would still be difficult for a
taxpayer to challenge successfully the Commissioner's denial of a
deduction.
704. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 39.
705. See note 690 and accompanying text supra.
706. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37-39.

707.
708.
709.
710.

See note 702 and accompanying text supra.
See REPORT, supra note 674, at 79.
See notes 692-93 and accompanying text supra.
See note 697 and accompanying text supra.
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4:-While the Comptroller General's Report is correct in its observation, that the present law is too complex and has created many
needless conflicts, 71 ' its proposed solution is still theoretically unsound. The more equitable and theoretically correct approach
Would be amortization or capitalization of long lived business-related educational expenditures. The administrative difficulties predicted by the Treasury in opposition to such an approach 712 could
be solved relatively easily.
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH: AMORTIZATION
A. Introduction
Under the present statutory pattern, section 162 of the Code
allows a deduction for the ordinary and necessary expenses of
carrying on any trade or business, 713 section 262 generally disallows
a deduction for personal expenditures, 714 and section 263 denies a
deduction for capital expenditures. 7 1 i
However, some assets
acquired by capital expenditures which are not properly the subject of current deductions under the Code may be depreciated or
amortized over the period of their useful lives under section 167.716
The present educational expense regulations attempt to balance
these provisions by conclusively presuming that all education which
qualifies the taxpayer for his present position or which qualifies him
for any other trade or business is either a personal expenditure or
an indivisible mixture of personal and capital expenditures.7 17 This
unsubstantiated assertion lies at the root of the problems in these
regulations.
Since many business expenditures other than education, such
as the entertainment 718 or traveling expense deductions, 719 have a
personal element, it is difficult to understand the absolute position
taken by section 1.162-5(b) of the regulations. Perhaps it was derived from the dictum in Welch v. Helvering,72o but Justice Car711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
supra.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
For

notes 688-89 and accompanying text supra.
supra note 674, at 87 app.
I.R.C. § 162(a) (1981).
id. § 262 (1981).
id. §263(a)(1) (1981).
id. § 167(a) (1981).
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37.
I.R.C. §274(a)(1) (1981).
id. § 162(a)(2) (1981).
a discussion of Welch, see notes 66-69 and accompanying text
REPORT,
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dozo clearly was speaking of a taxpayer's general education which
"enriches his culture," rather than education with a business
nexus. 7 21

Moreover, Justice Cardozo went on to say that education

is "akin to capital assets, like the goodwill of an old partnership." 72.
Perhaps it was derived from the early days of the income tax when
no deductions for educational expenses were allowed because such
expenditures were deemed to be personal.7 23 However, it does not
follow from the mere fact that some education is largely personal
that all education, including that related to business, should be
conclusively presumed to be personal.
It is submitted that a fresh approach to the deductibility of
education expenses is needed. In contrast to the present regulations,
which make almost all education expenses nondeductible because
of the inherently personal nature of some types of education, a more
satisfactory approach would be one based upon the assumption that
business-related education expenditures should be treated the same
as other business-related expenditures. The fact that some education may be personal should not prevent deductions for any educational expenses that are in fact business-related.
In the ensuing discussion of an alternative to the present regulations, it will be assumed that the term "personal" as used in
section 262 is the opposite of the term "trade or business" in section.
162.724

The fact that some education may have both a business

component and a personal component may warrant different tax
treatment for each separable aspect of education, but the existence
of mixed motives behind a taxpayer's continuing education should
not completely eliminate deductibility for that part of his education which is clearly business-related. Finally, it will be assumed
that business-related expenditures may be either expenses or capital
expenditures, depending upon whether the expected useful life of
72
the asset acquired is short or long. 5
721. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
722. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
723. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text supra.
724. The intermediate stage involving profit-seeking not connected with a
trade or business already established, such as the deduction for expenses incurred in the production of income under § 212, may be treated as a business
for purposes of this argument. If the following analysis is correct as to § 162
educational expenses, it would follow that similar reasoning would permit a
deduction under § 212 when the expense is proximately related to the taxpayer's profit-seeking activities. See notes 726-32 and accompanying text infra.
725. This is also the approach of the Comptroller General's Report. See
note 680 and accompanying text supra.
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Following this proposed approach, any expenditure would first
be characterized as personal or as business-related. Generally, this
characterization would be based upon the primary purpose of the
taxpayer in making the expenditure. 7- Although this all or nothing approach is simplest, some allocation between the personal and
the business aspects of a taxpayer's education is still theoretically
possible.72 7 The business-related expenditure could be currently
deducted as an expense if it has a short useful life; if it has a long
useful life, it would be a capital expenditure, amortizable under
72 s
section 167 over its useful life.
In sum, then, the proper tax treatment of any expenditure
should be determined by the business nexus and the useful life of
the education in question. For current deductibility, the requisite
nexus would need to be to a trade or business which the taxpayer
is currently carrying on. However, in theory, amortization of a
capital asset may be proper when it is proximately related either
to a present trade or business or to entry into a prospective trade
729
or business.
Under the approach suggested above, a combination of the
business nexus and useful life factors can produce four types of
expenditures, those which are: 1) short-lived and have no nexus
with a present business; 2) short-lived and have a nexus with a present business; 3) long-lived and have a nexus with a present business;
and 4) long-lived and have no nexus with a present business. The
first type can produce neither a current deduction nor amortization because of its lack of a nexus with a present business and because the brevity of the education precludes any qualification for a
new trade or business. Thus, the first type of expenditure can
never produce any deduction for the taxpayer. The second type,
on the other hand, clearly produces a current deduction. It is like
the Coughlin case, involving an education that is "evanescent"
rather than permanent and which is proximately related to the tax726. Such an approach is not unknown to the regulations. See Treas.

Reg. § 1.162-2(b), T.D. 6306, 1958-2 C.B. 64. The 1958 version of the educational expense regulations was consonant with this position. See notes 144-68
and' accompanying text supra.
727. See generally Halperin, supra note 605, at 869-73.
728. See note 716 and accompanying text supra.
729. A capital expenditure may be included in the cost basis of a new asset
under § 1012 or it may increase the adjusted basis of an old asset under
§ 1016(a)(1). See I.R.C. §§ 1012, 1016(a)(1) (1981). For an analysis of the
underlying basis for treatment of capital expenditures, see Gunn, supra note.
21, at 443-46.
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payer's present trade or business. 7 0 In this situation, the expenditures would clearly be deductible. 731 But when the asset acquired
by the expenditure is more permanent, as in the third and fourth
types of expenditures, conceptual problems arise because perma nency characterizes a capital expenditure rather than an expense.
These conceptual problems for long-lived leducation multiply because the business nexus can refer not only to the taxpayer's present
trade or business, as in the third type, or to a new trade or business
the taxpayer is preparing to enter, as in the fourth type; the 1onglived education may be proximately related to both a present: and
a new trade or business.
The third type of expenditure, in which the :edUcation involved is not evanescent, and which is -proximately related only to
the taxpayer's present trade or business, was involved in Hil.v.
Commissioner.7 2 Since the education for which, Hill sought a
deduction was to recertify her as a teacher for a ten year period,
amortization of the expenditure was the theoretically correct'way
for her to recover her costs. 78 3 However, the Hill court failed to
consider this possibility, perhaps because the Commissioner argued
only for total disallowance of the deduction, claiming that the education was personal.78 4 Had the Commissioner made the alternative
argument that Hill's expenditures for education were capital in
nature, the Hill court might have allowed recovery of the expenses
through amortization. Because the dollar amounts involved were
relatively small, 78 5 expense treatment may have been correct in
Hill since a capitalizable expenditure may be an expense if it produces no distortion of income. 736 Presumably, Hill is still the law;
730. For a discussion of Coughlin, see notes 124-40 and accompanying
text supra.
731. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(ii), Example 3,T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B.
89; id. § 1.162-5(e)(2), Example 1.
732. For a discussion of Hill, see notes 78-94 and accompanying text supra.
738. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
734. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
735. See Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 591

F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). The Sharon court,
drawing an analogy to § 1.162-12(a) of the regulations, suggested that small
capital expenditures might be currently deductible notwithstanding their capital
nature. 66 T.C. at 527 (dictum). See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a), T.D. 7198,
1972-2 C.B. 167-68. For further discussion of Sharon, see notes 759-69 & 778-88

and accompanying text infra.
736. One commenator has argued that capitalization treatment can be explained as part of the requirement that a taxpayer account for his income
in a manner that clearly reflects his income. See Gunn, supra note 21, at 442.
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at least within the broadly defined trade or business of teaching.
However, the third type of expenditure rarely arises in its pure
form because the Commissioner can usually assert that any longlived education, even if it is proximately related to the taxpayer's
present trade or business, qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or
business; since the present regulations disallow a deduction in this
context, the taxpayer could prevail only by overcoming the Commissioner's determination. 7 7 Thus, unless the Commissioner agrees
that the education in question cannot possibly qualify the taxpayer
for a new trade or business, no taxpayer can fit within the third
situation. This is unfortunate since it presents the clearest case for
amortization of an educational expenditure. Since the Commissioner does not have to justify his denial of amortization in the
relatively simple situation in which no new trade or business is
involved, he never has to justify his denial of amortization in the
more complex situations in which a new trade or business may be
involved.
By definition, expenditures of the fourth type have no connection with the taxpayer's present trade or business; 738 consequently,
no deduction is presently possible under section 162. 739 Thus,
section 1.162-5(b)(3) of the regulations properly denies a current
deduction for such educational expenditures.7 40 Furthermore,
capital expenditures are not deductible under section 162; instead,
they. are to be added to the basis of the asset which is acquired or
enhanced by the expenditure, possibly giving rise to depreciation
or amortization under section 167. The deficiency in the present
framework is not the disallowance of educational capital expenditures under section 1.162-5(b)(3) of the regulations, but rather it is
the unavailability of an amortization allowance for such expenditures under section 167. And this deficiency in the regulations is
compounded by their embodiment of the position that any hypothetical capital element will disallow a deduction even if there is
also a proximate relationship to a present trade or business.
It is the thesis of this article that amortization should be allowed for the costs of long-lived education. If the education has
no nexus to a present trade or business, the entire amount should
be amortized. If the education in question has a nexus with a
737. See notes 318-52 and accompanying text supra.
738. See notes 731-32 and accompanying text supra.
739. See notes 6-36 and accompanying text supra.
740. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 38-39.
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present trade or business in part, but is also related to some new
trade or business, an allocation should be made and each portion
treated separately. Since the validity of this overall approach depends on whether amortization of education can ever be proper,
the propriety of amortization of educational expenses must be
discussed.
B. Amortization of EducationalCosts
Few cases have discussed amortization of an intangible personal
improvement since few taxpayers have argued for amortization of
their educational expenditures. In Huene v. United States,7' a
taxpayer argued that his law school and business school expenses
should be deductible under the rule of Welsh v. United States and
similar cases. 742 The court found instead that Condit v. Commissioner was controlling, and denied any current deduction under the
1958 regulations.3
Huene had argued alternatively for amortization of his education expenses over his working life. 74 4 The court

summarily rejected this contention, stating: "Plaintiff cited no authority for this claim of amortization. I find none." 745
In Denman v. Commissioner,746 an engineer attempted to amortize the estimated cost of his engineering degree to his probable
retirement at age 65. 7 47 The Commissioner argued that the degree

was not "property" as contemplated within the meaning of section
167, but was rather the "end product of educational training, the
cost of which is a nondeductible personal expense under section
262." 74 The court did not discuss whether the degree was property, but the court did find that any educational expenditures not
within section 1.162-5(a) of the regulations were personal and thus
neither deductible nor capitalizable.7 49 Since the present regula741. 247 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
742. Id. at 569. For discussion of Welsh, see notes 172-89 and accompanying text supra. 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1962), aff'd per curiam, 329 F.2d
153 (6th Cir. 1964).
743. 247 F. Supp. at 569. For discussion of Condit, see notes 172-89 and
accompanying text supra.
744. 247 F. Supp. at 570.
745. Id. (citation omitted).
746. 48 T.C. 439 (1967).
747. Id. at 440.
748. Id. at 445.
749. Id. at 446. For discussion of the 1958 regulations, see notes 144-68
and accompanying text supra.
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tions acknowledge that there may be a capital element to educational
expenses, 750 the focus today would possibly be on how any capital
element of an expenditure could be separated from its personal
aspects rather than on whether the expenditure was personal.7 51 In
Bodley v. Commissioner75 2 a teacher attempted to deduct the cost
of attending law school753 and challenged the validity of the 1967

regulations. 754 The court denied a current deduction for the expenditure755 and went on to deny in short order the taxpayer's
alternate argument for a five year amortization of his law school
expenses, stating: "There is no legal or factual support for this contention. It must be rejected." 756 One other case, Hall v. Commissioner,7 5 7 summarily disallowed a taxpayer's attempt to capitalize
758
college and law school costs.
In Sharon v. Commissioner,759 the taxpayer, an attorney with

the Internal Revenue Service, 70 argued for either a current deduction or amortization of the costs of his college and law school education, 76 ' bar review courses in two states, 762 bar admission fees in
two states, 763 and admission to practice before the United States
Supreme Court.7 64 The taxpayer contended that his license to practice law in New York was an intangible asset, the acquisition costs
of which should be amortizable over the period between his admission to the bar and his expected retirement at age 65.765 He further
argued that the costs of acquiring that asset included his payments
for college and law school tuition, since graduation from an ac750. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 37.
751. See Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), aff'd per curiam,

591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). For discussion
of Sharon, see notes 759-69 & 778-88 and accompanying text infra.
752. 56 T.C. 1357 (.1971).
753. Id. at 1359.

754. Id. at 1361.
755. Id. at 1362.
756. Id. (citation omitted).
757. 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1970).
758. Id. at 1364.
759. For further discussion of Sharon, see notes 626-29 and accompanying
text supra; notes 778-88 and accompanying text infra.
760. 66 T.C. at 517.
761. Id. at 518-19.
762. Id. at 519-20.
763. Id.

764. Id. at 520.
765. Id. at 525. On appeal, the taxpayer conceded that no § 162 deduction was available for his education expenses, and sought only to amortize
those expenditures. See 591 F.2d at 1275.
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credited college and law school were prerequisites to taking the bar
examination.1 66 Although .there were four dissenting opinions in
the Tax Court, there was no dissent from the denial of a deduction
for, or amortization of, his college and law school costs. 7 7 The Tax
Court opined that his college and law school expenses were personal
in that they provided the taxpayer with a general education beneficial to him in a wide variety of ways other than preparation for
his chosen career.7 68 The court could find no " 'rational' or workable basis for any allocation of this inseparable aggregate between
the nondeductible personal component and a deductible component
of the total expense." 769
The Sharon court borrowed this concept from Fausner v. Commissioner.770 Fausner dealt with an airline pilot who sought a deduction for his commuting costs on the grounds that he had to carry
his flight equipment with him while commuting.7 7 ' The Fausner
court suggested that an allocation between the deductible and nondeductible components of a single activity may be feasible if the
taxpayer could show some additional expense incurred due to the
deductible component of the activity, but no such allocation was
found possible on the facts of Fausner.772 If section 1.162-5(b)(1)
of the regulations is correct in its assertion that any education which
qualifies a taxpayer for the minimum standards of a trade or business or for a new trade or business is wholly nondeductible because
it contains a personal component that cannot be separated from its
capital component, then Fausner would apply to the taxpayer in
Sharon.
When a taxpayer attempted to justify a deduction for his college
education expenditures in Carroll v. Commissioner,77 the court
based its denial of deductibility on the assumption that a general
education is a personal responsibility that "broadens one's understanding and increases his appreciation of his social and cultural
environment." 774 However, the Carrollcourt went on to hold that
766.
767.
senting);
senting).
768.
769.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.

66 T.C. at 525.
See id. at 534-36 (Dawson, C.J., dissenting); id. at 536 (Scott, J., disid. at 536-37 (Irwin, J., dissenting); id. at 537-38 (Sterrett, J., disId. at 525-26.
Id. at 526.
413 U.S. 838 (1973) (per curiam).
Id. at 838.
Id. at 839.
51 T.C. 213 (1968), af'd, 418 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1969).
51 T.C. at 216.
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the taxpayer had not borne the burden of showing a proximate relationship between his trade or business and any of the courses he
took.7 7T

Although the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court,

76

the government's brief to the court of appeals noted that the costs
of at least some of his courses might have been deductible had the
taxpayer shown the requisite relationship between the particular
courses and his trade or business. 777 An allocation between business
and personal education would have been possible in Carroll since
the taxpayer could show separate, itemized expenses for his enrollment in business-related courses. If this is true, then Fausner is
not applicable in this context because an allocation can be made.
The Tax Court in Sharon deprived the taxpayer of the opportunity
to make such a showing by its summary determination that no such
allocation was possible. 778 Assuming that the Carroll court was
correct concerning the personal nature of a general college education, neither Sharon court discussed why a law school education,
which by definition has an overriding vocational orientation, is
equally personal. Acting on the questionable assumption that educationwhich qualifies one for a new trade or business is conclusively
personal, the Tax Court opined in Sharon that, because section 262
is preeminent over section 167, no amortization of educational expenses could be possible. 779 The Tax Court permitted amortization
of Sharon's twenty-five dollar fee paid to New York for his license to
practice law there,780 permitted amortization of the fees paid to
78
California for his subsequent admission to the California bar, '
and allowed amortization of the fees paid for his admission to the
United States Supreme Court.7 8 2 The court disallowed any deduction for his bar review courses in New York 788 and California.7 8 4

The taxpayer in Sharon had argued for amortization over the number of years between his law school graduation and his age 65,
when he hoped to retire. 7 " As to those expenses for which the
Tax Court permitted amortization, the court used the period of
775.
776.
777.
778.
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.

Id. at 217.
See Carroll v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 91, 95 (7th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 95.
See note 769 and accompanying text supra.
66 T.C. at 526.
Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 529.

785. Id. at 525.
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the taxpayer's life expectancy since he had not shown that a shorter
useful life was proper, although he hoped to retire at age 65.716
The court offered no reason why it allowed amortization of
some of the costs of obtaining a license to practice law but not of
other costs which were equally necessary to obtain that same license, other than its conclusion that no education could be businessrelated unless it fit within the confines of section 1.162-5 of the
regulations. 71 The Ninth Circuit accepted these conclusions of
the Tax Court without an analysis of why the taxpayer's educa8s
tion was personal although vocationally oriented.
Although the courts have not been sympathetic to most taxpayers' requests for capitalization or amortization of their businessrelated educational expenditures, 8 9 several commentators have
taken the view that such treatment is necessary to perfect the definition of net taxable income. 70 Some of the commentators have
taken the view that the major reason that amortization of educational expenses has not been permitted has been the unascertainable
useful life of such expenditures. 79 1 However, even before Sharon,
amortization over an individual's life expectancy had been permitted for some business-related capital expenditures although they
were personal in nature.7 92 In light of such precedents, the denial
of amortization treatment for long-lived educational expenditures
can no longer be justified on the basis of the unascertainable useful

life of such expenditures.
One commentator has explored the principle that a capital
expenditure must create or enhance an asset in the context of the
786. Id. at 530. Two of the dissenters objected to the Tax Court's allowance of amortization to the taxpayer's age 65, since they felt that there was
no reasonable basis for ascertaining the life of a license to practice law. See
66 T.C. at 536 (Scott, J., dissenting); id. at 537-38 (Sterrett, J., dissenting).
787. See id. at 530.
788. 591 F.2d at 1275.
789. See notes 741-58 and accompanying text supra.
790. See, e.g., R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 85 (1964); Goode,
Tax Treatment of Individual Expenditures for Education and Research, 56
AM. EcON. REv. PAPERS & PRoc. 208, 209-10 (1966); McNulty, supra note 5,
at 16, 26-32; Wolfman, supra note 605, at 546-47.
791. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 43 at 29-30; Wolfman, supra note 117, at

1093 & 1112.

792. See, e.g., Hampton Pontiac, Inc. v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1073
(D.S.C. 1969); Heigerick v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 475 (1966). In Hampton
Pontiac, the taxpayer, an auto dealer, was allowed to amortize the cost of his
dealership franchise over his projected life expectancy. 294 F. Supp. at 1079.
In Heigerick, a doctor unsuccessfully contested the disallowance of a § 162 (a)
deduction for medical staff fees paid by him to a hospital. 45 T.C. at 478-79.
The taxpayer in Heigerick was allowed, however, an amortization deduction
for the fees. Id. at 478. See generally Wolfman, supra note 605, at 547-48.
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He starts from

the proposition that an education is not an asset because it is not
transferable. 7 4 It is submitted, however, that to fail to recognize
education as an asset is to disregard the two distinct uses of the
term "education." While education may refer to the actual goods
and services acquired by an individual, such as classroom instruction
and books, it may also refer to the goals of the learning processthe accumulation of information, the integration of new information
with prior knowledge, and the development of the skills and
methodology needed to practice a profession or engage in a business. 795

This distinction between the goods and services purchased

and the goal of such purchases may be illustrated by an analogy
to the relationship between the cost of advertising and the increase
in goodwill that advertising may help to develop. 79 6 Focusing on
the limited definition of education as merely a purchase of teaching
services ignores the broader meaning of education as an ongoing
accumulation of knowledge forming an essential constituent of a
license to practice a profession. When education is viewed in its
narrow sense, its costs could only be deductible, if at all, as current
expenses; in its broader sense, since education expenses may serve
to create or enhance any asset, any tax benefit could be through
amortization.
Reasoning from his premise that education is not an asset, 797
the commentator's position is that since educational expenditures
cannot properly be said to create or enhance an asset, the cases
denying current expense deductions for such payments must be
793. See Gunn, supra note 21, at 472-81. See also Commissioner v. Lincoln
Say. and Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971) (distinction between capital
expenditure and currently deductible expense is whether payment serves to
"create or enhance" an asset).
794. Gunn, supra note 21, at 473-74. Professor Gunn would also include
legal protection against the interference of others in his characterization of
the nature of an asset. Id. at 472. Although it would be unusual to find an
instance in which there could be interference with one's completed education,
it is the license to practice a profession, not the education which leads to the
license, which is an asset according to the thesis of this article. Moreover,

it is submitted that legal prohibitions against the unlicensed practice of a
profession such as medicine or law should be recognized as protection from the
unlawful interference of others in accordance with Professor Gunn's definition
of an asset.
795. See Note, Deductibility of Educational Expenses, 6 STAN. L. REv.

547, 550 (1954).

. 796. See id. at 550-51. Although Professor Gunn acknowledges this in the
context of expenditures for advertising and goodwill, he does not recognize the
distinction in the analogous relationship between the specific purchases and
the' goals of education. See Gunn, supra note 21, at 484, 489.

,797. See note 794 and accompanying text supra.
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explained on some grounds other than a recognition that such
expenditures should be recouped through capitalization. 798 This
view does not seem to recognize that educational capital expenditures that have a connection with the taxpayer's trade or business
may be said to enhance an asset and that an expenditure which
qualifies one for a new trade or business may be said to create an
asset.
Having concluded that educational expenses cannot be characterized as capital expenditures,7 99 the commentator explains their
nondeductibility on the grounds of their personal nature and their
lack of a nexus with a present trade or business.8 0 Moreover, he
does not appear to consider the possibility of an allowance of a
partial deduction to the extent that the education is business-related.8 0 ' His position may best be illustrated through a review
of his discussion of Primuth v. Commissioner.02 In Primuth, the
taxpayer, a business executive, had retained a consulting firm to
assist him in finding a new executive position.8 03 The consultant's
efforts led to several job offers, one of which the taxpayer accepted. 8°0 The Service disallowed his attempted deduction of the
consultant's fee as a nondeductible personal expense. 05 The Tax
Court permitted the deduction, 8°0 holding that since one may be in
the trade or business of being an employee, the expenses of moving
from one position to another within that trade or business should
be deductible. 0 7 The court reasoned that:
798. Gunn, supra note 21, at 472. It would appear that Professor Gunn's
conclusion that "capital expenditure concepts need play no part in the educational expense area" is founded primarily upon his observation that the majority of the cases disallowing current deductions for educational expenses were
decided not on the grounds that such expenditures were capital in nature, but
instead on the premise that such payments were personal rather than businessrelated. See id. at 477. It is submitted that the relative paucity of authority
for the proposition that educational expenses may be capital in nature may
only be indicative of the fact that few courts have acknowledged that the costs
of preparing for a profession could be amortized over one's expected life span.
Once such a period for amortization is recognized, however, there would appear
to be no obstacles to capitalization of educational expenses. See note 792 and
accompanying text supra.
799. Gunn, supra note 21, at 477. See note 798 supra.
800. Gunn, supra note 21, at 479-80.
801. See id. at 479.
802. 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
803. Id. at 374-75.
804. Id. at 376.
805. Id. at 377.
806. Id. at 379.
807. Id. at 377-79.
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[T]he expense had no personal overtones, led to no position requiring greater or different qualifications than the
one given up, and did not result in the acquisition of any
asset as that term has been used in our income tax laws.
It was expended for the narrowest and most limited purpose. It was an expense which must be deemed ordinary
and necessary from every realistic point of view in today's
marketplace where corporate executives change employers
with a noticeable degree of frequency. 0 8
It is submitted, however, that the Tax Court failed to distinguish between the personal and the capital aspects of educational
expenditures. As the court stated:
[T]he expenditure is basically personal in nature, analogous perhaps to general educational expenses. However, here we have an expense which was paid for the
limited purpose of securing employment at a particular
time and whose direct relationship to the obtaining of
said employment cannot be questioned. There was no
element in incurring the expense of qualifying for a new
trade or business or better preparing oneself to take advantage of any number of unknown opportunities or of
making life more enjoyable generally. Nor is it analogous
to commuting expenses which are dependent in extent
upon one's own convenience in choosing a personal residence. An employment fee by its very nature bears no
relationship to a personal expense but instead bears a direct relationship to the receipt of income. Personal expenses should be limited to those which are not acquisitive
in character from an income-producing point of view.809
In accordance with such reasoning, while a general education may
be basically personal, a vocationally oriented education would certainly be "acquisitive in character from an income-producing point
of view." The relevant inquiry for the latter type of education,
then, should be whether the tax law should permit amortization or
expense deductions for such expenditures.
The commentator would explain Primuth on the grounds
that the fees were paid solely to secure employment at a specific
time and were therefore not personal: "The inference is clearly
that the costs of qualifying for a new trade or business are per808. Id. at 379.

809. Id. at 380-81 (emphasis added).
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sonal." 810 Noting that a concurring opinion in Primuth stated
that expenses incurred in preparation for a new field of endeavor
are capital in nature, he concludes: "Since the cost of preparation
for engaging in a new field of endeavor will always be nondeductible
because [it is] not an expense of an existing trade or business, it
seems to make little practical difference whether such costs are or
are not capital expenditures, so long as amortization of such costs
is not allowed." 811

It is submitted that the commentator's approach begs the question of deductibility. Since a deduction is only possible for business-related expenses 812 or capital expenditures, 813 his argument
seems to proceed from the assumption that, since no capitalization
of educational expenses is possible, any such expenditures that are
not proximately related to the taxpayer's present trade or business
are not deductible. It would therefore appear that his position
does not address the issue of whether a deduction should be allowed
for education which is not only related to a present trade or business but which also may qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or
business. Moreover, he never explains why amortization should
never be permitted if the cost is related to a future business alone.
This brief survey of the judicial and administrative reactions
to attempts to amortize educational costs has endeavored to show
that the courts and the commentators deny an amortization allowance for educational expenditures principally upon the a priori
assumption that they cannot be amortized. Once the authorities
can abandon this assumption, little reason will remain to deny
amortization of educational expenses in appropriate cases. There
would appear to be no reason why educational costs should not be
treated the same as other expenses are treated; business-related educational expenses should be currently deductible if the education
is short-lived or amortizable if the education is long-lived.
C. Some Problems with Amortization

Manifestly, once it is established that amortization may be
proper for some educational costs, the period over which amortization deductions may be taken becomes an issue. The taxpayer's
810. Gunn, supra note 21, at 480 n.170.
811. Id. at 481 n.171. See Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 382
(1970) (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
812. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1981).
813. See id. § 167(a) (1981).
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actuarial life span has been approved as the proper amortizationl
period for non-educational costs of establishing one's self in a business or profession. 14 A forty or fifty year period, however, provides only a very small annual recovery. Discounting future deductions to present value would reduce the value of the recovery
even more. In addition, even if an education is long-lived in that
it leads to a lifetime license to practice a profession, at least some
portion of the education is evanescent; 815 the same education which
qualifies one for a new profession also has a component of current
knowledge. For example, although a law school education imparts
long-lived, substantive knowledge in various areas of the law, no
fault divorce, comparative negligence, and choice of law principles
are examples of a few areas of the law in which dramatic changes
have occurred in recent years. It would therefore appear that
such changes in the law render a part of legal education evanescent.
Since there are both permanent and evanescent aspects to a legal
education, an allocation of the costs of education between them
would be appropriate to determine the tax consequences of each
facet of such education. In most cases, however, there would be
no rational basis upon which to make such an allocation. While
only a minimal allocation of the expenditure to the evanescent parts
of an education would seem to be proper, an exact figure would
be difficult to ascertain. If, however, the burden of proof were
placed upon the taxpayer to show a useful life of the education that
is shorter than his actuarial life or to show a proper allocation between expense treatment and amortization, much of the advantages
of amortization treatment would be lost.
Despite these practical difficulties, it is submitted that a proper
approach could be devised within the framework of the present
statute. While a major thesis of this article has been that amortization is the proper tax treatment for certain educational costs, the
concept of acceleration of amortization is beyond the scope of this
discussion. However, equally difficult amortization problems have
81
been solved by statute. 6
814. See note 792 and accompanying text supra.
815. See notes 795-96 and accompanying text supra.
816. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 174(b) (1976) (amortization of certain research and

experimental expenditures); id. § 248 (1976) (amortization of expenses of organizing a corporation). The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 has significantly altered the "useful life" concept in the depreciation of tangible
assets for all taxable years after 1980. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201(a), 95 Stat. 203 (to be codified in I.R.C. § 168).
Perhaps education should be regarded as five year property or ten year property

even though it is intangible.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Educational expenditures have presented theoretical and prac.tical problems almost from the inception of the income tax.8 17 Although all education has a personal element since the individual
taxpayer is personally enriched by his education,81 8 it cannot be
denied that education also has a substantial business or profit-seeking element. These two aspects of education should have different
tax consequences, but, except for short refresher courses, the Commissioner and the Tax Court have failed to distinguish between
them in their conclusive presumption of the predominance of
the personal element.81 9 This article calls for a more reasonable
balance whenever a substantial business element has been shown.
The 1958 regulations generally adopted the position of Hill 820
and Coughlin 821 that educational expenditures are like other expenditures in the business context.82 2 As applied by the courts,
the primary purpose test of the 1958 regulations led to irreconcilable results since virtually identical fact patterns produced different results. 23 The Commissioner's response came in 1967 with
the issuance of the current regulations.8 24 The results under the
current regulations are predictable, but only because the taxpayer
almost always loses whenever the Commissioner contests an attempted deduction1s
Although. the regulations have been consistently upheld, most cases have been pro se and were not appealed
due to the small sums involved.8 26 In general, there has been little
analysis of the issues by either the courts or the commentators.
This article has questioned the validity of the present regulations and suggests that new regulations should be promulgated
which recognize the substantial business nexus of many educational
expenditures which are presently not deductible.8 27 Any new
817. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text supra.
818. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
819. See notes 382-423 and accompanying text supra.
820. For discussion of Hill, see notes 78-94 and accompanying text supra.
821. For discussion of Coughlin, see notes 124-40 and accompanying text
supra.
822. For a discussion of the 1958 regulations, see notes 144-68 and accompanying text supra.
823. See notes 172-89 and accompanying text supra.
824. For discussion of the 1967 regulations, see notes 262-423 and accompanying text supra.
825. See notes 398-420 and accompanying text supra.
826. See notes 569-72 and accompanying text supra.
827. See notes 555-649 and accompanying text supra.
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regulations should reconcile the business deduction provision of
section 162 with the disallowance for personal expenses in section
262.
The general disallowance of preferential tax treatment of educational costs must be changed. It led to cases like Cangelosi, in
which the Commissioner and the Tax Court unfairly pushed the
taxpayer's burden of proof to an illogical extreme.8 28 It led to the
bizarre readings of the regulations by the Commissioner and the
Tax Court in Toner.829 It led to the one-sided and unfair meaning
given to the phrase, "qualifying for a new trade or business" in Roussel.s 3° It led the Tax Court to conclude in Sharon that lawyers in
New York do not do the same general type of work as lawyers in
California. 8 ' It is submitted that the absurdities inherent in the
present framework suggest a pressing need for a more rational approach to the longstanding problem of the tax consequences of
educational expenditures.
828. For a discussion of Cangelosi, see notes 611-20 and accompanying text

supra.

829. For a discussion of Toner, see notes 302-05 & 346-52 and accompanying text supra.
830. For a discussion of Roussel, see notes 590-95 and accompanying text

supra.

831. For a discussion of Sharon, see notes 626-29, 759-69 & 776-88 and accompanying text supra.
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